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Abstract
This thesis is about the nature of proofs in mathematics as it is practiced,
contrasting the informal proofs found in practice with formal proofs in for-
mal systems. In the first chapter I present a new argument against the
Formalist-Reductionist view that informal proofs are justified as rigorous
and correct by corresponding to formal counterparts. The second chapter
builds on this to reject arguments from Go¨del’s paradox and incompleteness
theorems to the claim that mathematics is inherently inconsistent, basing
my objections on the complexities of the process of formalisation. Chapter
3 looks into the relationship between proofs and the development of the
mathematical concepts that feature in them. I deploy Waismann’s notion of
open texture in the case of mathematical concepts, and discuss both Lakatos
and Kneebone’s dialectical philosophies of mathematics. I then argue that
we can apply work from conceptual engineering to the relationship between
formal and informal mathematics. The fourth chapter argues for the im-
portance of mathematical knowledge-how and emphasises the primary role
of the activity of proving in securing mathematical knowledge. In the final
chapter I develop an account of mathematical knowledge based on virtue
epistemology, which I argue provides a better view of proofs and mathemat-
ical rigour.
3
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful for the extensive support, encouragement, feedback and
friendship I’ve benefitted from in the last three years in producing this the-
sis. First of all, I would like to thank the family of Caroline Elder for the
generosity in providing the Caroline Elder PG scholarship in her memory.
Thanks also for the further SASP scholarship I received, as well as travel
funding from the Indo-European Research Training Network in Logic.
Thanks to my supervisors Aaron Cotnoir and Patrick Greenough, who have
both been fantastic throughout and have had a huge influence on my think-
ing and writing in this thesis. Their comments and feedback have been
invaluable and led to massive improvements in the work presented here.
My particular interest in proofs and the philosophy of mathematical prac-
tice started under the supervision of Benedikt Lo¨we while doing the Master
of Logic in Amsterdam. In particular, the first two chapters were strongly
influenced by Benedikt and the work I did there for my master’s thesis, so
many thanks.
I have also had direct feedback on previous drafts from Noah Friedman-
Biglin, Bruno Jacinto, Josh Habgood-Coote, A´sgeir Berg Matth´ıasson, Alex
Yates, Caroline Torpe Touborg, Mark Bowker, Ryo Ito, Patrik Hummel,
Brian King, Claire Field, Morgan Thomas, Chris Sangwin and Colin Rit-
tberg. Many thanks to all.
I would also like to thank Jody Azzouni who was a great help for chap-
ters 1 and 5, and who provided excellent comments and discussion on the
overgeneration problem which led to a more robust objection. Thanks also
to Robert Thomas, Holger Andreas and Peter Verde´e, who provided use-
ful feedback on chapters 1 and 2 towards publication. Thanks too to three
anonymous referees in writing reports on earlier versions of the first two
chapters.
Thanks to Stephen Read for extra guidance and discussion on the philoso-
phy of mathematics, as well as for running the primary seminars I have been
4
involved with in Arche´. Thanks also to Lynn Hynd for the organisational
brilliance in keeping Arche´ running, and to the other staff who ran the phi-
losophy department over the last three years: Laura, Shaun, Emmy, Lucy,
Rhona and Katie.
The work in chapter 4 formed part of the content of a joint Prize Semi-
nar for St Andrews undergraduates with Josh Habgood-Coote, so thanks to
him for the huge amount of feedback and help on knowing-how. Thanks
also to the students who attended, asked insightful questions and pushed us
on many philosophical points.
The work in chapter 5 was presented alongside Colin Rittberg’s work on the-
oretical virtues for set theory theory as a three-lecture series in Aberdeen.
Thanks to Colin for extensive discussion in the run up to these and for invit-
ing me to Brussels twice. Anti-thanks to ISIS who tried to stop us.
Thanks to audiences at the many talks I’ve given in St Andrews and Stirling,
as well as audiences and organisers in Ume˚a, Bristol, Munich, Cambridge,
Storrs, New Delhi, Paris, Brussels and Aberdeen. Thanks also to the wider
St Andrews community, members of the philosophy department and Arche´,
for being great people.
I spent two months in 2014 at the University of Connecticut, with grati-
tude to the Arche´ Travel Fund which paid for it. I would like to thank those
who I interacted with while there and who made me incredibly welcome: Jc
Beall, Dave Ripley, Morgan Thomas, Nathan Kellen, Hanna Gunn, Andrew
Parisi, Damir Dzhafarov, Reed Solomon, Brown Westrick, Daniel Silvermint,
Keith Simmons, Nate Sheff and Suzy Killmister. I am also really thankful
to the many people who welcomed me into their community in Coventry
CT, with special thanks to Holly Parker and Joram Echeles.
Thanks to Aikman’s and Rendez-Vous for the good living.
I am surrounded by friends who have made doing a PhD possible. In addi-
tion to those mentioned above, many thanks to Joe Slater, Laurence Carrick,
Mat Chantry, Ally Holmes, Calum McConnell, Carley Hollis, Elspeth Gille-
spie, Alex Purser, Beth Allison, Bella Bandell, Ste Broadrick, Paul Black,
Alper Yavuz, Marissa Wallin, Gabriela Rino Nesin, Maja Jaakson, Aadil
Kurji, Nathaniel Forde, Jessica Olsen, Hraban Luyat, Ravi Thakral, Ryan
Nefdt and the many others I have failed to mention. You’re all top bananas.
Most of all, I am indebted to my family, in particular mum & Chris, dad and
Thecla: thank you all. Finally, thanks to Lea who has given me confidence,
patience, love and support over the last three years.
5
Publication
A version of chapter one has appeared in Philosophia Mathematica in 2015
with the title “A Problem with the Dependence of Formal Proofs on Infor-
mal Proofs”. This is in the bibliography under (Tanswell 2015).
A version of chapter two is forthcoming in the collection Logical Studies
of Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science and Mathematics, edited by Holger
Andreas & Peter Verde´e as part of Springer’s Trends in Logic series, with
the title “Saving Proof from Paradox: Go¨del’s Paradox and the Inconsis-
tency of Informal Mathematics”. This is in the bibliography under (Tanswell
forthcoming).
6
Contents
Introduction 9
0.1 The Twin Faces of Orthodoxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
0.2 The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice . . . . . . . . . . . 14
0.3 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1 A Problem with the Dependence of Informal Proofs on For-
mal Proofs 20
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.2 Minimal Desiderata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.3 Azzouni’s Derivation-Indicator View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4 A Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.5 Agent-Independent Derivation-Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.6 Agent-Dependent Derivation-Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2 Saving Proof from Paradox 41
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2 Formal and Informal Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.3 Go¨del’s Paradox and Beall’s Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4 Priest’s Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.5 Formalising Mathematics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.5.1 A First Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.5.2 A Second Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.6 On Mathematical Super-Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.7 Fragmented Formalisations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.8 On The Formal and The Informal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3 Mathematical Concepts 59
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2 Waismann and Open Texture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.3 Lakatos and Proofs & Refutations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.3.1 A Briefing on the Proof and Responses to Counterex-
amples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
7
3.3.2 Concepts and a Dialectical Philosophy of Mathematics 74
3.3.3 Fallibilism and Formality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.4 Kneebone on Mathematics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.5 The Open Texture of Mathematical Concepts . . . . . . . . . 88
3.6 Conceptual Engineering in Mathematics . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.7 Haslanger’s Manifest and Operative Concepts . . . . . . . . . 96
3.8 Scharp on Replacing Defective Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.9 The Concepts of Mathematics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.10 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4 Mathematical Know-How 113
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.2 Rav and Pythiagora the Oracular Computer . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.3 Knowing-How and Knowing-That . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.4 Mathematical Know-How . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.5 Lo¨we & Mu¨ller on Mathematical Skills . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.6 Proving in Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
4.6.1 Larvor’s Inferential Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
4.6.2 Proving as an Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
4.7 Conclusion: Knowing How to Prove It . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5 A Virtue Approach to Mathematical Epistemology 157
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.2 The Moderate Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
5.3 Virtue Epistemology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
5.3.1 Virtue Reliabilism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
5.3.2 Virtue Responsibilism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
5.3.3 Hybrid Virtue Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
5.3.4 Epistemic Vices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
5.4 The Strong Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
5.5 Virtues and Proving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
5.6 Rigour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
5.7 Mathematical Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
5.8 Case Study: Mochizuki and the abc Conjecture . . . . . . . . 187
5.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Conclusion 196
Bibliography 199
8
Introduction
Some will think that a mathematical argument either is a proof or
is not a proof. In the context of elementary analysis I disagree,
and believe instead that the proper role of a proof is to carry
reasonable conviction to one’s intended audience. It seems to me
that mathematical rigor is like clothing: in its style it ought to
suit the occasion, and it diminishes comfort and restricts freedom
of movement if it is either too loose or too tight.
— George F. Simmons (Simmons 1991, p. xi)
Proofs have many roles and functions in mathematics and beyond. They
are one of the central and long-standing ways to establish mathematical
truths and eradicate any rational doubt. They can also serve to convince a
stubborn-but-fair audience and to explain why some mathematical state-
ment is true. They contain the methods, techniques and know-how of
mathematics. They make explicit the logical dependencies of mathematical
propositions. They can educate students to understand particular areas of
mathematics and demonstrate acceptable inferential actions at work. They
can be used to test the boundaries of the concepts they use and point to
improvements that might be made. They can step beyond those boundaries
and lead us into paradox. They can tell an engaging mathematical story
and be elegant and beautiful. Finally, they make for a good topic for three
years of philosophy PhD research.
This thesis is about proofs as found in all mathematical settings, from
napkin scribbles to classrooms, and from journal articles to computer-coded
derivations. Naturally, proofs in these different settings vary a great deal
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in how they are presented, and this is something which will be of major
importance throughout the thesis. In particular, there is a difference to be
made between the idealised notion of proof, where each step is explicit and
endorsed by some underlying formal system, and the proofs that mathemati-
cians generally produce in practice. Following the literature, I will therefore
distinguish between these as formal proofs and informal proofs. I will save
an exploration of this distinction for the start of the first chapter.
In the coming five chapters I will be looking at many of the functions of
proofs in turn and in relation to one another. Each of the functions for proofs
will have associated guiding philosophical questions we will want answers to.
Amongst these, though, three topics come to the fore as those which form
the central problems of the thesis and relate to many of the above roles
for proofs. First of all, there is the question of the formality or informality
of proofs and how this affects whether the proofs are correct and rigorous.
Secondly, I shall consider the question of what exactly mathematical rigour
is. Thirdly, the question of the role of proofs and proving in our possession
of mathematical knowledge and in obtaining that knowledge.
The answers that I shall be giving to these questions will stand in con-
trast to two strands of orthodox thinking in the philosophy of mathematics,
which will be worth setting out before we begin with the main body of the
thesis.
0.1 The Twin Faces of Orthodoxy
In (Kitcher & Aspray 1988), Kitcher & Aspray offer an “opinionated in-
troduction” to the philosophy of mathematics, dividing up contemporary
thinking into two streams of thought: the mainstream tradition and the
maverick tradition. The first of these is taken to be following up on the
Fregean quest for foundations, and is characterised in (Ernest 1997) as best
represented by the work found in the edited volume (Benacerraf & Putnam
1983) and will be discussed now. Kitcher & Aspray take the second stream
to originate with Lakatos, and has since broadly grown into the philosophy
of mathematical practice. We will return to that shortly, and Lakatos in
detail in chapter 3.
I want to actually separate out two general families of views captured
under the heading of the mainstream, orthodox tradition for philosophy of
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mathematics. The first set of views, which I shall simply call the Tradition-
alist approach, concerns the kind of questions we are interested in about
mathematical knowledge, focusing on the a priori and privileging knowledge
of mathematical truths. The second view is the associated take on math-
ematical proofs, which I shall refer to as the Formalist-Reductionist view,
which wants proofs to primarily be understood in terms of formal deriva-
tions. This latter umbrella term is taken from (Antonutti Marfori 2010, p.
262) and is intended to capture the focus on formal proofs of the approach
while avoiding conflation with the formalist position in the philosophy of
mathematics. Let us consider these twin faces of orthodoxy in turn.
The first implicit trend in the philosophy of mathematics, which I have
termed the ‘Traditionalist view’, is about the kind of questions that philoso-
phy of mathematics is interested in, in particular in relation to mathematical
knowledge. Primarily, these seem to be about the a priori nature of mathe-
matical knowledge, what enables us to possess it generally and what enables
us to have access to the objects of mathematics to allow for such knowledge
to begin with. There are great historical precedents for these questions, as
these seem to be the kind of questions which concern almost all major fig-
ures in the historical consideration of the nature of mathematics, from Plato
to Descartes, through to Kant and beyond. As a result of the emphasis on
the ontology of mathematics and the problem of how we access it in order
to have mathematical knowledge, the Traditionalist tends to mainly focus
on mathematical truths, or how it is we can come to know true mathemat-
ical facts and what they consist in. Such a prioritisation of truths tends to
come at the expense of systematic discussion of the nature of proof, which
is downplayed as explainable via the Formalist-Reductionist view which we
will turn to shortly. The Traditionalist picture generally tries to account
for mathematical truth then offer a subsidiary picture of proof as delivering
these truths unto us. It is this trend of Traditionalism which is the target of
Rav’s argument that it is proofs rather than truths which are the primary
bearers of mathematical knowledge found in (Rav 1999) which I shall be
looking at in chapter 4.
Now, if you were to press someone who fell broadly into the Traditionalist
camp on the importance of proof, the likely response would be to admit that
there may be issues pertaining to proofs, such as how they deliver a priori or
deductive knowledge. Indeed, the Traditional picture is that proofs provide
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justification for the truth of the theorems proved, and that they do so in
a special way which elevates mathematical knowledge obtained via proofs
to some especially robust form of knowledge. Such robustness is normally
taken to be the result of the deductive nature of mathematical proofs, where
giving a deductive proof rules out the possibility of error or omission.
The problem comes when we try to apply this Leibnizian ideal of proof
to proofs as found in practice. Real proofs involve general proof techniques
and strategies which may not be easily reducible to anything formal; they
may suppress or omit many steps that would be found in a strict derivation;
they assume varying degrees of knowledge on the part of reader; they can
use diagrams and natural language explanations; and they may be more
aimed at understanding why a claim is true than filling in trivial details.
The gap between the two notions here is often defined in terms of formality ;
that the ideal of proving consists in formal proofs in formal systems, while
those found in practice are called informal proofs. The question then is
how these informal proofs, which constitute the majority of proofs given in
mathematics, meet the standards of rigour expected of mathematics as the
science of deduction.
Our second face of the orthodox view, the Formalist-Reductionist view,
takes a strong stance on the issues of rigour and formality: they take it
that good, correct proofs—that is, proofs which are sufficient to secure the
special kind of mathematical knowledge— just are formal proofs in formal
systems. However, more needs to be said to avoid the following troublesome
triad:
1. Mathematicians have mathematical knowledge gained from correct
proofs.
2. Correct proofs just are formal proofs.
3. Mathematicians only rarely know or encounter any formal proofs.
The first is taken for granted, since proofs are central to the methodology
of mathematics, while the third is a fact of mathematical practice which
is easily observed and corroborated. The second item is the Formalist-
Reductionist assumption, which is meant to complement the Traditionalist
view by answering how proofs deliver a priori and deductive knowledge. Yet,
taken together there is the clear difficulty that formal proofs are meant to be
12
the main source of the special kind of knowledge, while simultaneously not
being accessed by the mathematicians who have the mathematical knowl-
edge via proofs.
The extended answer of the Formalist-Reductionist view is that infor-
mal proofs can be justified as good, correct or rigorous via corresponding
formal proofs. Thus, the initial restriction of correct proofs only including
formal ones is relaxed to allow some of the informal proofs to be correct
too, so long as they are related to formal correspondents in the right sort
of way. There are many ways this can be filled out into a full account:
the connection between informal proof and formal proofs could be abbre-
viation/approximation (Mac Lane 1986, p. 377), formalisation, derivation-
indication (Azzouni 2004a), Carnapian explication (Sjo¨gren 2010)1, picking
out a logical form, using the informal proof to convince the reader of the ex-
istence of a formal proof “in the right way” (Burgess 2015) or even that the
informal proof needs to be sufficient for a hypothetical ‘midwife’ logician to
generate the formal proof (Steiner 1975). While the details of these accounts
may vary dramatically, the key thrust of the approach will be to save the
informal proofs of mathematical practice as properly deductive and rigorous
through their formalisations to formal proofs. Formal proofs have all of the
desirable properties, the idea goes, since by squeezing out all gaps we leave
no room for mistakes or omissions, so proofs are fully rigorous according to
our settled logical rules of inference and deductive from the explicitly iden-
tified axioms and granted premises. Informal proofs are somehow matched
up to these ideal, logical, formal proofs and can thus inherit, via what Rav
calls ‘Hilbert’s Bridge’ (Rav 1999, p. 12), the same justification, rigour and
epistemic status.
So how do our two characters, the Traditionalist and the Formalist-
Reductionist, relate to one another? Certainly nothing so strong as one
entailing the other, since one can have Traditionalist pre-occupations while
rejecting the formalistic conception of proofs, while one can believe that
only formal proofs are correct proofs while being markedly unconventional
in your other philoso-mathematical investigations. Nonetheless, the two
positions do interrelate and provide mutual support. For one thing, we
saw that the Traditionalist needs a story to tell which fits with the a priori
and special nature of mathematical knowledge. The Formalist-Reductionist
1Carnap’s notion of explication will be discussed in chapter 3.
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picture at least seems to fit this role without obviously upsetting any of the
requirements the Traditionalist would have for such a story. In fact, the
Formalist-Reductionist view is often the result of Traditionalist motivations
towards a special degree of infallibility that we want from mathematical
knowledge, translating to proofs needing to be formal in order to rule out
errors, illicit assumptions or gaps of reasoning. While the Traditionalist
position is deeply ingrained in the history of the philosophy of mathematics,
Formalist-Reductionist thinking is a much more recent trend, focusing as it
does on the relatively recent notion of formal proofs, seeing formal proofs as
the ultimate solution to these ongoing questions of rigour and fallibility.
My answers will go strongly against the Formalist-Reductionist posi-
tions, arguing against it explicitly in the first two chapters. The Tradition-
alist is a less concrete opponent, and I don’t think that all of what has come
before under this heading is flawed. Nonetheless, I shall be looking at a
broader class of questions about mathematics, following the approach of the
philosophy of mathematical practice. Let us introduce this now.
0.2 The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice
The second stream of thought in modern philosophy of mathematics, accord-
ing to Kitcher & Aspray, is the “Maverick” tradition following the work of
Lakatos.2 A great number of thoughts come out of the Lakatosian approach,
which will be covered in some detail in chapter 3. But while it is fun to see
oneself as a maverick, the rough amalgamation of researchers favouring this
approach is not generally ostracised nowadays and the distinction between
the two is not always so clear3, so we may call the approach the study of
mathematical practice, with the philosophical wing being the philosophy of
mathematical practice.4 For now, I will set out some of the main works that
fall under this heading, though for a fuller and more fine-grained discussion
of the history of the philosophy of mathematical practice see (Van Bendegem
2Lakatos starts this tradition with the famous phrase “You can be my wingman any-
time”. I was unable to trace this quotation, but see (Gu¨z & Eismann 1986) and (Lakatos
1976, fn. 2, p. 62).
3For example, a glance at the membership list for the Association for the Philosophy of
Mathematical Practice will reveal a great many traditional philosophers of mathematics.
4In (Lo¨we 2016), Lo¨we discusses to what extent this does form a unified school of
thought or community, as well as the place of philosophy amongst the various disciplines
taking an interest in mathematical practice.
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2014).
Naturally, there were forerunners to the mathematical practice approach
that Lakatos is seen as the early champion of. Later, in chapter 3, I will
discuss G. T. Kneebone who did pre-empt some of the particulars of the
Lakatosian approach but seems to have been widely overlooked. However,
there are also others who are well-known precursors such as George Po´lya,
who wrote about heuristics and mathematical reasoning, such as in (Polya
1945), and who is acknowledged as one of the main inspirations for Lakatos
alongside Hegel and Popper. Another work that goes in this direction is
Hardy’s A Mathematician’s Apology (Hardy 1929), which presents mathe-
matics from a mathematician’s point of view. Other major works include
Davis & Hersh’s The Mathematical Experience (Davis & Hersh 1981), Cor-
field’s Towards a Philosophy of Real Mathematics (Corfield 2003) and the
collected volume (Mancosu 2008). We may consider Maddy’s second phi-
losophy project as a similar practice-oriented approach (see Maddy 2007).
One notable absence from the list is the later Wittgenstein, who seems to
have had very little direct influence on the literature, with the exception of
(Avigad 2008).
The methodological issue that arises is how exactly to engage with math-
ematical practice. The researchers one finds at connected conferences span
a diverse set of fields, which might provide a similar span of answers drawing
on philosophy, history, sociology, maths education, psychology and ethnog-
raphy. For one thing, we can rely on reports from practicing mathematicians
and their reflections on what mathematics is, such as those of Hardy, Maddy,
William Thurston (Thurston 1994), Yehuda Rav (Rav 1999) or Tim Gowers
(Gowers 2006). The careful use of case studies and historical episodes is
also common, mirroring their general use in the philosophy of mathematics,
examples found in (Van Kerkhove & Van Bendegem 2008), (Muntersbjorn
2003) and (Schlimm 2011). Sociological studies can be carried out, such as
is done in (MacKenzie 2001). Empirical data collection can also shed light
on what is going on in mathematics, as is done in (Martin & Pease 2013),
(Inglis & Aberdein 2015), (Mejia-Ramos & Weber 2014) and (Geist, Lo¨we
& Van Kerkhove 2010). All of these combine to paint a rich picture of what
mathematics looks like in practice, and one which provides a stark contrast
with the traditional picture found in the philosophy of mathematics.
Proofs in mathematics form one of the central topics in the study of
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mathematical practices, and the opposition to the Formalist-Reductionist
approach to proofs a unifying theme. Lakatos argues this point strongly
throughout (Lakatos 1976), as do Davis & Hersh (Davis & Hersh 1981),
Thurston (Thurston 1994) and Rav (Rav 1999, 2007). Additionally, further
arguments are made in (Robinson 1991, 2005), (Hersh 1993, 1997), (Detlef-
sen 2008), (Antonutti Marfori 2010), (Larvor 2012, 2016), and (de Toffoli &
Giardino 2014), amongst others. It is this literature to which the arguments
of the first two chapters can be added.
The approach I will be taking to proofs in practice in the coming five
chapters will be a philosophical one, but drawing on quite a range of litera-
ture on mathematical practices and several case studies and examples. The
intention is to demonstrate that there is a great deal of relevant work from
philosophy that can be deployed in the debate about the nature of proofs,
in rejecting the Formalist-Reductionist picture, and in replacing it with a
better account which does accord well with practice.
0.3 Outline
Let us run through what is to come in the five chapters in turn.
Chapter 1 takes on one prominent version of the Formalist-Reductionist
position, Jody Azzouni’s derivation-indicator account. I give a new argu-
ment that this cannot work. The target for the argument is the correspon-
dence supposedly holding between informal proofs and their formal coun-
terparts. I present the dilemma of whether this correspondence is inherent
in the proof and independent of any particular agent who is engaging with
it, or alternatively whether the correspondence is agent-dependent and may
fluctuate between different mathematicians. The latter is a poor fit for the
Formalist-Reductionist view, I argue, so they must commit to the first horn
of the dilemma. However, this fails due to an overgeneration problem, where
a given informal proof might be formalisable to too many substantially dif-
ferent formal proofs. This is problematic because it undermines the prospect
of the questions of rigour and correctness being resolved by the dependence
on the associated formal proofs, which was the main motivation. We need
another set of answers as to why the informal proof only matches to rigorous
and correct formal proofs, meaning that the original Formalist-Reductionist
answer has not made any progress towards an answer.
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In chapter 2, I take on a related set of arguments about the inconsistency
of the concept of proof and the inconsistency of the whole of mathematics.
The first argument comes from both Jc Beall and Graham Priest and is based
on Go¨del’s Paradox, the sentence which says of itself that it is informally
unprovable. They suggest that this shows mathematics to be inherently in-
consistent, but I respond that while this may be a paradox, it doesn’t have
the devastating effects on mathematics they claim. The second argument
is a more advanced version of the first and is due to Graham Priest, de-
pending on Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem. Briefly put, he argues
that the theorem proves the existence of a true but unprovable statement in
mathematics. But mathematicians agree that all of mathematics can be for-
malised, so therefore we prove the statement and a contradiction, meaning
that the formal system of mathematics is inherently inconsistent. I consider
the relationship between formal and informal proofs, arguing that there are
multiple reasons that the formalisation move is dubious. First of all, there
is the re-emergence of the difficulties from chapter 1, where there may be
many different ways to formalise mathematics and no unique right answer.
Furthermore, we might grant that mathematics can all be formalised, but
even then it requires the extra fact of putting it all into a single formal
system, which we have no reason to accept. My suggestion is that along-
side the usual two axes of consistency and completeness, we can add a third
dimension of formality which explains where arguments such as Priest’s go
astray.
In chapter 3, I consider the nature of mathematical concepts and how
this relates to the formal/informal axis. I begin with a discussion of the
notion from Friedrich Waismann of open texture, where concepts are not
fully delimited for all applications. Next, I go into a detailed investigation
of Imre Lakatos’s Proofs and Refutations, looking at how conceptual devel-
opment in mathematics is coupled to proving activities. I then show that
some key ideas found in Lakatos were also anticipated by G. T. Kneebone’s
earlier work, especially the advocacy of a dialectical philosophy of mathe-
matics. Bringing these topics together I show that there is open texture to
be found in mathematical concepts too. However, spurred by a criticism
from David Corfield, I turn to the question of how the sketched approaches
to mathematical concept development can account for the modern mathe-
matical usage of formal methods and results. For this, I look at two recent
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proposals from conceptual engineering. First, I deploy Sally Haslanger’s
distinction between manifest and operative concepts to account for the gap
between what mathematics looks like in certain areas and how mathemati-
cians reflectively describe it, using the example of set-theoretic foundations.
Second, I see how Kevin Scharp’s replacement strategy for defective concepts
might also be effective in the mathematical realm.
The final two chapters deal with the role of proofs in mathematical epis-
temology. Chapter 4 is specifically about knowledge-how in mathematics.
I begin with a discussion about Yehuda Rav’s argument of Pythiagora the
oracular machine that it is knowledge of proofs which is of primary in-
terest in mathematics. I agree with the general point that knowledge of
methods, techniques, concepts, interrelations and strategies are all impor-
tant, but offer an alternative interpretation of the thought-experiment which
puts these alongside more traditional concerns. From here I discuss the
knowing-how and knowing-that distinction as found in the epistemology lit-
erature, including Gilbert Ryle’s original arguments, Jason Stanley & Timo-
thy Williamson’s modern revival of the debate, and the more recent position
taken by Jennifer Hornsby and David Wiggins, on which knowledge-how and
knowledge-that are in practice closely related and interdependent. Following
this I run through several examples of how this position is reflected in the
realm of mathematical knowledge. I spend some time critically discussing
the previous stance taken by Benedikt Lo¨we and Thomas Mu¨ller that mathe-
matical knowledge of some theorem is context-dependent, in that it involves
having the contextually-specified skills required to prove it. Finally, I em-
phasise the perspective of proving as an activity put forward by Brendan
Larvor, and argue that this is what needs to be focused on in an epistemo-
logical theory for mathematics.
In chapter 5, I set out one way of giving an account of mathematical
knowledge using the resources of virtue epistemology. The suggestion will
be that both of the main strands of virtue epistemology, reliabilism and
responsibilism, can be adopted to give full and rich accounts of mathematical
knowledge. This approach is previously unexplored and has advantages in
fitting well into the broader picture of knowledge through proving that I have
been drawing. Furthermore, I argue that for the responsibilist mathematical
rigour can be seen as a virtue possessed by mathematical agents, which gives
a new perspective on what rigour amounts to. I finish on a discussion of
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the recent controversy surrounding Shinichi Mochizuki’s proof of the abc
conjecture, showing that virtue-theoretic terminology is already being used
by mathematicians in relation to mathematics.
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Chapter 1
A Problem with the
Dependence of Informal
Proofs on Formal Proofs
[S]hould a naturalist who had never studied the elephant except
by means of the microscope think himself sufficiently acquainted
with that animal? [...] The logician cuts up, so to speak, each
demonstration into a very great number of elementary opera-
tions; when we have examined these operations one after the
other and ascertained that each is correct, are we to think we
have grasped the real meaning of the demonstration? [...] Ev-
idently not; we shall not yet possess the entire reality; that I
know not what which makes the unity of the demonstration will
completely elude us.
— Henri Poincare´ (Poincare´ 1907, p. 21)
1.1 Introduction
We can distinguish two types of proof: informal proofs and formal proofs (or
proofs and derivations). On the one hand, formal proofs are given an explicit
definition in a formal language: proofs in which all steps are either axioms
or are obtained from the axioms by the applications of fully-stated inference
rules. On the other hand, informal proofs are proofs as they are written and
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produced in mathematical practice. They may make assumptions about the
intended audience’s background knowledge and ability to follow lines of rea-
soning, skip over tedious or routine steps and make reference to semantic
properties and properties of mathematical objects1 without stating these
fully. They also are not confined to formal languages: though mathemat-
ical symbolism may be used, natural language, diagrams and mixed-mode
explanations are freely employed too.
While formal proofs, in our sense, may be defined mathematically in any
number of ways2, informal proofs are much harder to pin down precisely.
One way to identify the objects of discussion is to give a general description
of what they are like, as is done frequently:
[...] what we do to make each other believe our theorems [...] [an]
argument which convinces the qualified, skeptical expert. (Hersh
1997, p. 153)
[...] a kind of meaningful narrative [...] more like a story, or even
a drama, conveyed to us in language calling on our semantic and
intuitive understanding. (Robinson 1991, p. 269)
[...] a conceptual proof of customary mathematical discourse,
having an irreducible semantic content [...] (Rav 1999, p. 11)
[...] a sequence of thoughts convincing a sound mind. (Go¨del
1953, p. 341)3
A proof of a theorem in mathematics is what we require to con-
vince ourselves and others of the truth of the statement made
by the theorem. (Feferman 2012, p. 371)
However, the real problem is not giving such a general description of what
informal proofs are like, but it is rather to sort those informal proofs which
are correct and rigorous from those which are not.
1As seen through the ‘Plato-tinted spectacles’ described in (Buldt, Lo¨we & Mu¨ller
2008).
2Avoiding, for the purposes of this work, the need to fully get to grips with what it
means to be formal. For work towards this see (MacFarlane 2000; Dutilh Novaes 2011).
3When I presented this in a talk, Stephen Read pointed out that the sound mind in
question probably refers to Go¨del’s mind.
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While we may associate deductive reasoning and logicality with formal
proofs in formal systems, actual mathematics is regularly presented infor-
mally using informal proofs.4 This challenges any proponent of an account
of philosophy of mathematics to also give an account of how proving, as it is
practised, relates to the idealised notion of formal proofs. There are many
routes to take for such an account, from Lakatosian dialectics (see Lakatos
1976), to be discussed in chapter 3, all the way to denying that any mathe-
matics took place before Frege. In this chapter I want to focus on just one
family of responses, wherein the rigour and correctness of informal proofs
is taken to be dependent (in some sense) on associated formal proofs. As
in the introduction, we call this family of views the Formalist-Reductionist
approach.5 There are a number of different connections that informal proofs
can be argued to have to their formal counterparts: reductions, logical forms,
explications, abbreviations, sketches, formalisations, etc. In this chapter I
will look at one particular proposal by Azzouni: that informal proofs indi-
cate underlying formal proofs.6
I will begin by laying out some desiderata that any successful Formalist-
Reductionist account of informal proofs must meet. I will then explain
Azzouni’s view of informal proofs, focusing on the particular connection
between formal and informal proofs that is posited and how well Azzouni’s
view would meet the given desiderata. In section 4 I present a dilemma,
asking whether the link from informal proofs to underlying formal derivation
is an agent-independent one or whether it is dependent on the agent who
is presenting the proof. I take Azzouni to need the former in order to be
successful in obtaining his brand of formalism-reductionism, but in section 5
I will criticise this horn of the dilemma based on a problem of overgeneration.
Azzouni can avoid this problem if he adopts the second horn of the dilemma,
4What is ‘actual mathematics’? The intended answer here is mathematics as it is
practiced but this is only enlightening in that it points to further questions that need
to be addressed, concerning which parts of mathematical practice are relevant. For the
purposes of this thesis I take actual mathematics to simply be that published in mathe-
matics journals, presented at conferences and taught in mathematics classes. A number
of interesting discussions of this question can be found in (Mancosu 2008).
5To emphasise, I specifically avoid calling this simply formalism because the Formalist-
Reductionist stance is broader and may encompass positions that would traditionally fall
outside of the formalist school of thought. For instance, logicism is guided by the thought
that mathematics is part of logic and its approach to proof would fall under the heading
of Formalist-Reductionist, while being deeply opposed to formalism on other grounds.
6The bulk of this position is given in (Azzouni 2004a) and (Azzouni 2005a).
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but in section 6 I will argue that this is not compatible with Azzouni’s
theory. I shall therefore argue that the account is deficient in dealing with the
various desiderata it is aiming to address. Finally, I will conclude that the
fundamental difficulty that prevents Azzouni’s account from being successful
is one that is a general roadblock to successfully providing a Formalist-
Reductionist account of informal proofs.
1.2 Minimal Desiderata of a Formalist-Reductionist
Account of Informal Proofs
In this section I shall lay down the minimal aims that a Formalist-Reductionist
account should achieve in dealing with the problem of informal proofs. By
making these intentions clear from the outset, we will be able to see where
conflicts arise.
We can begin with two desiderata that were already mentioned:
(Rigour) To give an account of how informal proofs are (or can
be said to be) rigorous through their connection to formal proofs.
(Correctness) To distinguish correct informal proofs from in-
correct ones i.e. the connection should only link informal proofs
that are correct to the formal proofs that justify them.
The first of these is precisely the challenge the Formalist-Reductionist faces
in arguing that informal proofs can be rigorous if they are connected to
formal proofs in the right kind of way. The second adds to this the need to
properly distinguish the correct informal proofs from incorrect ones. One
could interpret this as the intention not to overgenerate through the posited
connection: it would be undesirable for the link matching informal proofs to
formal proofs to also associate flawed informal proofs with justifying formal
proofs.
Since informal proofs arise from mathematical practice and the way in
which we engage with and do mathematics, another desideratum is the fol-
lowing:
(Agreement) To explain how, in practice, mathematicians man-
age to consistently converge and agree on the correctness of infor-
mal proofs. (Additionally, to give an account of informal proofs
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that were conceived of long before we had a sufficiently strong
account of formal proofs to support them.)
The main part of (Agreement) is to actually engage with informal proofs
as a social phenomenon; to explain how and why the mathematical com-
munity has employed informal proofs, as well as how the underlying link
the Formalist-Reductionist account argues for relates to this practice. The
addendum presses the requirement further, asking for the account to also
explain how the cumulative nature of mathematics fits with the fact that
fully formal proofs, of the sort required by the Formalist-Reductionist, are
a rather recent discovery. A requirement like this is to avoid the immedi-
ate objection that might be raised: that formal proofs cannot underwrite
informal ones, because historically we have been using the latter far longer.
Now I will impose a stronger demand on the Formalist-Reductionists,
the demand that their account doesn’t simply state what the link is between
formal and informal proof (abbreviating, indicating, logical form etc.) but
that instead it gives some substance to the link.
(Content) To show how the content of an informal proof deter-
mines the structure of the formal proof(s) it maps to.
A reason that informal proofs do present a substantial difficulty is that, in
many ways, they are and appear quite different to any formal proofs. In
answering such a difficulty, then, saying that the relation between them is of
a certain kind is the easy part; showing that it is so is much harder. What
the account needs to provide is an explanation of how exactly the informal
proof can be used to pick out some formal proof or proofs. The picking
out must surely (and at least partially) follow the content of the informal
proof, so the account needs to tell us about how this content determines the
structure of the formal proof that is associated with it.
We may elaborate the above further, to require a response to the partic-
ular tricky cases:
(Techniques) To provide an explanation of apparently inher-
ently informal techniques.
A main example of what is required here is dealing with diagrams in math-
ematics. A legitimate response is to argue for some kind of eliminability
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thesis for diagrams: that all diagrams must be eliminable from proofs en-
tirely. Of course, such an argument would need to be given to complete
the account, and may bring additional commitments. Other examples are
proofs using symmetry, or the ‘untraversed gaps’ described in (Fallis 2003).
1.3 Azzouni’s Derivation-Indicator View
Azzouni’s derivation-indicator view of mathematical practice, as presented
in (Azzouni 2004a, 2005a), takes the link between informal and formal proofs
to be that informal proofs indicate underlying formal proofs.7 In his own
words:
I take a proof to indicate an ‘underlying’ derivation... Since (a)
derivations are (in principle) mechanically checkable, and since
(b) the algorithmic systems that codify which rules may be ap-
plied to produce derivations in a given system are (implicitly
or, often nowadays, explicitly) recognized by mathematicians, it
follows that if proofs really are devices mathematicians use to
convince one another of one or another mechanically-checkable
derivation, this suffices to explain why mathematicians are so
good at agreeing with one another on whether some proof con-
vincingly establishes a theorem. (Azzouni 2004a, p. 84)
The focus here is very much on answering (Agreement), dealing with the
general social conformity regarding good and bad proofs. However, it is clear
that for Azzouni this is closely linked to (Rigour) and (Correctness) in
that the link will explain the agreement in terms of informal proofs being
correct or rigorous due to underlying formal proofs.
An interesting aspect of Azzouni’s view is that the formal proofs are
defined more liberally than usual. He takes them to be located within ‘al-
gorithmic systems’, which are not restricted in the ways we generally take
formal proofs to be:
I’ve already stressed that ‘algorithmic systems’ are restricted nei-
ther to a particular logic, a particular subject-matter, nor even
7Although it should be noted that Azzouni has largely dropped the ‘indicating’ ter-
minology in later developments of the view in (Azzouni 2005b) and (Azzouni 2009) for
reasons we will see in section 1.4.
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to an explicit language (as opposed to something diagrammatic
or pictorial). What is required is that ‘proofs’, however these be
understood, are (in principle) mechanically recognizable. (Az-
zouni 2004a, p. 86)
This has already been criticised (see Rav 2007), with a response from Az-
zouni in (Azzouni 2009), so I shall not take up this discussion here. However,
in the present context the motivation for this view should garner at least
some sympathy, for Azzouni is explicitly trying to leave open a straightfor-
ward route to meeting the demands of (Techniques), in particular those
regarding diagrams as used in mathematics. This focus on diagrammatic
reasoning becomes clearer if we note Azzouni’s reference to another of his
papers analysing diagrammatic reasoning in Euclid’s Elements (Azzouni
2004b), suggesting that he believes diagrammatic proofs do not always need
to be informal, so long as they are given a mechanically checkable structure.8
More on Azzouni’s views of diagrams in mathematics can also be found in
(Azzouni 2013).
Turning now to the question of (Content) and how exactly it is that
derivation-indication links informal proofs to formal ones, Azzouni does not
argue that each informal proof is underwritten by some unique formal proof
in one algorithmic system. That would, he claims, be implausible as an
account of mathematical practice because in reality mathematicians are not
held to one specific inference system. Furthermore, if an account did limit
mathematicians to one specific formal system it would be open to objec-
tions based on incompleteness phenomena.9 Instead, in Azzouni’s view each
informal proof relates to a family of formal proofs which are located in a
number of different algorithmic systems.
It doesn’t much matter where in the family of algorithmic sys-
tems we take ‘the’ derivation indicated by a proof to be located...
since algorithmic systems embedded in one another are so em-
bedded to conserve derivational results, we can take the deriva-
tion indicated to be one located in any algorithmic system within
which the result occurs and is surveyable. (Azzouni 2004a, pp.
8Understanding formal proofs as mechanically checkable ones takes one of the stances
on the debate over what it means to be formal found in (Dutilh Novaes 2011).
9Discussion of the relationship between incompleteness, consistency and proof will be
the subject of chapter 2.
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93–94)
The conservativity requirement holding between algorithmic systems in which
‘the same’ formal proof is located comes closely coupled with a translation
of the ideas up and down systems:
Indeed, provided one is very strict about concept-individuation
conditions, what can be claimed is that the new systems come
with all-new concepts—and the old ones have simply been stip-
ulatively identified with (some of these) new concepts. Such a
stipulative identification of concepts that proves valuable is in-
nocuous solely because of the cumulative way that algorithmic
systems are embedded in one another: none of the old results
regarding the old set of concepts are jettisoned—new material
has only been added. (Azzouni 2004a, p. 98)
Azzouni rightly observes the need to deal with (Techniques) and, specif-
ically, that many informal techniques do not seem to point directly to some-
thing formal. The particular example Azzouni gives is using symmetry, i.e.
doing one part of a proof and then observing that another part is proved
symmetrically. What is understood is that the part of the proof already
given could be easily edited and adjusted to give the other part, though
the exact details of such an adjustment are never given. The solution he
offers is that in the course of informal proofs mathematicians may be using
‘meta-level’ reasoning, which means that the system(s) that the indicated
derivation is located in will be ‘larger’:
When formalized as a derivation, such a proof will necessarily
contain metamathematical elements which naturally drive it into
the form of a derivation in a system strictly larger than one
about, say, the objects officially under study. Mathematicians
automatically ascend to a discussion of what can be taken to
be properties and relations of the relations and properties of the
objects they are proving results about. (Azzouni 2004a, p. 94)
Here, his discussion of how to deal with the case of symmetry additionally
reveals some of the main evidence of what his view on (Content) is. It
appears that aside from these tricky cases of meta-level reasoning and the
like, the actual link from informal proofs to formal ones will usually be a
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straightforward ‘filling in the gaps’-type process. However, in developing
the view further in later work, Azzouni explicitly moves away from this
‘filling in the gaps’ account to a more sophisticated picture separating the
way we come to understand informal proofs (through ‘inference packages’)
from the way that corresponding formal proofs are determined (see Azzouni
2005b, p. 40). For simplicity I focus on the earlier account, but believe that
the problems I raise for it will remain problematic for the mechanisability
requirement still present in the more sophisticated picture.
1.4 A Dilemma
It is now time to start exploring the relation of derivation-indication more
thoroughly. A particularly weak understanding would be to see informal
proofs as a kind of time-saving communicative device, allowing mathemati-
cians to quickly transfer formal proofs by indicating them to one another
using informal proofs. However, this is not Azzouni’s intended meaning; he,
in fact, explicitly rules out the idea that mathematicians need to be aware
of the underlying derivations (“I should add that it isn’t a requirement on
‘indicating’ that mathematicians, generally, be aware that their proofs indi-
cate derivations.” (Azzouni 2005a, fn. 16) or similarly (Azzouni 2009, fn.
17)). So if not this, what is meant by indicating? Since the general intention
is to give an account of (Agreement), (Correctness) and (Rigour), it
appears that what is required is that indication is some kind of dependence
relation, but what properties it should have is just one of many questions
that must be faced to complete the account.
The particular question I propose to press for this account is the fol-
lowing: is derivation-indication agent-dependent or agent-independent?10
Since, in essence, it is a proof that indicates a derivation it is relevant to
ask who the supposed agent in this dilemma is. The proposal is that, on
the one hand, the dependence link could be argued to not involve any kind
of agent (say mathematician, student, listener, reader or anyone else that
is involved in the particular instance of the proof). On the other hand, the
agent-dependent horn of the dilemma suggests that the link from informal to
10This question is very close to the question of whether formalisation is a process that
varies with the agent performing it, like Carnap’s notion of explication (Carnap 1945) or
whether it instead is a process of revealing the ‘deep structure’ of the target phenomenon.
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formal proof may not be fully present in the proof itself, but instead some-
thing over and above generated by the practice of proving or formalising i.e.
something that is added by some involved agent.
In what follows I will examine the two horns of this dilemma, arguing that
Azzouni is proposing an agent-independent link between formal and informal
proof. However, I will contend that taking this horn will not be successful,
based on a problem of the informal proofs corresponding to multiple, non-
equivalent formal proofs. Taking the link to be agent-dependent, I argue,
is not an escape option for the Formalist-Reductionist though, because do-
ing so fails to satisfy the original motivations of the Formalist-Reductionist
enterprise.
1.5 Agent-Independent Derivation-Indicators
In this section I will consider the agent-independent horn of the dilemma, in-
vestigating the correspondence it posits between informal and formal proofs
in order to show the ways in which this correspondence cannot support the
answers to the various desiderata set out above.
Let us consider the following question: does each informal proof relate to
just one unique formal proof or to many of them? We have already seen that
for Azzouni each informal proof relates to a whole family of derivations, due
to the fact that he believes that ‘the’ formal proof is located in a range of
algorithmic systems and, strictly speaking, these are different proofs.11 The
question can be reissued in these terms, though: for some given informal
proof, is there a unique formal proof relative to each algorithmic system it
appears in? In all cases where Azzouni touches on the issue, he seems to
want each informal proof to pick out one unique formal proof per algorithmic
system, within the upper and lower bounds.12
Let us think about this kind of uniqueness, since proof identity conditions
are central to the problem I raise this section.
We already saw in section 1.3 that on the Formalist-Reductionist pic-
ture the informal proofs depend on formal proofs to be able to meet the
11This is because a formal proof is relative to a formal system and language.
12It should be noted that Azzouni, despite attempting to deal with some of the key
issues of mathematical practice and informal proof, is never particularly explicit about
the answers to these questions. Dealing with the various options for what he can and may
want to mean is precisely the current undertaking.
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various desiderata laid out above. In the light of this, the identity of proofs
is highly relevant because it affects which formal proof(s) an informal proof
depends on, and consequently impacts how well the desiderata are met. For
example, if an informal proof does not depend on a unique formal proof
(per algorithmic system) but instead depends on multiple, non-identical or
non-equivalent formal proofs, then this could lead to further difficulties, say,
in satisfying (Rigour) and (Correctness). For it is the underlying formal
proofs that are meant to be ensuring the rigour and correctness of informal
proofs, but if there are multiple different formal proofs simultaneously be-
ing depended upon this undermines the effectiveness of the explanation the
derivation-indicator account gives. For example, what is there then to stop
an informal proof from corresponding to both one correct and one incorrect
formal proof? The point is that if it is the case that the informal proof does
not uniquely determine which formal proof it depends on, then the depen-
dence is far weaker than is required to actually satisfy the desiderata. Once
it is conceded that there are multiple different, non-equivalent formal proofs
underlying some informal proof, we can immediately ask why it is these par-
ticular ones that are selected and what ensures that it is only correct and
rigorous formal proofs that are picked out. Now, if we need an extra step to
clarify why the informal proof only corresponds to just those formal proofs
which do ensure rigour and correctness, then it is this additional step that
is doing all of the philosophical work and the account given has failed to
properly answer the questions posed.
If the underlying formal proof is unique in some sense, then it seems the
structure of the formal proof could, perhaps, be related to the content of
the informal proof and avoid this underdetermination. Such considerations
are also clearly present in Azzouni’s theory: the fact that he writes of the
underlying formal proof in the singular13, even when it is in fact located in
different algorithmic systems with different languages, does not appear to
be accidental. Of course, we did see that this required two extra compo-
nents. Firstly, the moves ‘upwards’ had to be conservative of the derivational
results, to make sure ‘the’ formal proof is still present as one extends the
system. Secondly, we need to be able to identify proofs up and down systems
to ensure they are still the same in this crucial sense. As we saw above, this
is achieved by stipulatively identifying concepts between formal systems. I
13As evidenced by the quotations in section 1.3.
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shall return to these moves once the worry has been further articulated.
In the remainder of this section I will show that the lack of a unique
determination of the formal proofs an informal proof depends on does in-
deed occur and that as a result the problem just described applies to the
derivation-indicator view on the agent-independent horn of the dilemma. I
believe the other horn does not suffer this same problem, as will be discussed
in section 1.6. Another way of describing this problem is as an overgener-
ation problem.14 The idea is not that informal proofs are too resistant to
formalisation but instead that they are not resistant enough. There are mul-
tiple, equally legitimate formal proofs corresponding to any given informal
proof and it is this multitude which throws doubt on there being any deep
philosophical significance to the correspondence at all.
When proposing this overgeneration worry for Formalist-Reductionist
views, something that has often been brought up in response is whether or
not the difference between the various proofs is substantial. The thought
is, presumably, that if the type of difference between the various formal
proofs is only minor or insubstantial, then the proofs may be essentially
the same and so the overgeneration problem loses its bite. However, I do
not find this distinction particularly helpful in avoiding the problem for two
reasons. Firstly, while being essentially the same may hold for two formal
proofs with only some minor change, making lots of minor changes could
add up to a substantial change quite easily. Secondly, I don’t believe there
is any robust way of separating the variations between formal proofs into
substantial and insubstantial ones, but rather think that there is a whole
spectrum of potential variations, ranging from very minor differences all
the way to having no commonalities at all. Nonetheless, I will accept the
distinction for the sake of argument and proceed to why I think there will
be both the smaller and the more substantial variations between the formal
proofs that some given informal proof will depend on.
Given some informal proof, it is straightforward to see that there must
be a selection of formal proofs that it corresponds to just from the minor and
insubstantial variations that can be introduced. Examples I have in mind
are variable-renaming; changing the order of independent lemmas; switching
14I have adopted this terminology from Etchemendy’s attacks on the reductive view
of logical consequence in (Etchemendy 2008). Furthermore, I believe the spirit of the
arguments Etchemendy gives is very close to those deployed here.
31
between inter-definable logical constants; changing the order you prove bi-
conditionals (i.e. starting right-to-left or left-to-right) etc. Of course, the
kind of changes that are minor will depend on the particular proof, since at
times these rather innocuous differences can be relevant (or even crucial) to
the success of the proof. This not only supports my claim that the distinction
between minor and substantial differences is not a robust one, but also the
more general argument I am making that even the minor differences can
potentially cause problems for the agent-independent position.
Now Azzouni has essentially two options. He can stick to his guns, as it
were, and insist that for any given informal proof there is just one formal
proof per algorithmic system, in which case he fails to capture basic intu-
itions about formal proof identity concerning these minor variations, say,
as well as being exposed to a worry about the arbitrariness of the partic-
ular proof that underlies the informal proof. Alternatively, he can accept
that there is instead some equivalence class of formal proofs in each system
matching up to any informal proof. In this case, for some given informal
proof and an appropriate algorithmic system, there is a class of formal proofs
that the informal proof indicates. It seems obvious that Azzouni should take
the latter option; given that he accepts inter-system identity of proof, intra-
system identity does not appear to be any more problematic.
However innocuous intra-system identity may seem, it is in fact deeply
problematic, even in cases of insubstantial variation. To begin, a concern is
that even though we have seen some suggestions for the acceptable minor
variations listed above, if the minor variations do still keep the given formal
proof ‘essentially the same’, then we would certainly like a more complete
description of the kind of variations that are acceptable. With this comes
the further need to justify such choices and convince us that adding up
the differences will not eventually amount to a more substantial change.
Considering the huge variety of systems that we could be talking about
here, these demands will not realistically be met. The rhetorical point,
though, is that the granularity of the notion of proof identity in play will
have a bearing on how well the theory holds up under scrutiny.
Even if there are answers to the questions of the previous paragraph,
this does not settle the matter concerning proof identity. Azzouni’s theory,
for good reason, identifies proofs between different algorithmic systems via
the stipulative identification between concepts and conservative translations
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between the systems. Again, if we were dealing with just a single formal
proof in each algorithmic system then this process might work, but if there is
an equivalence class of formal proofs underlying some informal proof in each
algorithmic system, then once again there are technical issues that must be
addressed. Even when the variations are minor relative to some particular
algorithmic system, those differences could be exacerbated and enlarged by
the translation between systems. Formal proofs that were essentially the
same (in the sense of being in the same equivalence class) in one system
could, for all we know, be translated to proofs that are no longer the same
according to the equivalence conditions in that other algorithmic system.
Suppose we have two formal proofs P and Q in algorithmic system A that are
both in the equivalence class underlying some informal proof, then translate
them in Azzouni’s sense to some other algorithmic system B. There is no
guarantee that the translations t(P ) and t(Q) will be in the equivalence class
for the informal proof in system B.
There are two ways that one might try to avoid this concern of iden-
tity and translation: by appeal to conservativity and stipulative identity.
Conservativity ensures that no results are jettisoned when moving between
algorithmic systems, so we are safe in the knowledge that whatever we have
a proof for in the weaker system will also have a proof in the stronger one.
Yet this is certainly not enough to avoid the problem, since the way it is
posed does not require the result to disappear, rather that the translation
may take minor differences and make them substantial in the translation
process. This can certainly happen if the result is still present in the new
system. The fact that the identification between systems is stipulative can
also not do any work here, because as we saw above the stipulative identity is
only argued to be innocuous thanks to the conservativity. Now I argue that
when it comes to formal proof identity, the stipulation of identity might not
be innocuous (in that substantial differences might creep into proofs during
translation) and that conservativity does not allow a way out of this fact,
therefore making use of stipulative identity would beg the question.
So much for minor variations; what of more substantial ones? Are there
ways in which the underlying formal proofs can differ which amount to sig-
nificant and sizeable differences? I believe that there certainly are and will
now give an example where this can be seen. First, though, I want to give
some thought as to what ‘substantial’ differences could be like. There is a
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sense in which the type of differences is constrained by the informal proof
that the formal proofs all correspond to, yet this constraint does not, I argue,
prevent substantial differences from appearing. The two most straightfor-
ward places to see this are in the treatment of mathematical objects and
the mathematical dependencies a theorem has. Firstly, the treatment of the
objects of an informal proof have to give some formal reconstruction of the
objects in terms of relevant properties (at least those that are used in the
proof). How the objects are represented in the formal system, then, will
affect how the formal details of the proof go. Even for these details there
may be multiple different ways to do things (totally ignored in the informal
proof). Together we get different formal constructions (which will only have
to overlap in some crucial properties) with different technical details. Of
course, differences in the representation will have knock-on and snowballing
effects the further through the proof we go, as the different representations
and details of the formal proofs cascade along. After all, the exacting nature
of formal proofs brings with it a delicate balance that must be maintained
for the proof to be correct. Secondly, by representing the proof in different
places, the mathematical dependencies that the proof has will be altered to
support the type of specific inferences that may be made in that system.
From all of these factors, the appearance of variations between the formal
proofs that are substantial should be expected.
Let us flesh this out with a concrete example. The one I have in mind
is that of the mutilated chessboard.15 The statement and proof are the
following:
An ordinary chess board has had two squares—one at each end
of a diagonal—removed. There is on hand a supply of 31 domi-
nos, each of which is large enough to cover exactly two adjacent
squares of the board. Is it possible to lay the dominos on the
mutilated chessboard in such a manner as to cover it completely?
(Black 1946, p. 157)
It is impossible ... and the proof is easy. The two diagonally
opposite corners are the same color. Therefore their removal
leaves a board with two more squares of one color than of the
15This example is central in (Robinson 1991) and can also be found in (Black 1946)
and (Gardner 1988).
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other. Each domino covers two squares of opposite color, since
only opposite colors are adjacent. After you have covered 60
squares with 30 dominos, you are left with two uncovered squares
of the same color. These two cannot be adjacent, therefore they
cannot be covered by the last domino. (Gardner 1988, p. 28)
This example has intentionally been chosen as one which is intuitively cor-
rect, rigorous and understandable but also has a great deal of freedom re-
garding the underlying formal derivations that Azzouni’s theory is commit-
ted to. Another advantage of this proof is that it has been formalised a
number of times in different systems as a good example of informal reason-
ing that is tricky to capture formally. The standard way that the various
attempts tend to approach the problem is reconstructing it set-theoretically,
after this was issued as a challenge in (McCarthy 1995), with such attempts
found in (Bancerek 1995; Rudnicki 1995; Subramanian 1994). These repre-
sent the board as sets of co-ordinates and then define an adjacency relation
on the sets of co-ordinates with a tiling making use of this relation. How-
ever, this is not the only approach that can be taken, as is demonstrated by
Paulson in (Paulson 2001), who instead makes use of inductive definitions
for the set of dominoes and the tiling, which then allows crucial properties
to be proved by rule induction. Furthermore, in (Subramanian 1996), Sub-
ramanian takes another distinct approach, in terms of states (of the chess
board) and actions (of placing dominoes on the board), with a focus on
modelling finite state machines.
Inspection of these various different formal versions of the same informal
proof shows that substantial differences do appear. Let us consider these
differences in turn.
Firstly, the different representations of the various objects of the proof
lead to major differences in the way that the main steps in the proof are
formalised. The representation obtained by defining tilings in the direct set-
theoretic way, inductively or over states, are different ways of giving formal
accounts of the various parts of the informal proof. Taking these different
approaches actually results in changing the significant steps in the proof.
For instance, in (Paulson 2001) the rule induction does a great deal of the
work for proving various facts, while the (Subramanian 1996) version has to
add a large number of additional, almost trivial facts to make the proof go
through.
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Secondly, these different representations also lead to different require-
ments for how the technical details in between the major steps are cashed
out, with no obvious way to translate these between the systems. On the
first approach, a number of extra details are added to pick out the right set-
theoretic facts and make these particular details form into a correct proof.
On the second, the inductive definitions are added to the set-theoretic com-
ponents to allow several of the sub-proofs to be completed in substantially
different ways. The third approach has to add lots of extra details to en-
sure that the numbers of coloured squares are well-behaved moving between
states.
Thirdly, invoking such different representations means that the proof
is dependent on different mathematical facts and background assumptions,
which is to say that we arrive at a proof with different dependencies. In our
chess board example we can point to the difference between a reliance on
set theory alone, the soundness of rule induction and the logic of the state
machines, as well as a whole selection of minor discrepancies.
Finally, since the formal proofs are all in different systems, we see the
additional problem that each system adds to the formal proof a number
of system-specific artefacts. These seem to be totally without correlates,
should we want to attempt to translate between the systems.
All of these are examples of substantial and sizeable differences in formal
derivations corresponding to the informal proof of the mutilated chess board
example. As such it should now be clear that substantial variations do exist
in underlying formal proofs and that the problem of overgeneration described
above is in full force against the derivation-indicator account.
One common response that Azzouni would usually have open is, inter-
estingly, not available in this case. The response would be that Azzouni
could give up the need for translations between systems and simply rely on
the fact that for each relevant algorithmic system there exists a formal proof
that corresponds to the informal one. So long as this property of existence
is preserved when moving between algorithmic systems, as Azzouni holds
is constantly happening in mathematical practice, the derivation-indicator
account can be maintained.16 The reason this path is not open on this
occasion is that my objection is one of overgeneration. In effect, I am in-
16Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion as to how the objection may be
avoided.
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sisting that this type of mere existence of corresponding formal proof is
not sufficient for the correspondence to provide adequate solutions to the
problems of (Rigour) and (Correctness). Furthermore, giving up the
translations between systems also concedes the point that there are multi-
ple different and non-equivalent formal proofs underlying an informal proof,
leading back into the need for an additional explanation of how it is that
the derivation-indication only picks out correct proofs etc. Such a retreat
does not, therefore, avoid the problems we have seen.
As a final point against the agent-independence of underlying formal
proofs, I add that the problems of the identity and uniqueness of formal
proofs strike me as the easier ones to handle compared to questions about
the identity of informal proofs. There are very strong intuitions concern-
ing which informal proofs are the same and which are not (an issue that
is, for example, important to properly crediting mathematicians for their
new discoveries). Presumably, in trying to examine mathematical practice,
at least some attention should be paid to ideas of informal identity. An
even broader line of difficulties would emerge from this though, concerning
whether informal proofs which are informally identical should indicate the
same classes of formal proofs and if not, why not.
All of the above follows Azzouni along the agent-independent horn of
the dilemma. Taking the other horn would make matters like this far easier
to deal with, since which equivalence class of formal proofs (both inter- and
intra-system) underlies the informal proof would depend on the particular
agent and circumstances of the informal proof. Unfortunately, the second
horn cannot be what Azzouni wants because it does not suffice to establish
the Formalist-Reductionist claims, as I will argue in the next section.
1.6 Agent-Dependent Derivation-Indicators
So let us consider the other horn of the dilemma, which has it that the formal
proof(s) underlying any given informal one are agent-dependent and supplied
over and above what is already present in the proof itself. This horn would
yield great benefits: there would be readily available practical evidence that
proofs can be linked to formal derivations from the field of Formal Mathe-
matics, in which there is an ever-growing collection of computer-checkable
37
formal counterparts for well-known mathematical proofs.17 At least on the
surface, the success of this grand formalisation project should add great cre-
dence to the idea that informal proofs can be linked to derivations. Formal
Mathematics is very clearly agent-dependent, with different mathematicians
converting different informal proofs to equally different derivations (as we
saw in the mutilated chess board example). In this section I will make the
case that the agent-dependent horn of the dilemma is, unfortunately, not
available to Azzouni or other Formalist-Reductionists.
Firstly, as we have seen, Azzouni insists that the agents need not be
aware of the indicated derivation that underlies the informal proof they are
communicating. This in itself seems to put a stop to agent-dependence for
Azzouni, for if the formal proof depends on agents who have no access to the
formal proof there is little hope of success in this direction. Furthermore, one
of the main desiderata for Azzouni, that of (Agreement), would be left in a
far more precarious position. For the social agreement on what constitutes
a correct proof is explained in terms of the indicated derivations, but if
the link is now agent-dependent then there is no given reason why any two
people will have the same class of derivations underlying the informal proof.
In this case, mathematics could then end up as a lot of talking past one
another.
The original reasons for wanting to reject the notion that mathemati-
cians are aware of the underlying formal derivations are good ones. Firstly,
this simply does not match up to the reality of mathematical practice. Sec-
ondly, this would fail to answer the clause of (Agreement) which asks for
an explanation of mathematics done long before there were formal proofs in
mathematics. Finally, formal proofs for mathematics tend to be long and
unwieldy therefore not the kind of thing that are ‘easy’ to know. In (Pelc
2009), it is argued that the formal counterparts to informal proof of the-
orems that have already been proved may very well not just be currently
inaccessible to us, but beyond the physical limits of our universe to ever
check.18 By avoiding having the mathematicians aware of the underlying
derivations, Azzouni will be sidestepping these three concerns. Except, if
Azzouni were to now take the second horn of the dilemma then these wor-
ries would be back with a vengeance. For in that case he would need to
17In mechanical proof-checkers such as Coq, Mizar, Isabelle, etc.
18See also (Boolos 1987) for another unwieldy formal proof for a clear informal one.
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explain how the link from informal to formal proofs can be agent-dependent
while the agent may nonetheless have no access to the formal proof, which
is precisely the type of worry he was attempting to sidestep.
Generalising somewhat to other Formalist-Reductionist arguments, there
is an even more crucial reason that they should not want to accept that their
link is agent-dependent. This is that whatever the posited link may be from
informal proofs to their formal counterparts, this link is one of dependence.
The entire project is aimed at explaining the utility of informal proofs in
terms of formal proofs, with their philosophically more straightforward ac-
count of logic and deductive reasoning. The desiderata of (Correctness)
and (Rigour) can be tackled by taking advantage of the dependence of in-
formal proofs on formal ones to import the story of rigour or correctness we
have for the latter. However, if we make this link agent-dependent, then the
clear waters are muddied once again by the complicated relationship that
the posited link has with the mathematicians themselves. For the entire
point of the undertaking is to resolve the tricky problem of the practical,
real-life side of mathematics in the philosophically simpler terms of formal
derivations. If the posited link is agent-dependent, the very difficulty that
we were resolving simply re-emerges at another level. In short, the attempt
to answer the problem of informal proofs in mathematical practice will find
itself once again dealing with the practical difficulties of formalisation. This
should be unacceptable to any Formalist-Reductionist account.
1.7 Conclusion
Having seen that the agent-dependent approach is not compatible with the
Formalist-Reductionist aims, let me now return to the first horn of the
dilemma and give a reason as to why an independent link from informal
proofs to underlying formal ones is going to be particularly hard to establish.
The reason is embodied in the desideratum of (Content). To success-
fully give the type of account that the Formalist-Reductionist is after, one
has to go from the informal, implicit, gappy and often hidden structure of
the informal proof to a fully explicit formal proof, which has picked out ev-
erything down to the smallest details. But one of the obvious reasons that
formal proofs are rarely employed in practice is that these minutiae will get
in the way of explanation, comprehension and communication of proofs. The
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result is, unsurprisingly, that they are often left out. What follows, then, is
that the link is adding extra structure and detail in going from informal to
formal proofs.
In section 1.5 we saw the mutilated chess board and a selection of sub-
stantially different ways that it can be made formal. Although such multiple
realisations of the formal proof’s corresponding to informal ones don’t pose
such a problem to a weaker, agent-dependent notion of formalisation, if we
want an independent link this is a serious problem because it compels us
to go beyond the link to explain which realisation is the correct one or how
they can all be correct, and as we have seen neither option is particularly
easy. The difficulty of filling in the leaps made in informal proofs is further
compounded by the fact that proofs have a great deal of structure, which
means that how we fill in a gap at one point can and does affect the options
for later stages of the proof. Believing that the answers to these techni-
calities is somehow already present in the proof and determined is entirely
misguided.
The moral, then, is that satisfying (Content) is really quite a chal-
lenging problem. Interestingly, the problem is one that extends far beyond
Azzouni’s particular proposal to Formalist-Reductionist projects generally.
Whether one wants to reduce all mathematics to formal derivations, claim
that informal proofs reveal a complete logical form, or any other proposal
in this direction, the hard problem of (Content) is a serious roadblock.
40
Chapter 2
Saving Proof from Paradox:
Go¨del’s Paradox and the
Inconsistency of Informal
Mathematics
Every formal system is thus incomplete in two respects: 1 insofar
as there are propositions undecidable within it, and 2 insofar
as there are notions that cannot be defined within it [...] Thus
we are led to conclude that, although everything mathematical
is formalizable, it is nonetheless impossible to formalize all of
mathematics in a single formal system [...]
— Kurt Go¨del (Go¨del 1935, p. 389)
2.1 Introduction
Is mathematics consistent? While in practice we generally proceed as if it
is, for dialetheists such as Priest in (Priest 1987), mathematics is one of the
main battlegrounds on which to establish that inconsistencies do indeed arise
and require their dialetheist solutions. In this chapter I shall consider two
related avenues of argument that have been used to make the case for the in-
consistency of mathematics: firstly, paradoxes which lead to contradictions
internal to mathematics and, secondly, the incompatibility of completeness
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and consistency established by Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems. These two
strands of argument are closely connected, for the most apparently prob-
lematic paradox in the case of mathematics is Go¨del’s paradox, that of the
sentence which says of itself that it is unprovable, which is closely related
to common constructions of Go¨del sentences for formal systems whereby we
get to the balancing act between completeness and consistency.
My response to the two lines of dialetheist argument will bring in con-
siderations from the philosophy of mathematical practice on the nature of
informal proofs. One thing I will argue for is that we should add to the two
axes of completeness and consistency a third axis of formality and informal-
ity. Given this third axis, we can consider the dialetheist arguments in two
different ways. At the informal end, the previously problematic paradoxes
may be genuine, but I argue that there is no compelling reason to see them
as internal to mathematics. Meanwhile, at the formal end of the scale, con-
siderations of the practical role of formalisation in mathematics will allow
me to make a positive case for incompleteness over inconsistency without
begging the question against the dialetheists. My main conclusion will be
that the dialetheist arguments considered do not establish that mathematics
is inherently inconsistent.
Answering the ultimate question of whether mathematics is consistent
from this perspective which encompasses informal proofs and mathematical
practice would, I believe, be a major undertaking, and one which I am not
intending to complete here. The intention is rather to take the first step
in this direction by demonstrating that the matter is not already settled,
since the standard arguments from Go¨del’s theorems and the paradox of
provability do not succeed. In fact, I believe these arguments fall apart
through a number of the assumptions they need about informal proofs, the
nature of mathematics and the process of formalisation, so I shall proceed
to raise these objections in turn.
To begin, section 2.2 will introduce the key distinction between formal
and informal proofs that my arguments will focus on. Next, in section 2.3 I
will lay out what Go¨del’s paradox is and why I do not take it to be a concern
for mathematics. In section 2.4 I present Priest’s longer argument for the
inconsistency of informal mathematics based on the application of Go¨del’s
first incompleteness theorem to informal mathematics and the conclusions
he draws from this concerning the inherent inconsistency of informal math-
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ematics. In section 2.5, I argue that the way of understanding formalisation
on which Priest’s argument succeeds is a bad one, then show that a better
understanding means the argument no longer goes through. In sections 2.6
and 2.7, I argue against the thought that we can formalise mathematics as
a single theory, proposing that a better thought would be to approach for-
malisation in a fragmented way. Finally, in section 2.8 I consider formality
and informality as a third axis, and a final argument against Priest that he
changes the subject in switching between the formal and the informal.
2.2 Formal and Informal Proofs
Before we can begin, we need to be sufficiently clear on the distinction
between formal and informal proofs, as this will play a central role in the
remainder of this chapter.1
Formal proofs are those which are studied in logic and proof theory,
and may be defined in the usual way. For example, we might define a
formal language, give rules for well-formed formulae in that language, specify
axioms to be taken as basic and lay down inference rules for stepping between
formulae. A formal proof (relative to such a specified system) will be a
(usually finite) sequence of formulae where each is either an axiom or follows
stepwise from previous formulae by an application of one of the inference
rules, where the final formula is a statement of what was to be proven and
is thus established as a theorem in the system.
However, formal proofs are rarely seen in actual mathematical practice.
Instead the type of proofs that are employed by mathematicians in their
daily activities, teaching and published work tend to be very different. In
most cases no formal language is specified, axioms are rarely given and
inferences are not confined to just the basic rules. Steps in these proofs
can rather be leaps, and they can invoke the background knowledge of the
target audience, the semantic understanding of the terms being employed,
visualisation, diagrams and topic-specific styles of reasoning. Let us call
proofs in this sense informal proofs. Although this would be extremely
unsatisfying as a definition, it is certainly not intended as such as one of the
1A terminological note: while I speak of ‘informal proofs’ and ‘formal proofs’, some
of the literature on this subject instead speaks of ‘proofs’ and ‘derivations’ to get at the
same distinction. In (Priest 1987), Priest also uses the term ‘na¨ıve proof’ to refer to the
informal proofs.
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main challenges for philosophers of mathematical practice is to pin down
exactly what counts as a good, legitimate, correct and rigorous informal
proof and filling this out further would take me beyond the scope of this
chapter. Nonetheless, there is a good deal of literature that does deal with
this issue that elaborates on the distinction I am invoking (see Robinson
1991; Hersh 1997; Rav 1999; Leitgeb 2009; Antonutti Marfori 2010; Larvor
2012).
A number of the differences between these two types of proof will af-
fect the assessment of whether the arguments I am considering successfully
establish that mathematics is inconsistent. Go¨del’s first incompleteness the-
orem relates to proof as an explicitly defined, formal notion attached to a
formal system and one of my main counter-arguments in what is to come
is that this will not transpose across to apply to informal proofs. Go¨del’s
proof tells us about the limits of formal systems which meet certain condi-
tions, like having a certain degree of expressive power, being able to prove
a certain amount of basic mathematics (enough to allow for the required
coding etc.) and having an effective procedure for enumerating its theo-
rems. What will be required for the dialetheist line to work, then, will be
to show that informal proofs are close enough to formal ones to even be-
gin applying these conditions. I will argue to the contrary that informal
proofs are sufficiently different from formal proofs that the argument does
not succeed. Some key differences of informal proofs that will play a role
later include the social and contextual components of whether such a proof
is successful or not; the partially-fragmented nature of modern (informal)
mathematics; and the fact that informal mathematics extends to include
diagrammatic proofs which have more intuitive inferential rules. Finally,
even if the dialetheist arguments manage to establish that informal proofs
can be formalised appropriately, there will still be the need to show that the
conditions are met.2
Before getting the details of the argument from Go¨del’s theorems, let
me assess whether a simpler argument from paradox outlined by Beall is
sufficient to show that mathematics is inconsistent.
2In (Priest 1987), Priest argues that these conditions will be met. I believe that the
flawed step in the argument is the earlier one of formalisation (as will be covered in section
2.5), so I will not actively engage in a discussion about whether this formalisation will
have an effective calculus etc.
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2.3 Go¨del’s Paradox and Beall’s Argument
The first argument I will consider is based on Go¨del’s paradox. Let us begin,
therefore, by examining the paradox:
GP: This sentence is (informally) unprovable.
Suppose GP is false; then it is informally provable. Since we take our infor-
mal mathematical proofs to establish mathematical truths, it follows that
GP is also true. Yet this contradicts the assumption that GP is false, so
using proof by contradiction we establish that GP is true. However, since
we have just proved GP, it is informally provable. But GP states that it is
unprovable, so it must be false. Contradiction.
Now consider how it is that this paradox might show that mathematics
is inconsistent. Beall gives the following argument:
There seems to be little hope of denying that [GP] is indeed
a sentence of our informal mathematics. Accordingly, the only
way to avoid the above result is to revert to formalising away the
inconsistency— a response familiar from the histories of na¨ıve
set theory, na¨ıve semantic theory, and so on. If one does this,
however, then (by familiar results) one loses completeness, which
can be regained only by endorsing inconsistency. Either way,
then, we seem to be led to inconsistent mathematics. (Beall
1999, p. 324)
Setting aside the option to formalise away the inconsistency until section
2.4, the initial argument is that since GP is part of mathematics and GP
leads to an inconsistency, it must therefore be that there is an inconsistency
in mathematics. In the rest of this section I will undertake the (purportedly
hopeless) task of denying that GP is part of mathematics.
The only sensible suggestion as to why GP should be part of mathemat-
ics, it would seem, is that GP concerns the broadly mathematical concept
of informal provability. I contend, though, that this is not sufficient to make
GP a statement of mathematics. The reason is that I take the concept of
informal proof to be used to talk and reason about mathematics without it
being a part of the subject matter of mathematics. While the former is ob-
vious, for the paradox to render mathematics inconsistent we actually need
the latter, more contentious claim. Of course, I hold that informal proof
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and provability are very important notions in talking about mathematics,
but it is crucial to emphasise that these are notions about mathematics. To
establish that the paradox will render mathematics inconsistent, though, we
need the extra claim that it is a part of informal mathematics. In general,
a statement being about mathematics and a statement being part of math-
ematics can coincide, but certainly don’t always. Consider the following:
(1) Mathematics is traditionally done on blackboards.
(2) This square building with 12m sides must have an area of 144m2.
(3) 111, 111, 111× 111, 111, 111 = 12, 345, 678, 987, 654, 321.
(4) Ron likes bacon and eggs.
Here (1) is a statement about mathematics but is not itself a part of mathe-
matics. In contrast, (2) is a mathematical statement which is being applied
to a situation, so in a relevant sense is not about mathematics. The third
item is both mathematical as a statement and about a mathematical fact,
while the fourth sentence is neither. Since these two notions can be pulled
apart with minimal effort, that a sentence falls under one of them certainly
can’t constitute a reason to think that it falls under the other. It can
therefore be concluded that the notion of informal provability being about
mathematics is not sufficient to establish that GP falls within mathematics.
One can also give positive arguments as to why informal provability
should not be considered a concept within mathematics. For example, the
lack of a precise mathematical definition we observed in section 2.2 clearly
supports the claim that informal provability is not a notion within the sub-
ject matter of mathematics. Nor does it interrelate with other mathematical
concepts in the way that standard mathematical concepts do (such as, for
example, group, integer, derivative, line, etc.). The only notable conceptual
link it has is with truth, as exploited by the paradox, but if anything the
informal notion of truth in mathematics (before being formalised into some
formal theory of truth) will belong to the same category of notions about
mathematics that are not within mathematics.
By denying that informal provability is a concept within informal math-
ematics, it can consequently also be denied that GP is a sentence of our
informal mathematics. It is thus reasonable to deny that Beall has showed
that informal mathematics is inconsistent by using GP. This certainly does
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not provide an ultimate solution to Go¨del’s paradox, but it does keep the
derived inconsistency out of mathematics and allows us to set aside the
paradox to be solved in line with whatever one’s favourite solution is to
paradoxes generally.3
Now, let me note two things about what has gone on here which will
be recurrent throughout the chapter. Firstly, although this section does not
solve Go¨del’s paradox, this is not really necessary for the purposes of the
current project. Beall, Priest and others have a substantial case for the
inconsistency of natural languages, a case which is not the target of this
chapter and would have to be addressed separately if one were so inclined.
For both of these authors the claim that mathematics is inconsistent is
an additional one that is supported by additional argumentation and it is
precisely these arguments which I am targeting. Thus, by rejecting that
Go¨del’s paradox is part of mathematics, what has been done is to show
that these additional arguments do not cover more ground than the original
case for the inconsistency of natural languages and therefore don’t provide
added support for dialetheism from the realm of mathematics. Secondly, the
separation between being part of mathematics and the concepts used about
mathematics is not just a way to re-introduce the object language/meta-
language distinction for informal mathematics. A separation of languages is
not important because the point is not really one about languages, instead
it is about the subject-matter of mathematics. While we may use GP to
argue that the concept of informal provability is inconsistent, this does no
more work than the liar or any other semantic paradox unless it infects the
realm of mathematics. As such, showing that informal proof is not the kind
of thing to be investigated mathematically blocks the argument considered
in this section.
3A final note on Beall: although the argument I am criticising is from an older paper,
the response offered here would fit well with Beall’s more recent work in (Beall 2009). The
suggestion I have made may be appropriated to make the case that informal proof should
join truth in the category of useful devices, which when introduced bring ‘merely’ semantic
paradoxes as by-products or ‘spandrels’ without thereby rendering the base language (in
this case, that of mathematics) inconsistent.
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2.4 Priest’s Argument for the Inconsistency of In-
formal Mathematics
In Chapter 3 of (Priest 1987), entitled “Go¨del’s Theorem”, Priest makes use
of Go¨del’s paradox in the same way as Beall subsequently went on to do,
arguing that it shows that informal mathematics is inconsistent. In Priest’s
case, however, it is given as the culmination of a longer argument which
aims to show that informal proof satisfies the conditions for Go¨del’s first
incompleteness theorem in such a way as to lead to its inconsistency. This
section will focus on explaining the details of Priest’s argument.
Priest wants to show that informal proof is susceptible to Go¨del’s first
incompleteness theorem. The first hurdle is that the theory of informal
proofs is, on the surface at least, not formal and hence not immediately
susceptible to Go¨del’s theorem. Priest addresses this in the following way:
It should be said at once that naive proof, or at least the naive
theory it generates, is not a formal theory in the sense of the
theorem; but it is accepted by mathematicians that informal
mathematics could be formalised if there were ever a point to
doing so, and the belief seems quite legitimate. The language of
naive proof, a fragment of English, could have its syntax tidied
up so that it was a formal language, and the set of na¨ıve theorems
expressed in this language would be deductively closed. Hence
we may, without injustice, talk about the naive theory as if it
were a formal theory. (Priest 1987, p. 41)4
In section 2.5, I will claim that Priest’s reasoning fails to go through at this
point. For now, though, let us complete Priest’s argument that informal
proof satisfies the conditions of Go¨del’s theorem. The other pieces that
Priest needs are that the formalised theory can express all recursive functions
and that the proof relation of the formalised theory is recursive. He rightly
takes the first requisite to be obviously satisfied and the second to be the
4As the target of his argument, Priest needs to explain what he takes na¨ıve or informal
mathematics to be exactly. He says:
Proof, as understood by mathematicians (not logicians), is that process of
deductive argumentation by which we establish certain mathematical claims
to be true. (Priest 1987, p. 40)
His distinction is, in effect, the same as the distinction between formal and informal
mathematics as found in section 2.2 and throughout this thesis.
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contentious one, listing a number of possible objections and his replies. A
discussion of these would be irrelevant to the purposes of this chapter, so
for now we shall grant that the formalised proof relation is recursive.
Given that Priest has now established that informal proof satisfies the
conditions of Go¨del’s theorem, the thrust of his argument is as follows:
For let T be (the formalisation of) our naive proof procedures.
Then, since T satisfies the conditions of Go¨del’s theorem, if T
is consistent there is a sentence ϕ which is not provable in T ,
but which we can establish as true by a naive proof, and hence
is provable in T . The only way out of the problem, other than
to accept the contradiction, and thus dialetheism anyway, is to
accept the inconsistency of naive proof. So we are forced to admit
that our naive proof procedures are inconsistent. But our naive
proof procedures just are those methods of deductive argument
by which things are established as true. It follows that some
contradictions are true; that is, dialetheism is correct. (Priest
1987, p. 44)
Priest soon makes the link between ϕ and Go¨del’s paradox. For if we take ϕ
to be the formalisation of GP5, the inconsistency of section 2.3 will quickly
re-emerge within the formalisation of informal mathematics. A key point
is that a standard move towards incompleteness over inconsistency is to
separate the object language from the meta-language, but that here we are
dealing with informal proof and informal mathematics, for which there is no
such distinction, meaning that the orthodox move towards incompleteness
is not available. Indeed, this is the entire point of focusing the argument on
informal mathematics.
The conclusion that Priest draws is that we are left with true contradic-
tions and dialetheism.6 Informal mathematics is seen to be inconsistent, but
5The matter is somewhat more complicated than this suggests, of course. Milne
discusses in (Milne 2007) the many ways that Go¨del sentences can be constructed and
what exactly they ‘say’.
6Not just this, though, since Priest takes it that the theory given by the formalisation
of informal mathematics can prove its own soundness and hence must be able to give its
own semantics. From here he takes it to follow that it must be able to prove the T-schema
for this theory inside the theory, giving him all of the paradoxes he describes as semantic
(as opposed to set-theoretic paradoxes). For example, he lists the liar, Grelling’s paradox,
Berry’s paradox, Richard’s paradox and Koenig’s paradox as falling under the umbrella
of semantic paradoxes. In fact, then, Priest argues that “Our naive theory is semantically
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even more penetratingly he can claim that there is no escape from this appli-
cation of the incompleteness theorems to informal mathematics and so “[...]
we might say that our naive proof procedures are not just contingently in-
consistent, but essentially so [...] dialetheism is inherent in thought.” (Priest
1987, pp. 47–48) That dialetheism is inherent in thought is one of the main
claims of In Contradiction, supported by several pillars of argument. The
argument described here that informal mathematics is essentially inconsis-
tent forms one of these pillars, but I shall now argue that this pillar will not
hold any weight.
2.5 Formalising Mathematics
The move from the informal version of mathematics to a formalisation
thereof is, in my opinion, too quick. By endorsing the claim that mathe-
maticians take it that informal mathematics can be formalised, Priest moves
from the informal theory to the formal one without much consideration of
what this move entails or how the mathematicians he is invoking conceive of
the formalisation process. For one thing, Priest might not want to endorse
the na¨ıve claims of mathematicians at all, since they most likely take math-
ematics to also only be consistent. If such claims were definitive it might
thus spell the end of dialetheism.
Nevertheless, it is worth considering how exactly the idea that mathe-
matics should be formalisable will work precisely. In the first half of this
section I discuss two options, along with how they interact with Priest’s ar-
gument. The first follows a straightforward interpretation of Priest’s claim
but is shown to fail as an account of the formalisation of informal mathemat-
ics. The second avoids the problems with the first but, I argue, no longer
lets Priest’s argument go through.
2.5.1 A First Option
Let us call the first option many-one formalisation.7 The idea is that one
takes the entirety of informal mathematics and tidies up the fragment of
closed and inconsistent. By contrast, any consistent theory cannot be semantically closed.”
(Priest 1987, p. 47)
7The ‘many’ here is due to the fact that it might end up being case that multiple
informal proofs are mapped to the same formal proof.
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natural language expressing it to give a formal language. All of the informal
theorems will have particular formal counterparts expressed in this one for-
mal language, and the set of these formalised theorems is then deductively
closed. For the first option, we consider this as the one single correct formal
counterpart for the informal mathematics, a type of super-theory8 of math-
ematics, in which all the current basic assumptions and their consequences
are contained. This mirrors a standard idea of formalisation involving a
routine procedure of ‘filling in the gaps’ as is discussed, for instance, in the
debate between Rav (Rav 1999, 2007) and Azzouni (Azzouni 2004a, 2005a)
though ultimately rejected by both. Since the formalisation that occurs is
crucial to the application of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem to infor-
mal mathematics, it would be very convenient for Priest’s argument if the
picture that is sketched here is the correct one, as this would take formali-
sation to effectively reduce informal mathematics to something formal, and
thereby allow the argument to proceed.
Unfortunately, we have good reason to think that this picture cannot be
correct. It is obvious that tidying-up syntax is not going to be a many-one
mapping. If we start with the natural-language versions of our mathematical
theorems, there will be a whole selection of ways in which we can reproduce
these theorems in some particular formal language. Even translating very
simple fragments of mathematics into simple formal systems can easily lead
to a plurality of results. Scaling this up to include all of mathematics
exacerbates this problem significantly. Add to that the fact that we don’t
start with a particular formal language that we are to be translating the
informal into, but instead generate it “on the fly” based on the syntax of
our informal mathematics. That there will only be one possible result is not
very plausible.9
Note also that the conversion of informal mathematics into this super-
theory is not really like the standard conversion of informal mathematics
into some ‘foundational’ theory such as ZFC set theory, which is potentially
8I use the terms ‘super-theory’ and ‘super-system’ throughout this chapter. I do not
intend anything of the ‘super-’ prefix besides emphasising that it is all-encompassing of
mathematics in the way described.
9An anonymous referee suggests that we may be able to distinguish between a plurality
of results which are equivalent under translation and those which genuinely disagree.
I believe, however, that this will not save the argument. In the critical discussion of
Azzouni’s formalist account of proofs in chapter 1, I have argued that such a move is not
going to deliver the substantial kind of formalisation required for the argument to proceed.
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what Priest has in mind for the mathematicians that he invokes. For if
this were the case we would quickly find ourselves with the Benacerrafian
problem that there are a large number of different adequate representations
for our informal concepts (see Benacerraf 1965). This would lead us out of
the first option and its super-theory, into a picture where there are multiple
different formalisations of informal mathematics.
I would like to emphasise here that the worry I am raising with the
generated super-theory is nothing to do with its inconsistency (for such a
theory would undoubtedly be inconsistent) and as such it is not open to the
usual charge of begging the question against the dialetheist.
2.5.2 A Second Option
As a second option, Priest could hold that the formalisation process for all
mathematics that he is after is actually a case of many-many formalisation.
As I have already argued, there may be many different formalisations of
mathematics, which Priest can accept as the case in order to avoid the
problems presented against the many-one formalisation picture. In essence,
this approach is embracing the plurality of formalisations as opposed to
letting it become a problem.
However, accepting this path immediately adds an extra complication to
the argument, in that now Priest’s claims about the formalised version of
informal proof must implicitly be quantifying over formalisations. In par-
ticular, each time he mentions the formalised version of a proof of informal
mathematics, there is no one thing this refers to but instead a selection of
different formalised versions of the informal proof. The next natural ques-
tion to follow this up with is how to determine which formalisations fall
under this quantification for any given proof. Put another way: which for-
malisations of informal mathematics will be adequate and acceptable? For
example, a formal language which is too expressively weak to even state
standard theorems would be inadequate and unacceptable. The question,
then, comes down to finding (and defending) criteria of adequacy for these
formalisations of informal mathematics.
Formalisation, as it is being conceived of here, is not a process of ex-
posing an underlying logical form already present in the informal proof, or
any thought in this direction. I take this to be the case because informal
proofs will underdetermine the language, system and structure that such a
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proof would adhere to and have. It is instead taken to be a process that
is inextricably linked to the context in which it occurs. Relevant factors
include the agent performing the formalisation, their purposes in doing so
and the formal theory they intend to formalise the given informal proof into.
It might be useful here to consider an analogy to Carnap’s notion of explica-
tion (as in Carnap 1945) where there is also no definitive fact of the matter
as to what the correct explication is for some given concept. Instead the
different results are compared and evaluated using pragmatic measures such
as usefulness, simplicity, explanatoriness and precision.
In a similar way, there could be a whole range of formalisations that can
be of varying degrees of usefulness in making some informal piece of math-
ematical reasoning fully formal. In Priest’s formalisation of all of informal
mathematics we may find a number of different results which are of vary-
ing degrees of usefulness, explanation, accuracy, simplicity etc. Of course,
amongst these there may be a number of formalisations that we would want
to recognise as inadequate, such as that in the above example of an expres-
sively weak language. We want some way of excluding these examples of
‘bad’ formalisations of informal mathematics from being implicitly quanti-
fied over in Priest’s argument. However Priest would want to go about this
project, we can see that it adds significant philosophical ground that needs
to be supplemented to the argument in question before it goes through.10
2.6 On Mathematical Super-Theories
A new worry that emerges from the consideration of different formalisations
concerns the reliance on one (or indeed many) mathematical super-theories.
Since we have seen the analogy to Carnap and want to evaluate our for-
malisations using pragmatic principles, we must consider whether unified
mathematical super-theories, in the sense that Priest has proposed, are in-
deed the best when evaluated in this way. In this subsection I will briefly
consider three reasons why this might not be the case.
Before I begin, though, let us just make explicit why for Priest’s argu-
ment there is now the need to formalise all of informal mathematics in one
10An anonymous referee proposes an additional argument against Priest based on this
section: that the translation on the many-many case is not effective means that informal
proof can therefore not meet the minimum requirements for falling under Go¨del’s theorems.
Grist to the mill!
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go, in its entirety, into a super-theory. If this is not done another key step of
the argument cannot go through, namely the step where it is insisted that
the Go¨del sentence is indeed provable. If we were to replay the argument just
in arithmetic, for example, we would code in (the formalisation of) informal
provability in arithmetic and soon discover the Go¨del sentence is not prov-
able in this formalisation. But here we would be free to take the traditional
lesson that this is just a limitation on the formalisation, which may well be
incomplete.11 It is only by squeezing out all room for this incompleteness
by quantifying over all mathematics and informal proof simpliciter that the
argument could hope to successfully establish that the answer is actually
inconsistency rather than mere incompleteness.12
Let us now consider why this super-theory will run into difficulties.
One worry may be that different fields or areas of mathematics might be
best served by different formal systems, or even different styles of formal sys-
tems. For example, the study of algebra, set theory and geometry all appear
very different at first glance, and so it may be that they are best served by
being formalised into different formal systems (say, with different proof rules
which better track the kinds of inferences made in these fields). Of course,
the judgment here must be relative to some purpose of formalisation, but
we may take the purpose at hand to be (something like) giving a formal
reconstruction of the informal proofs, which tracks the inferential steps that
were being used. To justify this, recall that Priest’s treatment of informal
mathematics as a formal theory was meant to be “without injustice”.
The first problem I am proposing, then, is that it might be that differ-
ent formal systems, which are tailored to different sub-areas of mathematics,
might allow the more accurate reconstruction of the reasoning present in the
informal proofs for those different areas. It also seems that Priest cannot
point to the fact that the super-system(s) he is after are those that repre-
sent a ‘tidying up’ of the fragment of natural language that mathematics is
expressed in, because the point that is being pressed here is that this talk
is an over-simplification of a more complex process.
Relatedly, the second concern I have is that diagrammatic proofs may
11And we are well used to theories being incomplete for more reasons than Go¨del
theorem. For instance, Peano arithmetic also has examples like Goodstein’s theorem and
the Paris-Harrington theorem.
12Note that this cannot be avoided by insisting that the Go¨del sentence must be part
of na¨ıve arithmetic without running afoul of the distinction of section 2.3.
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lead to a significant worry for Priest. In referring to the “fragment of En-
glish” that informal mathematics is expressed in, Priest seems to miss a
wide selection of mathematics that is communicated pictorially. Pictures
can serve to communicate mathematical facts, but can also function as com-
ponents of informal proofs or proofs in their entirety (see Nelsen 1993, 2000).
How is this to be accommodated in the super-systems which are meant to
formalise all of informal mathematics? What will the formalisation process
do to diagrammatic proofs? If they are simply to be eliminated, this once
again means that informal mathematics is undergoing a drastic change in
the formalisation process. Alternatively, there are formal systems for dia-
grams which may serve to formalise some of the diagrammatic proofs. For
example, there is work towards formal systems of mathematical diagrams in
(Manders 2008) and more explicitly in (Mumma 2010) and (Avigad, Dean
& Mumma 2009). However, we are now engaged in a project of making the
super-systems, which originally sounded straightforwardly close to informal
mathematics, encompass much broader pieces of mathematical reasoning.
At the very least, this is a non-trivial undertaking which involves construct-
ing a mixed-mode formal system which combines traditional syntactic com-
ponents with formal diagrammatics. The work just cited suggests that this
might be possible in certain respects, but it is certainly no mere triviality.
A deeper worry, however, is that we are now able to question whether it will
even be possible to capture all of the mathematical reasoning that occurs
in informal proofs in formal systems, without doing violence to the source
material. I shall return to this line of thought in section 2.8.
A third problem we encounter for the mathematical super-theory can
draw on Priest’s own considerations of mathematical pluralism in (Priest
2012). Modern mathematical investigation extends to examining which re-
sults obtain from adopting different logics to work in. Yet if all the various
investigations of different logics are taken to be part of informal mathemat-
ics, what happens when we formalise them into the one super-theory? Not
only do we face the prospect of systems collapsing into one another, but the
more alarming danger of triviality looms. Observe that some of the logics
we might want to use will include the principle of explosion, most notably
classical logic. As soon as a contradiction arises somewhere in the system
(which is exactly what Priest’s argument is attempting to force), immedi-
ately it follows that the whole super-system is trivialised. This is regardless
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of whether we think that there is something philosophically wrong with
classical mathematics, and the principle of explosion in particular, since we
are just formalising informal mathematics as we found it. This worry also
doesn’t rely on logical pluralism, instead just the more uncontroversial fact
of logical plurality.13 In the case of this worry, Priest’s argument will still go
through but using the fact that a trivial super-system is also inconsistent,
which is hardly a desirable result.
2.7 Fragmented Formalisations
The counter-suggestion to formalising all of informal mathematics simulta-
neously into one super-theory, with which we have seen some serious difficul-
ties, is that the formalisation process may be one that can only be successful
when done in a fragmented way. The suggestion is that constructing a for-
mal system is achievable when we take smaller “chunks” of mathematics
that we want to formalise, just not when we want to take it all at the same
time. Such an understanding would provide reasonable solutions to dealing
with the problems of previous section, without giving up the possibility of
formalising parts of mathematical reasoning.
Let us see why switching from the idea of a super-theory to the frag-
mented approach is not a good option if we want to maintain Priest’s argu-
ment that informal mathematics is inconsistent by Go¨del’s First Incomplete-
ness Theorem. The issue is that the argument relies on capturing informal
mathematics fully to insist that the sentence ϕ, which is unprovable in the
formalised version of informal mathematics but is nonetheless established by
informal proof, must also by provable in the formalised system. If, however,
it fails to obtain that any one theory does successfully formally represent
all of informal mathematics as a whole, then it cannot be insisted that the
last step holds. The point is that we get to the fact that the sentence must
be true in the system because the system includes all informal mathemat-
ical reasoning. If we do not guarantee this, then the inconsistency is not
guaranteed either.
Undermining this last step is sufficient for giving a criticism of Priest’s
argument, but what we have seen so far forms a deeper difficulty. Priest’s
13I take it that, as mathematicians, we don’t need to commit ourselves to the truth, in
some philosophical sense, of the mathematics that is being carried out.
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more general project in In Contradiction is to re-examine the balance be-
tween completeness and consistency, insisting that it is the latter we jettison
in light of Go¨del’s theorems rather than the former, which is the orthodox
choice. Recall that in section 2.3 we set aside Beall’s use of the same bal-
ancing act, where he suggests that when formalising mathematical reason-
ing we are returned to the completeness/consistency dichotomy. What has
implicitly been done here, then, is to use considerations of the process of
formalisation to give an independent motivation for why we might prefer to
end up with an incomplete system when formalising informal proofs, without
making reference to any concerns about consistency.
2.8 On The Formal and The Informal
For all that has been said, I think there is another more devastating ob-
jection to Priest’s argument. In part 2.5.1 we saw that the idea that there
would only be one formalised counterpart of informal mathematics would
not hold any water. However, it was only on this reading that it seemed
acceptable to treat informal mathematics as if it were a formal theory, at
least superficially, stemming from the fact that there was one ‘body’ of infor-
mal mathematics and one formalisation thereof. Nonetheless, having been
discussing the difficulties involved in formalising theories, it should now be
clearer that there was something fishy going on in this step of the argument.
The objection is the following: by moving from informal proof to a for-
malised version thereof, Priest’s argument is guilty of changing the subject.
The argument intended to show that informal proof was inconsistent, and
not just coincidentally but inherently so. Yet, almost immediately in the
reasoning, to get the application of the incompleteness results off the ground,
Priest needs the subject of his argument to be a formal theory. The answer,
therefore, is that mathematics is not a formal theory and that transforming
it to be one will do an injustice to its source material. The argument speaks
as if the multiple representations that informal mathematics can have as
formal systems are identical to the informal mathematics itself, but this is
just a confusion of distinct things.
While Priest was looking to demonstrate that informal mathematics was
inherently inconsistent, an option that is now on the table is that mathemat-
ical reasoning is inherently informal, a view common in the mathematical
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practice literature (e.g. Larvor 2012), or that it may be inherently incom-
plete, or indeed both. The thought would then, in these cases, be that
no formal system would suffice to adequately capture mathematics in its
entirety. Indeed, this is the traditional lesson that people take from the in-
completeness results, but this standard result relies on the question-begging
move from consistency to incompleteness. Now, though, we have seen inde-
pendent motivations for thinking so and rejecting the argument, motivations
stemming from mathematical practice and paying attention to formalisation
as a process.
Priest’s challenge was looking to adjust the balance between consistency
and completeness in favour of the latter over the former. But now, by con-
sidering the third axis of formality and informality, we have obtained a way
to defend incompleteness over inconsistency in the formal setting without
begging the question, and to see incomplete and inconsistent systems as
both serving purposes which may be justified by pragmatic principles. For
the argument relies on a number of assumptions about the nature of for-
malisation which allow one to easily and without injustice take informal
mathematics into formal mathematics. I have, to the contrary, argued that
this distinction runs deep and cannot be bypassed lightly, meaning that ar-
guments that work for formal theories cannot be straightforwardly applied
to informal mathematics, and ultimately that Priest’s argument does not go
through.
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Chapter 3
Mathematical Concepts:
Open-Texture, Dialectics and
Engineering
Proof suggests new mathematics. The novice who studies proofs
gets closer to the creation of new mathematics. Proof is mathe-
matical power, the electric voltage of the subject which vitalizes
the static assertions of the theorems.
— Philip J. Davis & Reuben Hersh (Davis & Hersh 1981, p.
151)
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I will explore something deeply connected to the over-arching
theme of proofs and their formality: the nature of mathematical concepts.
For proofs feature and operate on mathematical concepts and as such the
degree of formality or informality of a proof is closely related to the exactness
of those concepts it deploys. If one believes, like the Formalist-Reductionist,
that informal proofs correspond to formalised counterparts, then one should
also see mathematical concepts as having exact, formal definitions which
can be deployed in those formal proofs. Conversely, rejecting this idea leads
to the opportunity to be more historically sensitive in seeing that mathe-
matical concepts develop over time. Furthermore, we can also be more open
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to the possibility of mathematical concepts not being fully fixed in their
applications.
The philosophy of mathematical practice is heavily influenced by Imre
Lakatos on precisely these issues. Lakatos thought that mathematical con-
cepts were not fully fixed, but instead are changed and developed through the
proofs they appear in. One way to fill out what this means could be through
Waismann’s notion of open texture, where a concept is open-textured when
it is not fully delimited for all potential applications. The first half of this
chapter will bring out the connection between Waismann’s open-texture and
Lakatos’s dialectical approach to the philosophy of mathematics. With the
door hereby open to ongoing conceptual development in mathematics, in the
second half of the chapter I look to connect these ideas to recent work on
conceptual engineering. I will suggest that deploying particular distinctions
and strategies pertaining to conceptual change found in the conceptual en-
gineering literature is a promising route for integrating the formal/informal
axis discussed in the previous chapter with change of concepts in math-
ematics. This will ultimately leave us with three major questions. One
that underlies the conceptual engineering literature concerns whether the
concepts are to be revised or replaced. A second question is whether all
mathematical concepts need to be changed or just some. Finally, we can
wonder if conceptual change is needed for all mathematical contexts or just
some restricted range of them. Of course, the answers relate to one another
and jointly contribute to a view on mathematical conceptual change. I shall
return to these questions at the end of the chapter.
The precise plan for this chapter is as follows. In section 3.2 I will start
by explaining what Waismann holds open texture to be, and comparing
it to Shapiro’s more recent usage of the term, showing that the two are
very close but are different in the particular phenomena they intend to pick
out. Next, in section 3.3, we shall explore Lakatos’s Proofs and Refutations,
focusing on the roles of concepts and proofs. Following this, in section
3.4 I will briefly cover G. T. Kneebone, a figure who has received little to
no attention but pre-empts Lakatos in several crucial respects in proposing
a dialectical philosophy of mathematics. In section 3.5, I will bring the
three figures together and discuss how Waismann’s notion of open texture
is a useful way of describing aspects of the Lakatosian and Kneebonian
accounts. However, we will also see that open texture is just one tool in
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the toolbox for the contemporary undertaking of conceptual engineering,
introduced in section 3.6. Indeed, it has been argued in (Corfield 1997)
that Lakatos fails to appreciate the amount of formal and axiomatic work
that is involved in modern mathematics. In response to this I suggest that
we can draw on this new work in conceptual engineering to supplement
the Lakatosian picture of concepts. In sections 3.7 and 3.8, I consider two
examples of this: Haslanger’s distinction between manifest and operative
concepts and Scharp’s replacement strategy, showing how these might apply
to the mathematical concepts found in mathematical practice.
3.2 Waismann and Open Texture
Let us begin by investigating what it is for a concept to display open tex-
ture, as it is used by Waismann in (Waismann 1968) and Shapiro in (Shapiro
2006).1 It should be noted that although Shapiro follows Waismann in gen-
eral, the exact characterisation of open texture does shift somewhat between
them. I shall set out the two definitions and see how closely they agree.
The main difference between the two seems to come down to the differ-
ence between the potential for sharpening concepts versus the potential for
extending the domain of the concepts.
Waismann introduces the term ‘open texture’ through examples such as
the following regarding our concept of cat :
What, for instance, should I say when that creature later on
grew to gigantic size? Or if it showed some queer behaviour
usually not to be found with cats, say, if, under certain condi-
tions, it could be revived from death whereas normal cats could
not? Shall I, in such a case, say that a new species has come
into being? Or that it was a cat with extraordinary properties?
(Waismann 1968, p. 119)
Further examples include people who show the unusual feature of disappear-
ing and re-appearing, someone who is old enough to remember King Darius
and a lump of gold which emits a new kind of radiation. The point is that
in such surprising situations the concepts we possess do not settle whether
1Shapiro’s book has an appendix focussed entirely on Waismann’s account of open
texture (Shapiro 2006, pp. 210-215).
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these are just unusual manifestations of the familiar concept or the appear-
ance of some new thing entirely. Waismann links this up to two crucial
points: (1) that our concepts are only delimited in some possible directions
and not others, and (2) what he calls “the essential incompleteness of an
empirical description” (Waismann 1968, p. 121).
Waismann never gives an explicit definition of open texture2, but the
relevant property found in the examples appears to be that of (1): that
the concepts we deploy and use to understand the world around us are
not delimited in all possible ways. Indeed, let us take this as the central
component of Waismann’s account of open texture to give the following
definition:
Open Texture 1 (OT1) A concept or term displays open texture iff there
are possible objects falling outside of the standard domain of applica-
tion for which there is no fact of the matter as to whether they fall
under the concept or not.
In other words, Waismann’s idea of open texture concerns the potential to
expand concepts to new or larger domains. Concepts generally do have
a standard domain of application, a range of practical situations in which
we know which objects do and do not fall under that concept. Picking
Waismann’s examples, we are usually good at identifying and agreeing on
which things are and aren’t cats (in contrast with any other pets we might
see), humans (in contrast to shop dummies) and lumps of gold (in contrast
to other metals).3 However, these normal domains do not cover all potential
applications and his examples provide cases where we are asked to apply the
concepts beyond the standard situations, and there is no fact of the matter
as to whether the objects in question should fall under the relevant concepts
or not. Shapiro puts it as follows:
2It may be that open texture itself is the sort of thing that avoids full specification,
such that the concept of open texture is itself open-textured. Such considerations are
familiar from the literature on vagueness. The connection between open texture and
vagueness will be discussed shortly.
3Note the contrastivist spirit of how I have described this agreement on the standard
domains of application and disapplication. Waismann doesn’t have an explicit story of how
we pick out these domains, but seems to favour empirical descriptions. These don’t seem
incompatible if the empirical descriptions are only fine enough to separate out particular
examples from others. The contrastivist pull also seems to be present in the Bartha
quote below. On the other hand, we can just read the contrast here as providing cases of
application and disapplication which are clear in practice.
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We language users introduce terms to apply to certain objects or
kinds of objects, and, of course, the terms are supposed to fail to
apply to certain objects or kinds of objects. As we introduce the
terms, and use them in practice, we cannot be sure that every
possible situation is covered. (Shapiro 2006, p. 210)
A good way to think about this is presented by Bartha in terms of hard and
easy cases:
Typically, the decision about whether the predicate applies in-
volves a nontrivial comparison to paradigm cases or prototypes.
There will be “easy cases” where there is general agreement that
the predicate does or does not apply, and “hard cases” where
applicability is open to debate. (Bartha 2010, p. 9)
Importantly, open texture does not require that we have already identified
such areas of openness, only that it is possible that there are such areas.
The mere potential for new situations to arise in which we can question how
the concepts are applied is enough. We do not need to know in advance
which kinds of questions will push us outside of the standard domain of
application, and in fact we usually don’t know this in advance and usually
don’t predict the difficult situations that might arise for our application of
concepts.
Shapiro’s account of open texture is slightly different. In (Shapiro 2006),
Shapiro is arguing for an account of vagueness which incorporates a strong
flavour of open texture. However, we can observe that the definition he uses
is not quite the same:
Suppose, again, that a is a borderline case of P . I take it as
another premise that, in at least some situations, a speaker is free
to assert Pa and free to assert ¬Pa, without offending against
the meanings of the terms, or against any other rule of language
use. Unsettled entails open. The rules of language use, as they
are fixed by what we say and do, allow someone to go either way.
Let us call this the open-texture thesis. (Shapiro 2006, p. 10)
We may take the characterisation here to be definitional of open texture in
the sense he uses it:
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Open Texture 2 (OT2) A concept or term displays open texture iff there
are cases for which a competent, rational agent may acceptably assert
either that the concept applies or that it disapplies.
While Waismann’s account of open texture is about the extent to which
a concept is delimited, in contrast Shapiro’s definition is about competent
language users being able to go either way on whether or not a term should
be applied or a proposition asserted. What seems to be driving this definition
in the text, though, is that the open texture in OT2 will be applicable to
borderline cases, thus also includes the potential for competent agents to
go about deciding one way or another and sharpening the concepts. The
difference becomes less marked, however, if we realise that on Waismann’s
account, in going beyond a concept’s standard domain a competent speaker
can go either way on the application of the term corresponding to the open-
textured concept, as we have on Shapiro’s definition.
The main difference between the two definitions is with respect to vague-
ness, through which we see that Shapiro’s notion is somewhat broader in a
certain sense. On Shapiro’s account borderline cases of vague terms can
count as open-textured because we can sometimes go either way on whether
the term applies or not, while on Waismann’s definition these will still fall
within the standard domain of application (even if they might be hard to
decide) so wouldn’t count as cases of open texture. For example, taking a
paradigm case of vagueness such as bald, there will be some borderline cases
in which it isn’t clear whether the head in question is bald or not, satisfy-
ing the second definition, nonetheless if the person whose hairline is under
discussion is a normal one then this will be within the standard domain of
application and disapplication of the term ‘bald’ so the first definition will
not be satisfied. However, the term ‘bald’ will still be open-textured on the
first definition because of the possibility of other hard cases not previously
considered, say a two-headed person—maybe where one head has no hair
and the other has some— how do we apply a term like ‘bald’ then? An
interesting upshot, then, will be that the two definitions seem to agree on
the extension of which concepts count as open-textured, because any con-
cepts which permit the vagueness Shapiro is interested in where competent
users are allowed to settle borderline cases either way (thereby satisfying
OT2) will happen to have cases outwith their standard domain of applica-
tion for which there is no fact of the matter (thus also satisfying OT1) by
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the ubiquity of the latter phenomenon. Similarly, if there is no fact of the
matter regarding these non-standard cases, it would be strange to insist that
a rational agent could not be free to settle it either way if we do choose to
extend the cases in this direction.4
Nonetheless, there is clearly a difference in the kind of phenomenon the
two notions are intended to capture. Shapiro’s definition is aimed at the
broader idea which incorporates both open texture in Waismann’s sense
and vagueness, by focusing on the openness in the agent’s settling of the
hard cases. In contrast, Waismann is more concerned with the openness
of new cases and potential applications which the concepts might be put
to. Indeed, Waismann does compare open texture to vagueness, describing
open texture as “something like possibility of vagueness” (Waismann 1968,
p. 120), which is explained as follows:
...a term like ‘gold’, though its actual use may not be vague, is
non-exhaustive or of an open texture in that we can never fill
up all the possible gaps through which a doubt may seep in.
(Waismann 1968, p. 120)
As Shapiro points out (Shapiro 2006, p. 211), Waismann does not say
much more concerning vagueness and certainly doesn’t offer an account.
However, I believe that I have here identified the source of the differences
in the two definitions and their intended phenomena: Shapiro is interested
in the sharpening of terms, with the openness to decide either way, while
Waismann is concerned about how our terms apply to entirely new cases
which might arise.
As a final component in setting out the nature of open texture and Wais-
mann’s definition of it, let us return to point (2) left aside above, concerning
the “the essential incompleteness of an empirical description”. Indeed, I
think this will be useful in elaborating on what is meant by a domain of ap-
plication. The main idea concerns how we describe and define our concepts
or terms5, where Waismann says:
4Although it might well be that there are other demands on a rational agent which
push them one way or the other, changing the picture I am sketching here. For example,
one choice might be rationally preferable over another to remain consistent with the way
other concepts have been settled.
5One thing I have not yet discussed is the difference between a concept and a term,
i.e. whether these are meant to be mental, linguistic or something else. Clearly, Shapiro’s
notion leans far more towards the linguistic side and thus towards ascribing open texture
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A term is defined when the sort of situation is described in which
it is to be used. (Waismann 1968, p. 122)
Waismann’s idea is that the difference between complete and incomplete
descriptions and definitions is crucial. A complete description exhausts all
the details of its subject and a complete definition “anticipates and settles
once for all every possible question of usage” (Waismann 1968, p. 122).
Conversely, an incomplete description can be extended with more details
that haven’t previously been mentioned and an incomplete definition fails
to anticipate and settle usage. Waismann’s point is that most descriptions
of things we find in the world will be incomplete, but even further this
incompleteness will not be settled as we add further details:
[H]owever far I go, I shall never reach a point where my descrip-
tion will be completed: logically speaking, it is always possible
to extend my description by adding some detail or other. Every
description stretches, as it were, into a horizon of open possibili-
ties: however far I go, I shall always carry this horizon with me.
(Waismann 1968, p. 122)
Similarly, according to Waismann a definition will not be able to anticipate
all eventualities meaning “the process of defining and refining an idea will
go on without ever reaching a final stage” (Waismann 1968, p. 123). A
standard domain of application and disapplication, then, might just pick out
those cases which a definition does anticipate and straightforwardly applies
to, which is just to say: Bartha’s “easy cases”.
Let us briefly return to an issue footnoted earlier: whether the notion
of open texture is itself open-textured. The question is very similar to
that of higher-order vagueness, where if we take vagueness to be about
having borderline cases, there are further borderlines as to where those first
borderlines start and finish. That is to say, the conception of what counts as
a borderline case is itself vague. There are several problems pertaining to the
fact that it seems that we may be able to iterate the vagueness of borderlines
of borderline onwards indefinitely, problems which I shan’t cover further but
are discussed with regards to Shapiro’s open-texture account of vagueness by
to terms. Waismann, however, was unsurprisingly less clear on this matter, switching
between concept-talk and term-talk. This is not something I intend to resolve here, nor
do I think much hangs on it for my discussion.
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Greenough in (Greenough 2005). With open texture being defined in both
OT1 and OT2 using other terms which are not given full specifications, I
believe that these terms are prone to open texture and thereby open texture
itself is too. For instance, OT1 refers to domains and, indeed, concepts
and it is not hard to suppose that unexpected cases and interpretations
may arise for these. Even more so, OT2 is in terms of rational, competent
agents, and these will certainly face new cases.6 One could even claim that
the slight shift in the intended usage of open-texture from Waismann’s view
to Shapiro’s demonstrates an instance of the expansion of the domain to
include vagueness as a kind of open texture.
To finish, given that we are going to be investigating mathematical con-
cepts, it is interesting to see that Waismann’s main comparison for the
essentially incomplete empirical terms are the concepts found in mathemat-
ics. For example, he takes the description of a triangle by giving the side
lengths to be complete and discusses enumerating all possible situations in
chess to leave no room for new possibilities to emerge. Put explicitly:
Goldbach’s hypothesis [...] may be undecidable [...] But this
in no way detracts from the closed texture of the mathemati-
cal concepts. If there is no such thing as the (always present)
possibility of the emergence of something new, there could be
nothing like the open texture of concepts. (Waismann 1968, pp.
123-124)
But I believe Waismann is wrong on both the claims that mathematical
concepts are closed-textured and that there is no possibility in the mathe-
matical case of new possibilities arising. Let us turn to Lakatos to see how
this might be the case.
3.3 Lakatos and Proofs & Refutations
Imre Lakatos’s Proofs & Refutations was published posthumously in 1976
as a book edited by John Worrall and Elie Zahar, including additional work
developed from his 1961 PhD Thesis. Previous to this the dialogue sections
had also appeared as a series of four articles as (Lakatos 1963a,b,c,d). In the
6It is already not uncommon to hear computers discussed as a case outwith the stan-
dard domain of application, where we might have reasons to count them as agents in
relevant respects.
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main parts of the text, Lakatos presents a classroom dialogue of a teacher
and students named after letters of the Greek alphabet, discussing various
proofs of Euler’s conjecture for polyhedra, which links the vertices (V), edges
(E) and faces (F) by the formula V − E + F = 2. The brilliance lies in
the fact that the dialogue is also a rational reconstruction of the historical
development of the proofs, counter-examples and concepts involved, where
the various students are used as representatives of various historical positions
and reactions. Sometimes this is in a very direct sense, with footnotes to
the text indicating that the words of the students are quotes from various
mathematicians. All of the main ideas that Lakatos presents are important
to the themes of this thesis, so it is worth going through them in some
detail.7 In particular, for the current setting, the account of mathematical
concepts and their dialectical development will provide us with the main
version of the view which takes mathematical concepts to change over time
rather than being timeless and immutable.
3.3.1 A Briefing on the Proof and Responses to Counterex-
amples
Let us spend a moment on the mathematical case study which Lakatos uses.
The dialogue opens with a statement of the problem: that all polyhedra
satisfy the formula V −E+F = 2, followed by a purported proof8 (originally
stemming from Cauchy) which proceeds roughly by the following method.
1. Imagine a polyhedron to be made of a thin surface of rubber. Then we
can remove one face and stretch the remainder flat onto a surface, for
which we then must show V − E + F = 1 (having removed one face).
2. Triangulate the flat network that the previous step delivered. That is,
for any face that is not already a triangle, we add diagonals and keep
doing so until all faces are triangulated. Since we add an edge and a
face for each diagonal, the equation isn’t affected.
3. Remove triangles from the triangulated network one by one. For this
either we remove an edge and a face, or we remove two edges, a vertex
7It should be noted, though, that I am just focusing on Proofs & Refutations, so will
not spend time on Lakatos’s other papers on mathematics or the philosophy of science.
8One of the big points concerns what proofs amount to, so the exact status of the
various proofs doesn’t divide neatly into correct proofs and merely purported ones.
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and a face. In both cases, the equation V − E + F = 1 is unaffected.
4. Ultimately, we are left with a single triangle, for which V − E + F =
3− 3 + 1 = 1 as required.
Despite indicating that many historical figures were fully convinced by the
above as a proof of Euler’s conjecture (Lakatos 1976, p. 8, fn. 2), the de-
scription of the method as a ‘proof’ does not last long in the dialogue. Im-
mediately the students are suspicious of all three main steps in the method.
For example, the third step fails if one removes a triangle from the inside of
the triangulated network, and furthermore can fail if we choose the wrong
order of removing faces, as pointed out by student Gamma (Lakatos 1976,
p. 11).
Prompted by the different kinds of problems that arise, the Teacher dis-
tinguishes between local counterexamples and global counterexamples. Global
counterexamples present a counterexample to the theorem, while local coun-
terexamples demonstrate a flaw in a lemma. For instance, the cases just
mentioned which are brought up by Gamma are local counterexamples to
the third step in the proof. Further examples appear of polyhedra which
can’t always be stretched flat after removing a face, such as the nested
cubes, or can’t necessarily be triangulated, such as the crested cube with
its ring-shaped face, which therefore are local counterexamples to steps 1
and 2 respectively. For the nested cubes and the crested cube, though, the
equations are V −E+F = 4 and V −E+F = 3 respectively, meaning they
are also global counterexamples to Euler’s conjecture.
Lakatos reviews numerous possible responses to the problematic cases
that arise, again made concrete by the footnotes revealing that these were
all positions taken by historical figures. Let us review the responses in turn
with some comments on how well they work.
Method 1: The Method of Surrender
A single counterexample refutes the conjecture as effectively as
ten. The conjecture and its proof have completely misfired.
Hands up! You have to surrender. —Gamma (Lakatos 1976,
p. 13)
The response offered by Gamma is passed over rather quickly, mainly be-
cause it offers very little. The idea is that if a global counterexample appears
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to a conjecture, then the conjecture is false and must be abandoned. Such
a response might be appropriate in some cases, and might seem natural to
modern mathematicians, but the response is too extreme in that it also is
clear that we are unlikely to hit on the right answers on our first attempt,
and yet the ways in which we go wrong can be informative in improving
and refining the key ideas, something which is a main point that Lakatos is
making.
Method 2: The Method of Monster-Barring
It is the ‘criticism’ that should retreat. It is a fake criticism. The
pair of nested cubes is not a polyhedron at all. It is a monster, a
pathological case, not a counterexample. —Delta (Lakatos 1976,
p. 14)
The response espoused by Delta is that of monster-barring, in which global
counterexamples are themselves rejected as not being genuine instances of
the key concepts, and therefore should be rejected as counterexamples too.
For instance, in the text numerous polyhedra are proposed which are coun-
terexamples to the conjecture, but Delta offers new definitions of the concept
of ‘polyhedron’ which each add additional necessary conditions which serve
to rule out the tricky cases and thereby the counterexamples. This is aptly
mocked in the text with the ‘definition’ of a polyhedron as anything which
satisfies the conjecture (Lakatos 1976, p. 16), revealing the ad hoc nature of
ruling out problematic cases. In essence, the notion of a polyhedron “defines
the domain of application” (Martin & Pease 2013, p. 102) for the conjec-
ture and thus deciding on what counts as a polyhedron can be employed to
decide whether the theorem will remain valid or not. Initially, the stream of
new definitions given by Delta are seen as contracting the concept of poly-
hedron to rule out the many examples that have already been encountered9,
but monster-barring is given a second hearing later in the book, where the
student Pi suggests that it may be that Delta was merely scrambling for
definitions to defend a view of what counted as a polyhedron which had
seemed natural but turned out to be na¨ıve:
Let us go back to the time of the first explorers of our subject.
9Despite protestations from Delta: “I do not contract concepts. It is you who expand
them.” (Lakatos 1976, p. 21)
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[...] For the polyhedra they had in mind, the conjecture was
true as it stood and the proof was flawless. Then came the
refutationists. In their critical zeal they stretched the concept
of polyhedron, to cover objects that were alien to the intended
interpretation. —Pi (Lakatos 1976, p. 84)
This discussion of what delimits concepts and their application will be rel-
evant to the notion of open texture when we return to it later.
Method 3: The Method of Exception-Barring
No conjecture is generally valid, but only valid in a certain do-
main that excludes exceptions. —Beta (Lakatos 1976, p. 24)
The method here is to endorse the positive aspects of monster-barring,
namely to give a precise characterisation of the domain of validity for the
conjecture, while avoiding the endless moves just intended to not have to
give up the theorem to counterexamples. Of course, the precision with which
the domain can be picked out is quickly undermined for a distinctly Wais-
mannian reason: the Teacher points out the possibility of new cases arising
which show that the excluded exceptions might not be the only problematic
cases. Under pressure, Beta is left to retreat into smaller and smaller do-
mains while still failing to arrive at any confidence that these domains are
necessarily safe, i.e. that the theorem will be true for all cases there.
Method 4: The Method of Monster-Adjustment
Monsters don’t exist, only monstrous interpretations. One has
to purge one’s mind from perverted illusions, one has to learn
how to see and how to define correctly what one sees. —Rho
(Lakatos 1976, p. 31)
The method of monster-adjustment works not by rejecting the global coun-
terexamples, but instead by changing the way they are interpreted. In
particular, this can work by changing our understanding of sub-concepts.
The motivating case in the text is how to interpret the small stellated do-
decahedron. In the text this shape is introduced as having twelve star-
pentagon faces, twelve vertices only at the tips and thirty edges, whereby
V −E+F = 12−30+12 = −6, which means that the stellated dodecahedron
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does not satisfy the Euler conjecture. However, Rho’s suggestion is to see
the faces instead as the individual triangles, thereby reinterpreting the shape
as a “triangular hexacontaeder”. On this reading, there are sixty triangular
faces, vertices joining them all to a total of thirty two, and edges on each of
the triangular faces adding up to ninety. Now V −E+F = 32−90 + 60 = 2
satisfying the Euler conjecture.
What is interesting in what the method of monster-adjustment brings
out is the deep way in which concepts in mathematics are interrelated. Eu-
ler’s conjecture does not merely rely on the concept of a polyhedron, but
also on a range of related and interrelated concepts, especially the concepts
of face, edge and vertex. Changing the interpretation of these will result in a
different outcome for the Euler formula. While the change of interpretation
in the one case considered might be a good one or not, the reason that it is
not taken up much beyond its initial proposal seems to be that it is severely
limited in scope.10
Method 5: The Method of Lemma-Incorporation
I build the very same lemma which was refuted by counterexam-
ple into the conjecture, so that I have to spot it and formulate it
as precisely as possible, on the basis of a careful analysis of the
proof. —Teacher (Lakatos 1976, p. 36)
The idea here is that many global counterexamples will also be local coun-
terexamples to certain lemmas in the proof. For example, many of the
problematic examples for polyhedron fail on the first step of the proof of
flattening out the polyhedron minus one face onto a surface, so the Teacher’s
method is to restrict the domain of validity for the theorem to the domain
where the first lemma does indeed hold. The difference from exception-
barring, then, is that exception-barring is ad hoc in ruling out examples as
they arise, whereas lemma-incorporation is intended to achieve similar ends
but by analysing what went wrong in the proof and adding restrictions to
improve it. Thus lemma-incorporation has a reason for the exceptions it
10The method of monster-adjustment is brought up again at (Lakatos 1976, pp. 38-39,
fn. 2). Here it concerns the positing of hidden faces and edges to show that counterex-
amples are Eulerian after all. Lakatos is not impressed and rightly so: if one can posit
these willy-nilly then nearly any proposed polyhedron can be adjusted to fit the Euler
conjecture.
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introduces: these are the restrictions generated by examining why and how
local counterexamples undermine the proof steps and how to avoid them.
On the downside, lemma-incorporation is seen as still too tied to exception-
barring methods. The lemmas one builds in might be sufficient to mark out a
safe domain, but still this is not guaranteed, as is evidenced by the Teacher
needing to backtrack on the exact lemmas incorporated into Euler’s con-
jecture. Furthermore, the listing of proof-generated restrictions without a
record of why they are given is the main feature of the Deductivist approach
which Lakatos criticises, something we will return to later.
Method 6: The Method of Proof(s) and Refutations
[O]ne cannot put proofs and refutations into separate compart-
ments. —Lambda (Lakatos 1976, p. 49)
The method of proof and refutations (soon re-dubbed to the titular method
of proofs and refutations) is the final methodology emerging from the others,
and the main approach advocated by Lakatos. This method, according to
Lakatos, encapsulates the dialectical development of mathematical concepts,
proofs and theories. The method proceeds by four stages (see Lakatos 1976,
p. 127):
1. A na¨ıve conjecture.
2. A ‘proof’ is offered for the conjecture, where ‘proof’ is not a success
term but instead represents a “rough thought-experiment” where the
na¨ıve conjecture is decomposed into a series of lemmas or subconjec-
tures.
3. Global counterexamples are found.
4. ‘Proof re-examined’: the global counterexample is examined and found
to also be a local counterexample to particular lemmas in the original
proof. A re-examination of the problematic lemmas leads to incorpo-
rating restrictions into the conjecture, or a development of the concepts
being deployed (to proof-generated concepts) which can then be used
to state an improved conjecture-and-proof pair.
Of course, the central example of Euler’s conjecture presents a rational re-
construction and Lakatos points out that therefore this is not an exact pat-
tern that will be followed in general. The third and fourth stages might
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be bound up more closely, such as if a careful proof-analysis uncovers the
counterexamples. The responses in the fourth item show a fork in the road,
where several mathematically interesting things might happen, ranging from
a simple restriction on the domain of validity to the creation of a new concept
through the proof-analysis. In many ways this method is the culmination
of the lessons learned from the various other methods considered, taking on
their positive attributes as part of the heuristic, while minimising their var-
ious problems. While the four stages describe the main idea of this method,
further discussion reveals that there are additional important stages that of-
ten feature in the analysis of proofs with an end to mathematical discovery
and development. These are (see Lakatos 1976, p. 128):
5. Checking related proofs of other theorems to see if any of the new
concepts or lemmas occur in them, which might show that these are
of additional importance.11
6. Checking accepted consequences of the original conjecture.
7. Converting counterexamples into new examples and thereby revealing
new fields of inquiry.
These additional steps broaden out the scope of where the process is taking
place, rather than being limited to a particular conjecture, proof and their
various developments, instead these additional stages acknowledge that the
conjectures and theorems are not isolated from surrounding mathematics.
The link between the method of proofs and refutations and the develop-
ment of concepts is what we shall turn to next.
3.3.2 Concepts and a Dialectical Philosophy of Mathematics
One of the major themes of Proofs and Refutations, is the development and
change of mathematical concepts, as well as the close connection this has to
practices of proving.
A particularly important notion for conceptual change in Lakatos is that
of the heuristic counterexample. These serve not to refute the theorem as
logically false, but to show that it falls short in its scope. In particular,
11This stage is shown clearly at work in Lakatos’s description of the discovery of uniform
convergence in (Lakatos 1976, Appx. I).
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these may be cases of relevant examples which are not covered by the theo-
rem or concepts as they stand. In the central example, the initial proof only
applied to a very limited class of polyhedra and so many of the counterexam-
ples initially appeared to be logical ones. However, in the reconsideration of
monster-barring discussed above, it emerges that the initial concept of poly-
hedron may not have been intended to apply to the broad class of examples
that were raised in the dialogue. As such, these were instances of heuristic
counterexamples, in that they showed the limited scope of the notions in-
volved in the proof. What we shall return to in section 3.5 is the echoes of
Waismann in this: one can see heuristic counterexamples as falling outside
of the standard domains of application and disapplication, showing thereby
the poverty of the concepts with respect to the larger domain.
Initially, the class begins with poorly delineated, na¨ıve concepts of things
such as polyhedron, edge, vertex and face. This comes out particularly
clearly, for instance, in the difference between treating polyhedra as hollow
surfaces and treating them as solid objects, which both appear early on. As
the students examine more problems with the initial proof and counterexam-
ples to the initial conjecture, they start to change their concepts in response
to the challenges that appear. Lakatos’s term for the concepts that emerge is
proof-generated concepts. Proof-generated concepts are those concepts that
arise from the na¨ıve concepts we begin with through the method of proofs
and refutations. Lakatos is careful to point out, though, that it would be
inaccurate to see them as simply specifications, generalisations, expansions
or the like of the na¨ıve concepts:
The impact of proofs and refutations on naive concepts is much
more revolutionary than that: they erase the crucial naive con-
cepts completely and replace them by proof-generated concepts.
—Pi (Lakatos 1976, pp. 89–90)
So what has gone on is that the method of proofs and refutations involves the
identification of (1) flawed or limited lemmas and (2) what has gone wrong in
particular instances that have been encountered, drawing out the problems
in them and incorporating additional conditions to give a new proof which
is not subject to the counterexample. However, through repeated iterations
of the cycle of proofs and refutations, the fresh conditions can form into new
concepts. As Larvor puts it:
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If this pattern is repeated sufficiently often, these conditions may
accumulate to the point where they collectively define a new
concept. (Larvor 1998, p. 13)
In fact, it seems that what has gone on in the dialogue is something more
intricate than this. As was noted in describing monster-adjustment and dis-
cussed by Larvor immediately after the above quote, mathematical concepts
are deeply intertwined, such as in the relations between ‘polyhedron’, ‘face’
and ‘edge’. It is not at all clear that you can change one without changing
the other related concepts. For example, in the case of the ‘urchin’ (that is,
the stellated dodecahedron) the difference between seeing it as having star-
pentagram faces as opposed to triangular faces is fully intertwined with how
one counts the edges, i.e. whether one sees each face as having five or ten
edges. But this does not seem to necessarily fall out of simply putting to-
gether new conditions as they appear through proof-analysis, without some
associated conceptual analysis.
Of course, that an analysis of the proofs is required to see the place of
the concepts within them, and to generate new ones, is just part of Lakatos’s
very idea. For one thing, the listed rules of the method of proofs and refu-
tations are not strict rules but instead an attempt to induct the reader into
a different methodology for the philosophy of mathematics. Observe the
difference between the two summaries given of the method of proofs and
refutations. The first description of the method of proofs and refutations
(Lakatos 1976, p. 50) is given as a list of general rules, putting them in an
imperitival form stating how one should go about applying the method. The
later summary of the method (which I have used above) is a description of
the stages of the pattern of mathematical discovery. Clearly these two de-
scriptions are not the same12, and the reason is that neither an overly-specific
set of rules nor a description of the patterns of mathematical discovery are
meant to capture the methodology in full. Rather the method of proofs
and refutations is part of Lakatos’s broader project of offering a dialectical
philosophy of mathematics.
Already this provides an answer to a particular criticism offered by Fe-
ferman in his response to Lakatos:
12Most papers that describe the method of proofs and refutations seem to ignore this
fact, simply setting out one of the descriptions. e.g. (Corfield 1997, p. 100). Ernest
does better, setting out only one description but observing the different functions that the
method plays (Ernest 1997, pp. 117–118).
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A related question is whether the method of proofs and refuta-
tions is supposed to be descriptive or normative. It seems at best
that it could be descriptive of progress since 1847. But much of
the tenor of the discussion leads one to view it as normative.
(Feferman 1978, p. 316)13
Of course there is the potential for confusion here. The first description
of the method of proofs and refutations in terms of rules seems to fit a
normative reading, while casting it in the light of stages in a pattern of
mathematical discovery seems to fall into a descriptive reading. The an-
swer is, I believe, that this is a false dichotomy. For one thing, the dialogue
is a rational reconstruction, so is intended as neither an entirely accurate
description14 nor simply to declare how to go about discovering new math-
ematical theorems, concepts and proofs. Rather, it is meant partially as a
demonstration that mathematical discovery is a rational process predomi-
nantly driven by mathematical ends. Certainly, this involves both normative
and descriptive elements, but Feferman is wrong to expect it to fall neatly
into one or the other.
Dialectical philosophy of mathematics has several major features which
distinguish it from the more traditional approaches, as described in (Larvor
2001). Larvor sets out the following key points of what such a dialectical
philosophy of mathematics involves on the Lakatosian programme:
Internal Stance: To see that “changes in the body of mathematics nor-
mally take place for mathematical reasons” (Larvor 2001, p. 215)
While this is certainly defeasible (mathematical changes can take place
due to many other factors), the idea is to see that the development
of mathematics follows a rational pattern, rather than one marked by
arbitrary decision or spontaneous insights.
Human Minds in Mathematics: “Dialectical philosophy [...] typically
recognises that human minds, however fallible, are the only available
vehicles for the greater rationality of science.” (Larvor 2001, p. 215)
13The year 1847 is significant as the year Lakatos mentions the method of proofs and
refutations to have been discovered by Seidel, (see Lakatos 1976, p. 131, p. 139). I have
changed the emphasis in the quote here from underlining to italics.
14Lakatosian wit tells us a little about his view on the relationship between history and
its reconstruction: “Pi’s statement, although heuristically correct (i.e. true in a rational
history of mathematics) is historically false. (This should not worry us: actual history is
frequently a caricature of its rational reconstructions.)” (Lakatos 1976, p. 84)
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Concepts Over Propositions: To be interested in the nature and devel-
opment of concepts, ahead of the propositions that involve them. Lar-
vor notes this to be something Lakatos follows Hegel on.
Dialectical and Formal Logic: The previous item involves a split be-
tween dialectical and formal logic, where dialectical argument develops
concepts while formal logic keeps them fixed to avoid fallacious equiv-
ocation.
Different Notions of Rigour: Another idea rooted in Hegel, that the
“formal and dialectical logics have different aims and incompatible
standards of rigour; so we ought not to mix them up.” (Larvor 2001,
p. 217).
Ontological Neutrality: dialectical philosophy of mathematics has noth-
ing to say on the ultimate ontological and metaphysical basis of math-
ematics, since the methodology makes neither assumptions concerning
them nor does it have any way of deciding between rival accounts.
All of these are, of course, evident in Lakatos’s work towards building this
dialectical school of philosophy of mathematics. The “fundamental dialecti-
cal unity of proof and refutation” (Lakatos 1976, p. 37) is at play precisely
because this dialectical approach is to be found in the method of proofs and
refutations. After all, the subtitle of the book is that of “The Logic of Math-
ematical Discovery” and in the work we find that this logic is a dialectical
one too, besides the formal logic which dominates traditional philosophy of
mathematics. The existence of heuristic counterexamples in mathematics
demonstrates the need for a rigorous method for dealing with them and the
conceptual change that they bring about.
3.3.3 Fallibilism and Formality
Let us now turn to another aspect of Lakatos’s philosophy: fallibilism about
mathematical knowledge. In the introduction, Lakatos presents his work as
a new step in the battle for certainty:
In this great debate [between sceptics and dogmatists], in which
arguments are time and again brought up to date, mathematics
has been the proud fortress of dogmatism. Whenever mathemat-
ical dogmatism of the day got into a ‘crisis’, a new version once
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again provided genuine rigour and foundations, thereby restor-
ing the image of authoritative, infallible, irrefutable mathematics
[...] Most sceptics resigned themselves to the impregnability of
this stronghold of dogmatist epistemology. A challenge is now
overdue. (Lakatos 1976, p. 5)
The dogmatist position in mathematics which is Lakatos’s (indirect) target
is that of the formalist, or in keeping with our terminology, the Formalist-
Reductionist. As always, the Formalist-Reductionist takes pieces of knowl-
edge of mathematical propositions to be certain and infallible as a result
of formal, logical proofs. The advent of modern logic brings with it the
‘fortress’ of dogmatism, settling what it is for a proof to be immune to doubt,
error and leaps of reasoning. Closely related to the Formalist-Reductionist
position is the deductivist approach, discussed in the second appendix if
Proofs & Refutations.
In deductivist style, all propositions are true and all inferences
are valid. Mathematics is presented as an ever-increasing set of
eternal, immutable truths. Counterexamples, refutations, criti-
cism cannot possibly enter. An authoritarian air is secured for
the subject with disguised monster-barring and proof-generated
definitions and with the fully-fledged theorem, and by suppress-
ing the primitive conjecture, the refutations, and the criticism of
the proof. Deductivist style hides the struggle, hides the adven-
ture. (Lakatos 1976, p. 142)
The deductivist style thus also encompasses a presentational style of defin-
ing concepts, setting out theorems and providing proofs, which separates
these from the dialectical environment in which they were created. Indeed,
Lakatos suggests that mathematics would be greatly improved if we pre-
sented mathematics in the heuristic style which makes explicit the growth
of the theorem, proof and concepts involved.
The challenges to the Formalist-Reductionist, the deductivist and the
dogmatist, then, come from presenting an alternative picture of mathemat-
ics and its development. By making the dialectical logic of mathematical
discovery clear, it demonstrates that mathematics cannot be equated with its
formal shadow, that mathematical concepts change and emerge from mathe-
matical practices, and that the status of mathematical theorems will change
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as they and the concepts they feature change. In a way, this deflates some of
the radicalism that talk of fallibilism—and indeed scepticism— might sug-
gest, for the sense in which mathematical statements are fallible is merely as
the by-product of the idea that concepts and theories are changeable through
dialectical logic. Meanwhile, this doesn’t cast doubt in a more radical sense,
as Larvor puts it:
[I]t has been and will remain the case that an apple taken to-
gether with two oranges makes three pieces of fruit. (Larvor
1998, p. 36)
The point is more subtle than the radical sense of fallibilism. Larvor con-
tinues:
It is also the case that an apple released in mid-air will fall to
earth. Nevertheless, in both cases the theoretical apparatus we
use to describe and to account for the phenomenon is highly
complex and open to criticism. (Larvor 1998, p. 36)
Ultimately, then, the sense of fallibilism which we find in Lakatos is about
the fact that we don’t find certainty in having established some mathemat-
ical theory because that theory will always been open to potential change,
revision and development in light of new counterexamples, new ideas and
new mathematics. One might even see the major part of the project as
being the attempt to show that this does not collapse into pure subjectivity
and that there are good mathematical criteria for these kinds of dialectical
changes.
Moving on for the moment, what is of particular interest to consider
for our purposes is the distinction between formal and informal proofs in
Lakatos’s picture. In arguing against ‘formalism’ and ‘deductivism’ so widely,
there is a point of view which is natural to Lakatos: that informal proofs are
the central method of mathematical demonstration, with their own associ-
ated notion of rigour operative in differentiating correct and incorrect proofs.
While at time controversies do arise, these are beneficial for mathematics in
that they drive the development of proofs and concepts, as discussed above.
Conversely, formal proofs and the purely deductive picture of mathematics
cannot underlie the rigorousness of proofs as they appear in mathematics
nor can they account for mathematical discovery. In fact, in the second
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chapter of Proofs & Refutations Lakatos has the student Epsilon go through
a separate proof of the Euler conjecture in the ‘Euclidean’ style, where the
theorem and concepts are translated into the language of vector algebra:
I analysed our concepts of polyhedra and showed that they are
really vector algebraic concepts. I translated the circle of ideas of
the Euler-phenomenon into vector algebra, thus displaying their
essence. Now I am certainly proving a theorem in vector algebra,
which is a clear and distinct theory with perfectly known terms,
neat and indubitable axioms, and with neat, indubitable proofs.
—Epsilon (Lakatos 1976, p. 118)
The class raise several problems for this line of thinking. Firstly there are
the standard worries of whether the translation fully captures the informal
concepts they are formalising and whether the ‘certain’ system is guaranteed
to be consistent.15 This, of course, relates closely to the discussions of
chapters 1 and 2. Moreover, though, the Lakatosian view seems to be that
while such a translation does successfully limit the counterexamples that
may appear within the theory, it also loses out on much which we had
before the translation:
[Y]ou may push out the original problem into the limbo of the
history of thought— which in fact you do not want to do. (foot-
note: This process is very characteristic of twentieth-century for-
malism.) —Alpha (Lakatos 1976, p. 122)
and
Epsilon wanted, “in virtue of a series of startling definitions to
save mathematics from the sceptics”, but what he saved was at
best some crumbs. —Gamma (Lakatos 1976, p. 123)
The standard idea in this direction, then, is that we can formalise any math-
ematics we choose, but formality is balanced against meaning and so fully
formalising leads to theories devoid of meaning, pushing content into the
meta-mathematical interpretation.
15Indeed, Epsilon admits that they must
[...] forget about the old meaning. I create freely the meaning of my terms
while scrapping old vague terms. —Epsilon (Lakatos 1976, p. 122)
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There is some dispute over where Lakatos stands on this exactly, though.
On the one hand, there are Davis & Hersh (Davis & Hersh 1981, pp. 345–
359) and Larvor in (Larvor 1998, pp. 33-34), offering a reading much like
the above, but on the other hand there are Worrall & Zahar, the editors
of Proofs and Refutations, who insert several substantial footnoted com-
ments into the book offering an alternative reading, backed up by Corfield
in (Corfield 1997) who defends their interpretation of Lakatos. In the in-
serted footnotes, Worrall & Zahar suggest that Lakatos is mistaken about
the need to reject the infallibilist idea that “deductive, inferential intuition
is infallible” (Lakatos 1976, p. 138), writing in their footnote that:
This passage seems to us mistaken and we have no doubt that
Lakatos, who came to have the highest regard for formal deduc-
tive logic, would himself have changed it. First order logic has
arrived at a characterisation of the validity of an inference which
[...] does make valid inference essentially infallible. (Lakatos
1976, fn. 4, p. 138)
Both Davis & Hersh and Larvor see Worrall & Zahar as making mistakes
of the precise sort that Lakatos is arguing strongly against. Firstly, Davis
& Hersh argue that the mistake is one of conflating mathematical proof
with its formal representation as a derivation in some fixed formal system.
In essence, they accuse Worrall & Zahar of Formalist-Reductionist thinking,
and reject it for several of the classical reasons. Secondly, Larvor argues that
their mistake is to focus on language-statics rather than language-dynamics.
That is, the fallibility is not of the logical validity in some given system (say,
first-order logic) but rather that the counterexamples will be heuristic in a
way that might lead to change or abandonment of the system altogether.
Corfield sets out a defence of Worrall & Zahar against Davis & Hersh’s
criticism, trying to show that Lakatos was more conservative than they
appreciated. The claim is that while they are correct that Lakatos focuses
on informal mathematics, and that most mathematics found in practice
is informal, in fact Lakatos made a distinction between different levels of
informality. The difference lies between informal proofs proper and ‘quasi-
formal’ proofs which really are formal proofs with some of the interim steps
left out or supressed. Corfield then says:
Thus, while Davis and Hersh imagine that Lakatos’s account of
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informal mathematics extends to present day proofs in estab-
lished branches of mathematics, surely the majority of the es-
timated 200,000 produced each year, Lakatos himself wishes to
count them as ‘almost formal’ or ‘quasi-formal’. (Corfield 1997,
p. 115)
Furthermore, the point is that formal systems, logic and axiomatics do play
a major role in modern mathematics and that even in these cases the de-
velopment of new concepts does not cease, but instead works alongside the
axioms. With respect to axiomatics, their role in mathematical discovery
is brought out particularly clearly by Schlimm in his case study of lattice
theory in (Schlimm 2011).
In general, I think that Corfield’s reading, along with that of Worrall
& Zahar, cannot be right. The claim that most modern proofs are quasi-
formal rather than informal, and as such are not subject to the Lakatosian
arguments, strikes me as entirely wrong. Indeed, the central argument of my
first chapter, that of the over-generation of formalisations relative to some
given informal proof, stands strongly against such a view. The Formalist-
Reductionist line seems to hold that the modern work in formal mathematics
supports their view of proofs, as is made explicit by Corfield:
Given the stabilization that has occurred in the idea of what
constitutes a rigorous proof, this gives them [Davis & Hersh]
little room for manoeuvre against their formalist adversaries.
(Corfield 1997, p. 117)
I think the advantage of my argument against such a view is precisely that
it draws so directly on work in formalisation, showing that the idea that
modern proofs are no longer informal in a strong sense is false, but also
delivering the fact that formal mathematics projects are no help in defending
against the criticisms of the informalist camp. In addition to this argument,
it seems wholly unlikely that the Formalist-Reductionist interpretation of
Lakatos is correct when read in the context of the rest of the text. For
instance, the opening passage quoted above on the constant retreat of the
dogmatist in the face of sceptical challenges, and it being time to finally
storm the stronghold of dogmatism in mathematics, makes for a poor fit
with the acceptance that actually most modern mathematics is suitably
infallible by virtue of being quasi-formal.
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Despite believing that Corfield is totally mistaken in following the Wor-
rall & Zahar interpretation, I do think there is a point to his argument that
cannot be ignored. That point is that the Lakatosian framework does not
fit well with the methodology of modern mathematics. Axiomatisations,
formalisms and metamathematical results are used alongside traditional, in-
formal proving; the relationship between syntactic proofs and associated
model theory is highly complex and fruitful; reverse mathematics offers gen-
uine insights into the provability strength of mathematical statements; and
computational mathematics is developing at a phenomenal rate. The point
is that while I have been stressing the importance of taking informal math-
ematics and proof seriously, this has to be taken alongside formal methods
rather than instead of them. I think Corfield is right to stress that the
strict dichotomy found in the Lakatosian picture between fruitful and con-
tentful informal mathematics and the sterile and static formal theories does
not fully do justice to modern mathematical practice. I will come back to
this final point shortly as a motivation for investigating whether other work
towards conceptual development, conceptual change and conceptual engi-
neering might be fruitfully applied to the case of mathematics. Before then,
let us consider another dialectical proposal for mathematics: that of G. T.
Kneebone.
3.4 Kneebone on Mathematics
While Lakatos is the leading figure we turn to in defending the kind of di-
alectical account of proofs and mathematical concepts described above, such
as being credited as the source of the maverick tradition in (Kitcher & As-
pray 1988), there is another figure who espouses views similar in certain key
respects but has received seemingly no attention: G. T. Kneebone. This
despite the fact that Kneebone pre-dates Lakatos, writing in the 1950s al-
ready.16 In his papers (Kneebone 1955, 1957), he discusses the relationship
between intuitive and rigorous mathematics, the fixity of mathematical con-
cepts, and dialectical versus deductive mathematics.17 In this section I will
briefly run through Kneebone’s main views and arguments, bringing out the
16The plot thickens: in the LSE archives there exists some Kneebone-Lakatos corre-
spondence. Future work ahoy!
17Despite being two papers, these do have the advantage of being explicit in his views
rather than exposing them through the dialogue form that Lakatos uses.
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similarity to the Lakatosian position.
The starting point for Kneebone is the consideration of the role of logic in
mathematics. Tracing the emphasis on symbolic logic and the formalisation
of mathematical reasoning back through mathematical history18, he places
particular emphasis on Peano as seeing the formalisation of mathematics as
a move away from intuition towards rigour:
Peano, on the other hand, realized that if complete rigour is to
be achieved intuition must be banished completely from mathe-
matical argument. (Kneebone 1957, p. 206)
Peano’s project was of major influence on two of the big schools of thought
in the philosophy of mathematics: Logicism and Formalism. The former
encapsulated by the Principia Mathematica project by Russell and White-
head19, intending to define all mathematical concepts in terms of explicitly
logical ones, reduced mathematical rigour to formal, logical rigour. Formal-
ism, headed up by Hilbert, aimed to formalise all of mathematics in order
to allow us to prove that it is consistent. Of course, the failures of both
are well-known: the axiom of infinity Russell needed was not purely logical,
the various class-theoretic paradoxes stood in the way of a na¨ıve picture of
classes and membership, and Go¨del’s theorems seemed to undermine the
possibility of consistency proofs which were more reliable than that which
one is proving consistent. From this Kneebone concludes:
The failure of both undertakings suggests that the relationship
between mathematics and logic may perhaps have been wrongly
understood, and prompts reconsideration of the nature of this
relationship. (Kneebone 1957, p. 210)
The answer, according to Kneebone, is to acknowledge the divide between
formal logic with its notion of logical validity and dialectical reasoning:
18Although it is worth remarking that Kneebone’s picture of history is shaky at best, for
example describing Logicism and Formalism as sequential rather than the actual relation-
ship between the two. In fact, he says “Up to this point in the history of the philosophy of
mathematics the idea of rigour had developed naturally and smoothly” (Kneebone 1957,
p. 207) which seems even further from the truth than Lakatos’s rational reconstruction of
history. The bumpy history of the development of rigour is covered in (Kleiner 1991).
19Kneebone sets Frege aside as having had little influence on philosophers besides
Russell, which might be true historically of Frege’s time, but is another amusing reminder
of the age of the paper.
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Mathematics, on the face of it, is completely undialectical; but
this is only appearance, and it is my thesis in this paper that
the basically dialectical character of mathematics is precisely the
feature that has been neglected hitherto. (Kneebone 1957, p.
212)
Taking the earlier list of features of dialectical philosophy of mathematics
in the vein of Lakatos, as set out by Larvor, we can now run through and
see some of these same features at play in Kneebone’s work.
To begin, the ‘internal stance’ of seeing mathematical developments come
about for rational, mathematical reasons is certainly not as fully developed
as Lakatos’s detailed case studies but is implicitly present in Kneebone’s
consideration of historical examples which cannot be fully explained on the
purely deductivist model, such as in his discussion of Kummer’s ideal fac-
tors. More explicitly, Kneebone acknowledges that mathematics must not
be separated from those that practice it, the human agents, but that this
gives rise to one of the puzzling aspects of a dialectical logic for mathematics:
that it is both personal and impersonal. He says:
[I]n so far as mathematical thinking is dialectical it appears to
be both personal and impersonal at the same time. It is per-
sonal because thinking is a process that can only take place in
the minds of individual mathematicians, and impersonal because
it produces a body of mathematical knowledge that is accessi-
ble to every individual mathematician, and valid for all alike.
(Kneebone 1957, pp. 220–221)
The solution to this puzzle is that the mathematicians who are carrying out
the mathematics are embedded in particular cultural traditions, and that
concepts within these manage to span the personal and impersonal divide:
The concepts of the cultural tradition are thus part of the mind’s
equipment and at the same time part of the structure of the
known world, and they are able therefore to be both personal
and impersonal together. (Kneebone 1957, p. 221)
Next, the emphasis on concepts and conceptual development instead of see-
ing mathematics as a body of propositions is also undoubtedly central to
Kneebone’s dialectical philosophy of mathematics:
86
[W]hereas deductive reasoning operates with fixed concepts, which
might be represented by the symbols of a logical calculus, di-
alectical reasoning always brings about development of concepts.
(Kneebone 1957, p. 212)
Mathematics is usually thought of, by philosophers of the subject
no less than by those who take it more for granted, as a body
of propositions. But although it is true that the mathematics of
the textbooks is such a propositional edifice, propositions are by
no means all that the creative mathematician is concerned with.
(Kneebone 1957, p. 215)
As we have already seen, Kneebone separates out deductive and dialectical
aspects of mathematics, but additionally he is clear in the fact that these
must come with separate notions of rigour :
There is rigour of demonstration and also rigour of dialectical
development, and the two are by no means the same. (Kneebone
1957, p. 222)
On Larvor’s last point, ontological neutrality, we don’t find anything explicit,
although the desire to see beyond the limitations of logicism, formalism and
intuitionism (which take mathematical ontology to reside in the world, in
language and in the mind respectively) to a dialectical form of justification
beyond them seems to indicate sentiments in this direction.
While Kneebone’s position is covered briefly in just the two papers, from
looking at the various aspects of his introduction of a dialectical philosophy
of mathematics, we can see that it largely aligns with the aims and positions
Lakatos has in engaging in such a project in general. Indeed, often the
language the two use is incredibly close, such as concerning the difference
between dynamics and statics:
In other words for the purposes of philosophy we have to conceive
of [dialectical] rigour in dynamical not in statical terms—as the
rigour of a process which yields knowledge, not of a system of
propositions which summarize a particular state of knowledge.
(Kneebone 1957, p. 223)
Heuristic is concerned with language-dynamics, while logic is
concerned with language-statics. —Pi (Lakatos 1976, p. 93)
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In actual fact, the importance of the dynamics underlying mathematical
activities will be a major point we shall return to in chapter 4.
While the two are close in their positions on many things, there are
some notable differences between them, most markedly the role of proofs
and refutations. Lakatos’s study is deeper precisely because it begins the
process of delivering on the investigation of how a dialectical development
of mathematical concepts might play out (which is strongly connected to
proving practices and the discovery of counterexamples) something which for
Kneebone is only the ultimate aspiration. Even then, there is no suggestion
that proofs and counterexamples have any particularly important role in
the dialectical story for Kneebone. Another point of difference between the
two is their attitudes towards formal logic: Kneebone seems content for
formal logic to stand supreme as the canon for correct, rigorous deduction
(something which I have argued against in chapter 1) while Lakatos seems
to reject this.
In summary, it seems that Kneebone managed to slip through the cracks
of history. While Lakatos is seen as one of the guiding figures of the philoso-
phy of mathematical practice, Kneebone appears to have missed out on any
widespread acknowledgement for his work. Nonetheless, Kneebone’s ideas
about the need to step towards a dialectical philosophy of mathematics are
worth taking seriously alongside Lakatos’s.
3.5 The Open Texture of Mathematical Concepts
Having discussed Lakatos at length and then the similar direction found in
Kneebone, let us now connect this to Waismann’s notion of open texture.
Recall that Waismann claimed that mathematical concepts display closed
texture, in contrast with empirical concepts which are open-textured. The
aim now is to reject Waismann’s position here by applying Lakatos and
Kneebone’s arguments concerning conceptual development in mathematics
to show that mathematical concepts do display open texture after all. This
has been noted as a central point to be taken from Lakatos by several au-
thors, such as Shapiro in (Shapiro 2006, 2013), Schlimm in (Schlimm 2012)
and mentioned by Bartha at (Bartha 2010, p. 10). Let us go through the
argument first, then consider what the other authors have to say in turn.
The big point of putting together Waismann and Lakatos is that math-
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ematical concepts can display open texture. Heuristic counterexamples fall
outside of the domain of application and disapplication as it stands, showing
that these are too narrow in that there are interesting and pertinent cases
which have not been covered by the accepted definitions. The first defini-
tion of open texture in OT1 is precisely this, so the existence of heuristic
counterexamples with respect to some concept in mathematics is enough to
show that that concept displays open texture. The second definition in OT2,
concerns the freedom rational agents have to go either way on the applica-
tion of the term. With respect to the heuristic counterexamples there does
seem to be a rational freedom to choose different responses. While Lakatos
does poke fun at the more simplistic implementations of monster-barring,
monster-adjustment etc. the ultimate upshot of the dialectical approach is
that there is the mathematical freedom to respond and develop the concepts
in a way that a purely deductivist approach cannot accommodate.
Waismann takes open texture of concepts to be the result of a lack of full
delimitation and definition of when a concept or term applies. The reason
he takes this to hold for empirical concepts and not mathematical concepts
boils down to this. On the one side, Waismann sees empirical descriptions
as never being able to anticipate all potential cases and possibilities that
might arise concerning their applications. Recall:
Every description stretches, as it were, into a horizon of open
possibilities: however far I go, I shall always carry this horizon
with me. (Waismann 1968, p. 122)
On the other side, Waismann suggests that this kind of endless possibility of
new cases arising is not applicable to mathematics, with its strict, explicit
definitions. But this is where he is mistaken, as demonstrated by Lakatos
and Kneebone. Indeed, Kneebone cites Waismann’s notion of open texture
in (Kneebone 1955, p. 37) as one way in which conceptual development oc-
curs.20 If one restricts oneself to deductive logic and ignores the development
20The exact quote is:
One of the ways in which conceptual evolution is actually brought about has
been described by Waismann, who has drawn attention to the open texture of
empirical concepts. Such concepts are never finally and completely defined,
as concepts can be in pure mathematics. (Kneebone 1955, p. 37)
While this might seem to go against the open texture of mathematical concepts and agree
with Waismann on their closed texture instead, the wider context of the quote shows that
more is going on. Since this is the earlier paper by Kneebone, he has not fully articulated
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of mathematical concepts, ideas and theories then this may sound convinc-
ing. However, it seems clear that Lakatos has put this myth to rest; that
there are ongoing developments and discoveries which are driven by reasons
internal to mathematics and require a dialectical philosophy of mathemat-
ics. In light of this, there is little question that mathematical concepts can
display open texture just as much as empirical concepts do.
One issue that this ties into is that of the formality of mathematics.
Above, I discussed the controversy over Lakatos’s attitude to modern math-
ematics, according to Worrall & Zahar, Davis & Hersh, Larvor and Corfield,
where the issue is over whether something like first-order logic captures some
infallible inference patterns and thus whether modern mathematics is still
subject to the kind of dialectical developments Lakatos and Kneebone de-
scribe. Implicit in Waismann’s suggestion that mathematical concepts are
closed-textured is the perspective on which modern logic has succeeded in
pinning down mathematical concepts exactly for all applications.21 But on
the more natural reading of the core idea of a dialectical philosophy of math-
ematics, such a perspective presents a mistakenly narrow view of mathemat-
ics. We should agree with Corfield that formal systems and axiomatisations
both play important roles in mathematics, but as I have argued in the pre-
vious chapters of this thesis, even in modern mathematics there are good
reasons to want to keep both formal and informal proofs as essential parts
of mathematics which play dual roles.22 One important role for informal
the difference between deductive and dialectical theories of mathematics, instead focusing
on concrete and abstract modes of thinking. After mentioning Waismann, he discusses
how conceptual development comes about, where he presents an example of the way in
which conceptual development occurs particularly through the use of analogy, which takes
as its object mathematical concepts:
An example of a different kind, in which the analogy is not merely heuristic,
may be seen in the extended use of such geometrical concepts as “point” and
“space” in modern mathematics. Here the analogy goes very deep, for what
has happened is that a logical structure has been isolated which is exemplified
in classical geometry and which can now be seen to pervade the greater part
of pure mathematics. It is to this development of the analogical mode of
thinking that mathematics owes much of its recent spectacular progress.
(Kneebone 1955, p. 40)
Certainly this appears to be more in the direction of his later picture and in agreement
with Lakatos.
21In the quote at the end of section 3.2, Waismann mentions undecidability, which
suggests to me that he held the corresponding Formalist-Reductionist type view of proofs
as fixed relative to formal systems.
22We can now also reframe the problem with Priest’s argument for the inconsistency
of mathematics. The arguments I offered against this in terms of formalisations being
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mathematics more generally is its place in a dialectical process, wherein
concepts display open texture and can thus be extended and developed as
new ideas arise.
Let us turn now to briefly consider the other authors who have also
connected Lakatos’s views with the notion of open texture.
In the articles cited, Shapiro is discussing the notion of computability and
whether or not we can hope for a mathematical proof of the Church-Turing
thesis. We needn’t go into the details of this, but the aim Shapiro has is
of showing that the mathematical notion of computability has developed in
a broadly Lakatosian sense, and that the informal notion of computability
that they began with displayed open texture. It is in this context that
Shapiro discusses both open texture and the Lakatosian framework, making
it explicit that he takes one of Lakatos’s main ideas to be that mathematical
concepts display open texture. Referring to Lakatos’s case study of the Euler
conjecture, he says:
[T]he notion of polyhedron exhibited what Waismann calls open-
texture. This open-texture did not prevent mathematicians from
working with the notion, and proving things about polyhedra.
Still, at the time, it simply was not determinate whether a pic-
ture frame counts as a polyhedron. (Shapiro 2006, p. 432)
Shapiro also discusses the translation of the main notions such as polyhedron
into set-theoretic terminology, such as in Epsilon’s vector algebra version of
the proof:23
The student [Epsilon] then gives a fully formal (or at least easily
formalizable) proof of a generalization of Eulers theorem from
these definitions. The only residual question left, it seems to
me, is the extent to which the set-theoretic definition captures
the essence of the original, pre-theoretic (or at least pre-formal)
fragmented into different systems which are useful for different purposes, stem from this
direction of thought, of formal and informal mathematics playing useful interdependent
roles. Meanwhile, the view that all of mathematics can be straightforwardly formalised
is Formalist-Reductionist in its approach and misses out on the broader perspective that
the dialectical model can offer.
23Shapiro treats the vector algebra proof as a set-theoretic one. We may suppose for
the sake of argument that there is nothing substantial in the differences between these,
without conceding that this is ultimately true.
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concept of polyhedron. Lakatos had that exactly right. (Shapiro
2013, p. 167)
So Shapiro suggests that the formalised versions of the concepts do not
display open texture, and are properly fixed up to certain considerations:
One can perhaps claim, now, that the final, austere and rigorous
set-theoretic definition of “polyhedron”—as a set of “vertices,”
“edges,” and “faces” under certain conditions—is not subject to
open texture. Its boundaries are as determinate as one could
wish—assuming that there is no flexibility concerning the logic
or the underlying set-theoretic model theory. (Shapiro 2013, p.
168)
There is frequently flexibility over logic and set-theoretic model theory, as
Shapiro well knows, so the ultimate security here is hardly unchangeable.
However, the point is just that formal and axiomatic systems are powerful
tools for fixing meanings within a particular domain and that mathemati-
cians are very good on agreeing on large stretches of mathematics in this
way. What is interesting is that Shapiro might be right that even if we
encounter new mathematical possibilities that had not previously been con-
sidered concerning set theory or its related logic, the open texture seems
to be located in the meta-language now and no longer applying to the for-
malised definitions of the concepts discussed by Lakatos directly.
Shapiro also brings out nicely the connection between Waismann and
Lakatos concerning the questions surrounding the identity of concepts. Re-
call Lakatos quoted above saying:
The impact of proofs and refutations on naive concepts is much
more revolutionary than that: they erase the crucial naive con-
cepts completely and replace them by proof-generated concepts.
—Pi (Lakatos 1976, pp. 89–90)
But there is the obvious problem that there are two possibilities (which I
have thus far kept in play alongside one another) which are either that the
concepts are replaced with entirely different concepts, or else that they are
revised, developed and extended in a way that is consistent with them being
fundamentally the same concept. On the latter take, Kneebone says:
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There is frequently enough affinity between the concepts involved
in a succession of accounts of the same body of experience, or
of related bodies, for it to be legitimate to speak of changes
undergone by a single enduring concept; and so we have the idea
of conceptual evolution. (Kneebone 1955, pp. 38–39)
Shapiro quotes Waismann on the response to this dichotomy which is to
mostly not worry about the difference:
[T]here are no precise rules governing the use of words like ‘time,’
‘pain,’ etc., and that consequently to speak of the ‘meaning’ of a
word, and to ask whether it has, or has not changed in meaning,
is to operate with too blurred an expression (Waismann 1951, p.
53)
While concepts and expressions are developed in the dialectical accounts
they offer of mathematics, whether this ultimately is about replacing con-
cepts or revising them will come down to how coarse or fine the identity
conditions are.
Moving on to Schlimm (Schlimm 2012) and Bartha (Bartha 2010), these
authors both discuss Lakatos in terms connected to Waismann’s open tex-
ture. Schlimm’s central thesis is that we should be pluralists about mathe-
matical concepts, accepting both Fregean and Lakatosian concepts in math-
ematics. These are summarised as follows:
According to the first, concepts are definite and fixed; in con-
trast, according to the second notion they are open and subject
to modifications. (Schlimm 2012, p. 128)
The difference here clearly matches the difference as I have been deploying it
between Lakatos’s dynamic, dialectical approach and the more traditional,
static approach. The characterisation of Lakatosian concepts has them as
“subject to modifications” and “fluid” (Schlimm 2012, p. 43), which is not
quite open texture by either of the definitions we have seen above. However,
Schlimm does discuss the term ‘open-textured’ with reference to Bartha’s
work and Bartha, in turn, applies the framework explicitly to Lakatos:
Very similar observations apply to mathematics. There are open-
textured mathematical concepts. Lakatos (1976) famously re-
constructs the reasoning that leads us to include or exclude
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certain objects from the category of regular polyhedra. Here,
too, open-textured concepts are the ones under investigation.
(Bartha 2010, p. 10)
Bartha’s ultimate point is one about the role of analogy in reasoning and
argumentation, which we may set aside. Nonetheless, this is another recog-
nition of the close proximity between Waismann’s ideas on open texture and
Lakatos’s ideas on mathematical concepts.
3.6 Conceptual Engineering in Mathematics
Taking stock for a moment, we have now seen that one of the ideas underly-
ing a dialectical philosophy of mathematics, be it Lakatos’s or Kneebone’s,
is that mathematical concepts are not fully fixed and immune to change but
instead display open texture, developing in response to new examples, ideas
and methods that arise through mathematical practice.
For all that, though, there are two remaining issues for this claim con-
cerning the open texture of mathematical concepts.
The first of these outstanding issues is that there is more going on in the
dialectical philosophy of mathematics than the simplistic picture on which
we have open-textured mathematical concepts, find new examples which
are not covered by them, expand the concept to apply or disapply, repeat.
While at times this pattern might be operative, the reason for dedicating
so much space to the Lakatosian and Kneebonian frameworks is that these
are significantly more broad and more subtle. A better conclusion, in light
of this, would be that open texture is one feature of mathematical concepts
which participates in the more complex patterns of conceptual change and
evolution.
This leads us to the second remaining issue: that even this broader frame-
work does not seem to be enough to give an account of modern mathematics.
As discussed above, Corfield has presented the case that a lot of mathemat-
ics now is bound up with axiomatic systems and formal provability, in a
way not captured by the Lakatosian story of proofs and refutations. In fact,
axiomatics, formal derivations, metamathematics and computational math-
ematics are involved in large parts of the modern mathematical landscape,
including discovery, and I fully agree that if we are to adequately account for
mathematical concepts we need a picture which also sees the interaction be-
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tween informal and formal mathematics, and proofs in particular, as playing
an important, rational role in the dialectical development of concepts.
What I propose to do in the remainder of this chapter is to explore some
more recent work on the nature of concepts and apply this specifically to
mathematical concepts. In particular, I shall draw on some recent work
which falls under the general heading of conceptual engineering. Conceptual
engineering extends beyond the well-known philosophical method of concep-
tual analysis to include a more active participation in knocking down bad
or defective concepts and building new ones as we want them to be. The
term seems to come from Blackburn where he says:
I would prefer to introduce myself as doing conceptual engineer-
ing. For just as the engineer studies the structure of material
things, so the philosopher studies the structure of thought. Un-
derstanding the structure involves seeing how parts function and
how they interconnect. It means knowing what would happen
for better or worse if changes were made. This is what we aim
at when we investigate the structures that shape our view of the
world. Our concepts or ideas form the mental housing in which
we live. We may end up proud of the structures we have built. Or
we may believe that they need dismantling and starting afresh.
But first, we have to know what they are. (Blackburn 1999, p.
1)
The idea is not new to Blackburn, though. A more traditional modern
starting point which leads in a similar direction would be Carnap’s method
of explication. According to Carnap explication is
[...] the transformation of an inexact, prescientific concept, the
explicandum, into a new exact concept, the explicatum. (Carnap
1950, p. 3)
The purpose of explication is to gain new understanding and insight into
this explicandum, but importantly it aims to revise an informal or natural
language concept, to end up with a more scientifically acceptable concept
which is useful in academic research, for instance.24 In other words, the
24This does lead to some amusing mismatches in practice. See
http://www.mrlovenstein.com/comic/643
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purpose is to serve as a more fruitful and precise concept for the more
exacting demands of scientific realms. Carnap held that explication should
be guided by the following principles: similarity of the explicatum to the
explicandum, exactness, fruitfulness and simplicity. These allow us to assess
how good an explication is, but ultimately there may be several different
explications which do well by the different criteria. For Carnap, then, there
is no single correct explication, rather it is guided by our specific purposes
and motivations for going about the process in the first place.
While Carnapian explication may be a kind of conceptual engineering,
it does not cover the whole spectrum of possible approaches. Indeed, in
their (Burgess & Plunkett 2013a,b), Burgess & Plunkett emphasise that
conceptual engineering has a large normative component.25 They identify
four areas where conceptual engineering is already taking place, calling on
philosophers to investigate this methodology more widely. These four areas
are about personal identity through time; inconsistency, truth and logic;
fundamental metaphysics; and race and gender.
The two examples of conceptual engineering I draw on fit into the second
and last of these. The idea will be to see how the treatment of concepts
in these separate domains might be transferred to mathematical concepts
and, in particular, we are looking for a way to see how the open-textured,
informal concepts usually deployed in proofs can work with and alongside
formal definitions and derivations to spur the development of concepts and
the growth of mathematics more generally.
3.7 Haslanger’s Manifest and Operative Concepts
Haslanger’s ameliorative project is ambitious, wide-ranging and has impor-
tant political and social ramifications. I shan’t go into depth on the project,
but the central idea is the following. Beginning from the philosophy of race
and gender, while we might want to investigate and describe how we deploy
racial or gender terms, or explicate these to get to more robust categories,
Haslanger argues that there is another project: to investigate the pragmatics
of how this language is used and whether it serves our purposes. Haslanger
says:
25Their term is actually ‘conceptual ethics’, precisely because of the normative aspects
of such an approach to concepts.
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What is the point of having these concepts? What cognitive
or practical task do they (or should they) enable us to accom-
plish? Are they effective tools to accomplish our (legitimate)
purposes; if not, what concepts would serve these purposes bet-
ter? (Haslanger 2000, p. 33)
In response to these questions, within feminist and anti-racist theorising
one purpose we have is to move towards and achieve social justice. But the
language of race and gender terms are part of sustaining the oppression of
the groups it picks out. The ameliorative approach then, looks to come up
with concepts of ‘gender’, ‘race’, ‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘black’, ‘white’ etc. which
best suit our purposes in exposing and fighting injustice, oppression and
inequality. To this end, Haslanger gives definitions of these terms which
build in the subordination and power dynamics which they are associated
with. For instance, to be a woman in part involves being subordinated along
some dimension in virtue of the social role ascribed to women (see Haslanger
2000, pp. 42–43).
The ameliorative project itself falls under the general heading of con-
ceptual engineering, in that constructing new, ideal concepts is part of the
process of bringing about equality. For now, though, I want to pick out just
one distinction which Haslanger makes frequent use of, such as in (Haslanger
& Saul 2006) and (Haslanger 2012), between manifest and operative con-
cepts. The insight here is that the concepts that we deploy in our practices
do not always align with the concepts we take ourselves to be deploying.
The manifest concept is that which we take ourselves to be using or work-
ing with, while the operative concept is that which we are actually putting
into practice.
Many examples are used to give substance to it actually being rather
common in practice for manifest and operative concepts to part ways. In
(Haslanger 2005) the example is of what counts as being late to school
(or ‘tardy’), with the difference between the official school policy and its
practical implementation providing two different concepts. In (Haslanger &
Saul 2006, pp. 99–100), Haslanger & Saul use the example of what counts
as a parent, with the concept splitting between a manifest concept being
the biological parents, and the operative concept of primary care-giver. In
(Haslanger 2012, p. 92), the example is that of the concept of being cool.
While cool dudes and the ‘in-group’ take themselves to be applying some
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objective standards of what is and isn’t cool (allowing a distinction between
being cool and merely acting cool), in the end coolness is just the product of
the interests and standards of the in-group, according to Haslanger. These
simple examples lead up to the big one:
As in the case of “cool,” we debunk the idea of Woman’s Na-
ture and find two concepts at work: The manifest concept of
Woman’s Nature—understood as defining what women are by
nature in traditional terms—is an illusion; the operative con-
cept being masked by it is constitutively constructed in terms of
men’s (socially conditioned) sexual responses. (Haslanger 2012,
pp. 93–94)
Further to the distinction in place, Haslanger adds the third notion of a
target concept, which is the concept which
[...] all things considered (my purposes, the facts, etc.), I should
be employing. In the ideal case, I adjust my practice and my
self-understanding to conform to the target concept. (Haslanger
& Saul 2006, p. 16)
This adds the normative component and the conceptual engineering, where
we are able to reflect on, construct, and choose which concepts suit us and
our purposes best.
Moving back to the realm of mathematical concepts, there are two levels
at which we can identify a similar distinction at work. The first is in the
deployment of mathematical concepts as we have been discussing so far in
this chapter, while the second is at the level of concepts about mathematics
(as discussed in chapter 2) such as the concept of proof itself. Let us consider
these both in turn.
We might think that the relationship between informal mathematical
concepts and formalisations thereof follows the manifest versus operative dis-
tinction in the following way. Formal definitions and definitions in axiomatic
systems can be seen as useful for a number of reasons already described,
such as their relative exactness, investigating foundations for mathematics,
unifying systems, computational mathematics, metamathematics etc. The
work of figures such as Frege, Russell, Whitehead and Hilbert (plus many
others besides) demonstrated that large-scale formalisation was possible. A
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favourite point of Azzouni’s is to emphasise the widespread success of Frege’s
project and that of Russell & Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica in their
translational endeavours, e.g. (Azzouni 2005b, p. 19) and (Azzouni 2009, p.
10). The point being that the failure of na¨ıve comprehension does not take
away from much of the successful formalisation that went on, as is taken ad-
vantage of by the neo-Fregeans for example. As such, it is not surprising to
find that there is often the view that these are ultimately what mathemat-
ical concepts pick out. On the other hand, the way we learn mathematics
is very much about being inducted into particular mathematical practices,
which lead more naturally to the informal concepts.26 As such, the operative
concepts which we learn through mathematics education do not necessar-
ily coincide with the manifest concepts which mathematicians might take
themselves to be using.
To make this more concrete, let us look at an example: set-theoretic
foundations. Declarations to the effect that mathematics is at its core just
set theory are ubiquitous in philosophy of mathematics, especially as es-
poused by mathematicians. Here are some samples (though opening up a
random selection of set theory textbooks will be enough to furnish you with
further examples):
[T]he mathematicians identify the natural numbers with the fi-
nite von Neumann ordinals. So, contrary to received wisdom, I
suggest that philosophers follow mathematical practice and iden-
tify the natural numbers with the finite von Neumann ordinals.
[...] Numbers are sets. (Steinhart 2002, p. 356)
and
All branches of mathematics are developed, consciously or un-
consciously, in set theory or some part of it. (Levy 1979, p.
3)
and
Set theory is the foundation of mathematics. All mathematical
concepts are defined in terms of the primitive notions of set and
membership. In axiomatic set theory we formulate a few simple
26Being inducted into a practice is an important way of obtaining knowledge how. This
will be the focus of the next chapter.
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axioms about these primitive notions [...] From such axioms, all
known mathematics may be derived. (Kunen 1980, p. xi)
and
All this is in stark contrast to what we now regard as the answer
to the question what mathematical entities exist? The working
practitioner of classical mathematics can answer the question
with one word — sets. Every mathematical entity is a set and
all sets are objects, some of them being infinite objects. (Clark
2009, p. 347)
and
[M]athematical objects (such as numbers and differentiable func-
tions) can be defined to be certain sets. And the theorems of
mathematics (such as the fundamental theorem of calculus) then
can be viewed as statements about sets. (Enderton 1977, p. 10)
Or slightly more cautiously:
[A]xiomatic set theory is often viewed as a foundation of math-
ematics: it is alleged that all mathematical objects are sets,
and their properties can be derived from the relatively few and
elegant axioms about sets. Nothing so simple-minded can be
quite true, but there is little doubt that in standard, current
mathematical practice, “making a notion precise” is essentially
synonymous with “defining it in set theory”. Set theory is the of-
ficial language of mathematics, just as mathematics is the official
language of science. (Moschovakis 2006, p. vii)27
You get the picture. Frequently these claims are in the opening pages of
introductory texts for students, setting out from the start the manifest con-
cepts for all of mathematics.
However, in practice mathematicians mostly are not doing set theory.
In the Levy quote above he even says as much with the admission that the
set theory supposedly underlying all mathematics might be unconscious.28
27Mathematics as the language of science is an allusion to a well-known quote by
Galileo.
28This is also reminiscent of Azzouni’s claims that mathematicians don’t need to be
aware of underlying derivations, as discussed in chapter 1.
100
The operative concepts will vary with the situation and who is deploying
them, of course, but I contend that frequently these will come apart from
the manifest, set-theoretic concepts. There is a traditional exemplification
of the manifest and operative concepts I have just described coming apart,
that found in (Benacerraf 1965). With the excellent story of two children
educated by “militant logicists” to truly believe that all mathematics boils
down to set theory, Benacerraf shows how quickly problems can arise. For
the children have been taught different set-theoretic representations of the
natural numbers: one knows the von Neumann ordinals, the other the Zer-
melo ordinals. There are then examples of theorems for one of the children
which are false for the other, such as 3 ∈ 17 or whether any n-membered set
can be put into one-one correspondence with the set n itself. Importantly,
for my purposes, these issues can’t be resolved by asking other people:
Attempts to settle this by asking ordinary folk (who had been
dealing with numbers as numbers for a long time) understand-
ably brought only blank stares. (Benacerraf 1965, p. 54)
Why is this so understandable? Because it is common knowledge that, while
the orthodox foundationalism declares that all mathematics reduces to set
theory, this is simply not what is found in practice. Not just that, but the
manifest concepts of the foundational picture come apart from the operative
concepts in direct mathematical ways, as claims about the membership rela-
tion holding between numbers don’t even make sense unless you are working
directly with sets. Now, it could be argued that the two representations are
not on equal footing. Steinhart, for instance, in (Steinhart 2002) argues for
the unique correctness of the von Neumann representation by what is es-
sentially monster-barring, inventing additional demands and conditions on
the concept of number which would give Lakatos a field day. Even still, this
does not undermine the fact that those not separately trained in set theory
would be baﬄed about statements of the form 3 ∈ 17.
To extend the example somewhat further, observe that representing
numbers in set theory is a straightforward and well-known construction.
But many of the claims about set-theoretic reductions talk of almost all of
mathematics, which includes a huge deal more. If we consider as an exam-
ple low-dimensional topology, explored excellently in (de Toffoli & Giardino
2014), it seems likely that the mathematicians working in this area do not
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know any actual set-theoretic construction corresponding to their concepts,
so even if they were to agree to the claim that mathematics is founded in
set theory, this would not be reflected in their operative concepts. However,
even if we were to find those who did happen to know how to translate the
main concepts into set theory, de Toffoli & Giardino demonstrate that the
kind of operations licenced by the topological concepts are often visual, di-
agrammatic and manipulative (in a tactile sense)— far removed from those
which one would find in the austere setting of set theory.29 So the opera-
tive concepts, i.e. the concepts as employed in practice, are not going to be
set-theoretical.
The foregoing does not stand against formalisation and representation
of mathematics more generally in set theory. Indeed, as in the first chapter,
the thought does not rely on arguing that formalisation is not possible for
some class of cases. Rather, the point is that if one insists on identifying the
mathematical concepts with some particular formal representations, then
the resulting manifest concepts will still come apart from those which are
operative in mathematics. As such, while one can point out that the readings
of set theory as foundational I have quoted above are pretty strong ones,
and even called ‘simple-minded’ in the quote by Moschovakis, we only need
a fairly light version of the position for the distinction between the manifest
and operative concepts to come out.
Let us move on to another kind of example. This echoes a lot that
has already been covered and doesn’t require full repeating again, but the
distinction between manifest and operative concepts may be a useful way to
think about the formal and informal proof distinction. As has been discussed
already, it seems to be fairly common for mathematicians, when pressed, to
offer formal derivations as the manifest concept in play when it comes to
the epistemological justification of mathematical propositions. This in turn
leads to the need for the Formalist-Reductionist to explain how this can be,
given how rarely these actually show up in practice. The idea raised by the
proponents of the philosophy of mathematical practice is to observe that the
operative concept, that of informal proofs, is doing all of the epistemic work
and that this is the idea we should be taking more seriously. I certainly
agree, and believe this terminology helps bring the idea out.
29This is only austere, of course, when seen in the foundationist way. Actual set
theorists will in practice draw plenty of diagrams to illustrate their ideas.
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To finish, let me return to the starting questions which lead us into dis-
cussing Haslanger’s distinction in the first place. We wanted to find a way of
seeing how formal and informal mathematics and their respective conceptual
contents could operate side by side, both contributing to the understanding
we have of the phenomena they describe and the discovery of new concepts,
ideas, techniques and theorems. Applying Haslanger’s distinction, we have
made progress because it is now clear that even in the realm of mathematical
concepts, the (operative) concepts we put into practice do not always coin-
cide with the (manifest) concepts we take ourselves to be using. Therefore,
we do have the two notions working side by side and, furthermore, I have
been displaying that in the mathematical case the difference between the
manifest and operative concepts does span the formal and informal divide.
Nonetheless, it seems like the work is not yet complete. The discussion
has showed that manifest and operative concepts coming apart in mathe-
matics should be somewhat worrying to us. In the case of formal definitions
not coinciding with the operative concepts they are meant to be identify-
ing, there is an underlying philosophical difficulty that comes out in the
fact that this seems like mathematicians are confused about what they are
doing and the philosophical status thereof, with the danger that this might
have mathematical repercussions (as in the Benacerraf and low-dimensional
topology cases). Concerning the concept of proof, again we find that most
mathematics does not fit to the standards that mathematicians frequently
proclaim are to be demanded of correct proofs, with the potential difficulties
that entails. So although we have achieved the ‘side-by-side’ aspect of our
goal, the duality here so far seems problematic rather than virtuous.
What is needed is a story about how the operative concepts and the
manifest concepts can work alongside one another in mathematics, rather
than being in tension. I will in the next section investigate how we might
make progress by looking at how Scharp manages this in the case of truth.
3.8 Scharp on Replacing Defective Concepts
Scharp holds the view that the concept of truth, as well as many other con-
cepts, is inconsistent. The project of his book Replacing Truth (Scharp 2013)
is to engage in conceptual engineering to design a replacement concept (or,
as it turns out, two replacement concepts) which can succeed at the various
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roles truth plays in our conceptual toolbox while also being consistent.
What does it mean for a concept to be inconsistent? Scharp discusses
this at some length to rule out an opposing view that concepts cannot be
inconsistent. On Scharp’s view, a concept is inconsistent if and only if its
constitutive principles are inconsistent. The toy example he uses is that of
the ‘rable’, with the following constitutive principles:
(1a) ‘rable’ applies to x if x is a table.
(1b) ‘rable’ disapplies to x if x is red.
Importantly, the concept of rable is not logically inconsistent, but rather
leads to a contradiction give the empirical fact of the existence of red tables,
to which the concept both applies and disapplies. Given the environment
we wish to deploy it in then, the concept of a rable is defective. Being a toy
example, the defectiveness is not so important. However, the important idea
is that the concept of truth is also defective because it also leads to incon-
sistency. The central constitutive principles for truth are the two directions
of the T-schema:
(T-In) If ϕ then 〈ϕ〉 is true.
(T-Out) If 〈ϕ〉 is true then ϕ.
Then by the well-know reasoning of the liar paradox or one of its ilk, we
can arrive at an inconsistency. There are good reasons not to give up either
principle, as Scharp argues that these encode two important uses of truth: as
a device for endorsement and rejection. To say that ϕ is true can function
as a way of endorsing ϕ, thus T-Out encodes the endorsement function.
Similarly, to say that ϕ is not true is a way to reject ϕ, so T-In encodes the
rejection function (by its contrapositive).
The problem is that in a classical setting, no single concept will satisfy T-
In and T-Out without leading to inconsistency. The conceptual engineering
Scharp engages in solves the difficulty by replacing truth with two concepts
which take over the two functions of endorsement and rejection separately:
[I]f we replace truth with two concepts, we can split the workload,
allowing one to serve as a device of endorsement and the other
to serve as a device of rejection. (Scharp 2013, p. 147)
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Scharp replaces the concept of truth by the two concepts he calls ascending
truth and descending truth, which each only satisfy one of the principles.
Descending truth obeys T-Out, so functions as a device for endorsement;
ascending truth obeys T-In, so functions as a device for rejection. Scharp
furthermore defines the predicates expressing the concepts to be duals, i.e.
D(〈ϕ〉)↔ ¬A(〈¬ϕ〉) and ¬D(〈¬ϕ〉)↔ A(〈ϕ〉).
Now we can begin to see how Scharp’s project might be a useful parallel
to dealing with the concepts of mathematics. For Scharp proposes a formal,
axiomatic theory to go along with the new concepts, a theory which exhibits
a large number of principles which we would want truth to obey, but splits
these between ascending truth, descending truth and several hybrid princi-
ples given in terms of both new predicates.30 The crucial result is that this
formal theory is consistent (or, to be clear, consistent if set theory is), which
Scharp establishes by building a model with what he calls Xeno semantics.
We don’t need to go into a full assessment of Scharp’s theory of ascending
and descending truth.31 Rather, what is of interest is the way in which the
conceptual engineering Scharp engages in uses formal, technical machinery
to develop the new twin concepts of ascending and descending truth, as
well as the relationship this has to the defective concept of truth they are
replacing. There is a particular objection based on practicality which Scharp
can set aside, which is that it does not seem realistically achievable to convert
the general public to the replacement concepts which are based on subtle
and complex philosophical motivations.32 The reason Scharp can set this
aside is that he does not believe that such widespread adoption is necessary:
It is essential to remember that, on the proposal defended here,
it is legitimate to continue using ‘true’ for most purposes. Only
where the difference between ascending truth and descending
truth is not negligible does one need to use ‘descending true’ or
‘ascending true’ instead of ‘true’. (Scharp 2013, p. 174)
30To be exact, the theory of ADT is meant to be a kind of minimal theory for ascending
and descending truth, in that it will be a subtheory of any adequate theory for these two
concepts. For instance, Scharp does not demand that a theory of ascending and descending
truth should be fully axiomatisable, so this might only be a part of such a non-axiomatised
account. (See Scharp 2013, p. 153).
31For a start towards this, see reviews of the book such as (Ripley 2014; Read 2014).
32This point is frequently raised against Haslanger’s project too, but is even more
pressing because of the centrality of trying to achieve political and social aims with the
new concepts.
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That is, a lot of the time the new framework is not necessary for the purposes
at hand. Comparing the concept of truth to the concept of mass, Scharp
elaborates:
Just as in casual conversation, people use ‘mass’ with the under-
standing that what they are saying might not be, strictly speak-
ing, correct, but it is good enough for the purposes at hand.
That is, those involved would have reached the same conclusions
even if they had used the more complicated replacement con-
cepts instead (with more effort). If a conversational participant
wants to insist that the questions under consideration warrant
a more precise conceptual framework, then those in the conver-
sation can switch to the more precise terminology of relativistic
mass and proper mass. Likewise, if necessary, conversational
participants can switch from talk of truth to talk of ascending
truth and descending truth. (Scharp 2013, p. 275)
So the replacement concepts, those which are consistent, are there in case the
common but inconsistent concept of truth is likely to get us into trouble.
Nonetheless, the everyday uses of truth are often harmless and actively
useful—the well-known existence of paradoxes of truth has not hindered
its functioning in endorsement and rejection, for instance. The defective
and the engineered concepts both have roles in our theorising about and
interaction with the world, and this perspective allows for them to operate
side-by-side, each prevailing in suitable settings.
What about the case of mathematics and mathematical concepts? I have
been investigating how the literature surrounding conceptual engineering
might be applied to this question. While little previous work seems to have
been done explicitly on this approach, there is an exception to be found in
(Scharp & Shapiro forthcoming). In it, Scharp & Shapiro are still primarily
concerned with truth, but run through three other examples of inconsistent
concepts to illustrate their approach, two of which are mathematical: the
na¨ıve concept of set and na¨ıve infinitesimals.33 These two examples are
33The final example is a practical situation in which the barber’s paradox appears,
concerning a club called the “Secretary Liberation Club” precisely for secretaries of clubs
they are not eligible to join, with trouble arising when they hire a secretary who wants
to know if they can join the Secretary Liberation Club. The example is attributed to
(Chihara 1979).
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common in philosophy of mathematics, at least partly because analysis and
then set theory were major stopping points in the development of the modern
era of mathematics. Indeed, the process of rigorisation in analysis in turn
led to the drive towards the now-dominant foundationalist picture. So it is
an important observation that major concepts in the history of mathematics
have turned out to be inconsistent, but Scharp & Shapiro equally stress that
this does not mean that the practices they found themselves in were wholly
broken:
The lesson of this episode (at least as we have characterized
it) is that inconsistent terms need not undermine an otherwise
successful and productive intellectual project. The project can
go on so long as the practitioners have a good feel for what
they can and cannot do with the potentially troublesome terms.
And this particular project went on splendidly for some 200 or
300 years, engaging some of the finest mathematical minds ever.
Until the trouble arose, internally, the project was not regarded
as broken, and was in no need of fixing. (Scharp & Shapiro
forthcoming)
As it turned out, infinitesimals were never really replaced, but rather ban-
ished. This did lead to the conceptual development of new definitions for
all of the central notions of analysis via the  − δ definitions, which are re-
placements of previous concepts. For instance, the concept of convergence
was replaced by the two notions of uniform and pointwise convergence, and
observing that these two come apart in certain cases was an important math-
ematical step in the development of analysis. Set theory, on the other hand,
has been a huge success mathematically, replacing the na¨ıve concept of set
with whatever is defined within the system of ZFC. Whether this is one
concept of set or many is still an ongoing question underlying the debate
between proponents of the universe view of sets (Woodin 2011) and the mul-
tiverse approach favoured by Hamkins (Hamkins 2012). I certainly think
that debate could do with some input along the lines of this chapter on the
nature of mathematical concepts.
I shall not attempt to cover the full range of mathematical concepts just
in virtue of the sheer number and diversity of them in the history of math-
ematics. Still, it does seem that the strategy being championed by Scharp
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is a useful one for beginning to untangle the many threads interweaving
in the realm of mathematical concepts. However much I am suspicious of
foundationalist projects, and their link to the Formalist-Reductionist phi-
losophy, it cannot be denied that formalisation projects are enlightening to
us in coming to understand mathematical concepts, theories and methods,
as well as deeply important to our confidence in the edifice of mathematics.
But the formal and axiomatised aspects of mathematics and their positive
contribution to mathematical discovery also does not mean that we have to
accept that these are the ultimate foundations for mathematics and that all
that came before was broken. Rather, we can deploy Scharp’s replacement
strategy in recognising that certain concepts in mathematics are defective—
and, occasionally, inconsistent—so we replace them and perform conceptual
engineering to develop new ones.
Yet we should not be so simplistic as to see the old concepts and the
practices they are embedded in as always flawed or misguided, nor that the
concepts we end up with are deep or rich enough to embody all the wealth of
mathematical thinking. Practices which make use of open-textured, informal
concepts do contribute to the development of new mathematics and allow
for a great deal of mathematical reasoning. The Scharpian move, involving
detailed conceptual engineering of formal models and axiomatic theories of
truth, should be mirrored in dealing with mathematical concepts, where the
formal models and axiomatic systems do provide us with new insights into
the informal and open-textured concepts, but where we only need to replace
them in certain settings and contexts, such as those where we are investi-
gating meta-mathematics, or how mathematical theories can be represented
within one another. Instead of being in tension, the two ends along the axis
of formality work in parallel and are useful to mathematics in different ways,
or useful to different mathematical projects.
3.9 The Concepts of Mathematics
To finish, let us return to the three general questions about mathematical
concepts change that we began with. These were:
1. Do mathematical concepts need to be replaced or merely revised?
2. Do all mathematical concepts need to be changed or merely some of
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them?
3. Does the change of concepts need to apply to all contexts or just some?
The answers to these questions are going to be tied to some set of purposes
we have for changing mathematical concepts. For instance, in Haslanger
and Scharp their answers were linked to achieving social justice and pro-
viding consistent replacements for truth, respectively. So we can ask what
the purposes for mathematical concepts and their development are? Well,
from what we have seen there are multiple answers to this question. As we
have seen, the big traditional answer is that we replace defective concepts in
mathematics to ensure rigour. Indeed, the conceptual development under-
lying modern analysis was brought about as the “rigorisation of analysis”
by Cauchy, Weierstass, Dedekind etc. Similarly, the follow-up project of the
formalisation of mathematics by Frege, Russell & Whitehead, and Hilbert
was guided in a large part by the desire to secure mathematics on a fully
rigorous foundation. Besides rigour, though, we have seen from the dialecti-
cal approach to the philosophy of mathematics that conceptual development
is also part of the broader methodology of mathematics. Hereby, the pur-
pose of conceptual change will be connected to broader mathematical aims,
such as problem-solving, structural understanding and discovering proofs.
A full discussion of what mathematical conceptual development is aimed at
when we are treating it with conceptual engineering would be part of larger
project, one which I certainly don’t have the answers to, so let me set it
aside for now.
Instead, let us consider where some of those writers discussed above land
on the three main questions.
In section 3.5 we already compared Lakatos, Waismann and Kneebone
on the identity of concepts. Identity conditions are clearly hugely important
to the first question, as the weaker the identity conditions, the easier it is
to call concepts “the same” and the more straightforward it is to claim that
concepts are just being revised rather than being replaced. Lakatos, first of
all, was above quoted as holding that proof-generated concepts erase and
replace the na¨ıve concepts. This offers a strong answer on the first question,
but I suspect that it is slightly too strong to accurately capture Lakatos’s
views. More rightly, the context of the line seems to refer to larger jumps
in the understanding of our concepts, where these involve “characteristic”
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proof-generated concepts, i.e. those central to a particular proof idea. This
does not seem to rule out the thought that for smaller alterations to concepts
it would be acceptable to call these “revisions” rather than “replacements”,
as is somewhat suggested by the term ‘concept-stretching’, which brings to
mind a single concept being deformed. On the other two questions, Lakatos
believes that interesting mathematical concepts will all change through the
proofs they occur in, barring perhaps formal proofs and the concepts de-
ployed therein. On the other hand, Kneebone appears to place much more
emphasis on the slow development of concepts, calling it ‘evolution’, ‘enlarg-
ing’ and ‘transformation’ of concepts, which is suggestive of revision over
replacement. Like Lakatos, he seems to think that all mathematical con-
cepts are subject to development and change, but unlike Lakatos he seems
to think that context manages to fix concepts well enough in the moment
to avoid equivocation and to put formal logic to work, pointing to a slightly
more conservative answer to the third question. Meanwhile, we saw that
Waismann thinks that concepts are too loose in their definitions for there
to be a meaningful discussion about whether they are or are not the same
before and after they have been confronted with new cases.
Turning to the figures from conceptual engineering, Carnap is somewhat
ambiguous on the revise/replace question. For instance:
The task of explication consists in transforming a given more or
less inexact concept into an exact one or, rather, in replacing the
first by the second. (Carnap 1950, p. 3)
This seems to give both readings. On the other hand, Carnap is clearer that
explication is important mainly for moving from ordinary language terms
to scientifically precise ones, so on the last two questions the concepts are
restricted to the ones we want to treat this way, and the context is specifi-
cally the scientific or academic one. Scharp is quite explicit about the use
of replacing concepts rather than just revising them. This matches Scharp’s
fine-grained view of the identity of concepts via constitutive principles. On
the other hand, Haslanger often sounds like she wants to replace the un-
just operative concepts with better target concepts, but also describes the
ameliorative project as being akin to Carnapian explication in its method
of improving concepts in (Haslanger & Saul 2006, fn. 5), ultimately seeing
the question of what is going on in such conceptual analyses as inquiry-
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dependent:
It should be understood, however, that on my view, whether
or not an analysis is an improvement on existing meanings will
depend on the purposes of the inquiry. (Haslanger & Saul 2006,
fn. 5)
As such, there seems to be an openness similar to Carnap’s position.
So what should we say to these questions for the specifically mathemat-
ical cases of conceptual engineering? Let us draw some morals from the
preceding discussion. Having argued that mathematical concepts are open-
textured like empirical concepts, it results that we should be open to the
possibility of concepts being revised in the light of new cases. However, be-
yond this there are clear cases of replacements in the well-known examples
of analysis and set theory. For instance, the previous concept of conver-
gence was replaced by two concepts of uniform and pointwise convergence.
Therefore we should conclude that both revision and replacement are to be
found in mathematics and should be utilised. Taking a lesson from the di-
alectical philosophy of mathematics, the answer to the second question will
be that interesting mathematics will develop all concepts we use, although
pragmatically this might be restricted to less than that. For instance, it
might be that different concepts are more or less fixed in our practices at
different times. We might also limit replacement processes to concepts which
are defective for our purposes, whatever those happen to be, which again
might be a far more restricted class of mathematical concepts, one which
varies over time with our purposes and our opinions on what defectiveness
amounts to. The answer to the third question is that the contexts in which
revision and replacement of mathematical concepts occur are not all of them
but just some. As discussed, I believe this is important for the resolution
of puzzles about the relationship between formal and informal mathemat-
ics. In different contexts our purposes will be best served by different levels
of formality and rigour, and it is part of mathematical thinking to be able
to move between these as the broader context demands. As such, we can
look to conceptual engineering for strategies on how to connect the different
concepts, to allow them to work in parallel.
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3.10 Conclusion
In this chapter I have been looking at mathematical concepts and how they
should often be seen in a dynamic rather than static way, in the sense that
they are developed over time via mathematical practices. In the first half
of the chapter I looked at how we can make it clear that not all mathe-
matical concepts are fixed and ‘Fregean’, by examining Waismann’s notion
of open texture and how it applies to mathematical concepts; Lakatos’s di-
alectical theory of mathematical conceptual change and the connection this
has to proving; and Kneebone’s earlier work on changing mathematical con-
cepts. However, there was the central problem that if concepts are tracking
mathematical practices, then we need an account of how this extends to the
modern side-by-side usage of informal proofs and formal results. I turned
to conceptual engineering as a place to look for a strategy for dealing with
the axis of informality and formality in modern mathematics, finding two
approaches that might provide answers from Haslanger and Scharp. Finally,
I examined what morals should be drawn from the discussions of this chap-
ter towards how to give a full account of modern mathematical conceptual
development.
The place we have reached leaves a great deal open and further work
to be done. Nonetheless, I hope to have set out a path which leads from
the work of Waismann, Lakatos and Kneebone, to a consideration of the
relationship between proof, formality and concepts in modern mathematics.
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Chapter 4
Proof and Mathematical
Know-How
A proof is like the mathematician’s travelogue. Fermat gazed out
of his mathematical window and spotted this mathematical peak
in the distance, the statement that his equations do not have
whole number solutions. The challenge for subsequent genera-
tions of mathematicians was to find a pathway leading from the
familiar territory that mathematicians had already navigated to
this foreign new land. Like the story of Frodo’s adventures in
Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings, a proof is a description of the jour-
ney from the Shire to Mordor.
— Marcus du Sautoy
4.1 Introduction
In Why do we Prove Theorems? (Rav 1999) Rav argues that mathematical
epistemology should focus on proofs rather than truths or, as he puts it:
[P]roofs rather than the statement-form of theorems are the bear-
ers of mathematical knowledge. (Rav 1999, p. 20)
The argument proceeds from here to various conclusions about mathemat-
ics such as rejecting both foundationalism and the Formalist-Reductionist
approach to the justification of proofs. I will not focus on these so much
here, rather I will investigate more deeply the epistemological picture that
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we should adopt in response to Rav’s arguments. The Ravian idea is to
move away from the shallow picture of mathematical knowledge as knowing
the propositional statement-forms of mathematical theorems, and towards
one more focused on knowledge of techniques, methods and general proof-
constructing tools. Crucially, what Rav taps into in the re-conception he
provides of mathematical knowledge is a distinction familiar from episte-
mology between knowing-how and knowing-that. However, Rav does not
explicitly relate his move to an emphasis on knowing-how in mathematics
over knowing-that, nor is this drawn out in subsequent literature.1 On the
other hand, the literature in epistemology has a great deal to say on the rela-
tionship between knowing-how and knowing-that, so drawing out how these
insights apply in the case of mathematics will provide a number of links,
ideas and proposals that will in turn lead to a more subtle and worked-out
theory of the practical side of mathematical knowledge.
The main idea of this chapter is the following. While accepting the point
Rav makes that we should focus on mathematical methods, skills, tech-
niques, concepts and connections, I will argue that the actual conclusion
to be drawn from Rav’s main argument is that mathematical epistemology
should be investigating both the traditional propositional knowledge and
knowledge-how, as well as the way in which the two connect. The last part
is crucial: throughout I will argue that propositional and practical aspects
of knowledge in mathematics are thoroughly entwined, and the job of math-
ematical epistemology should in part be to look at the relationship between
them. I will argue later that this has a large impact on the epistemological
function of proofs, in that activities of proving are epistemologically pri-
mary, while proofs are to be seen as a guide to action which are used to
communicate directions on how to carry out the activities.
In section 4.2, I will weigh up Rav’s argument for the switch of em-
phasis from mathematical truths to mathematical proofs to find that while
it is successful at rejecting the opposing view, the outcome of his thought-
experiment is not exactly the one he envisages, with interesting philosophical
results. Next, in section 4.3, I will set out the distinction between knowledge-
how and knowledge-that as it is found in the epistemology literature. I go
1With the exception of (Lo¨we & Mu¨ller 2010) who argue that knowing-how in math-
ematics should be analysed in terms of mathematical skills. I will return to this later in
section 4.5.
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on, in section 4.4, to apply the epistemological picture to the case of math-
ematics, discussing benefits of the cross-over between the literatures and
several examples. In section 4.5, I describe and critique the arguments from
two papers by Lo¨we & Mu¨ller which argue that mathematical knowledge is
context-dependent and should be filled out in terms of mathematical skills.
From here I will be lead into a discussion of the epistemological importance
of the activities of proving in section 4.6. Finally, I will return to the rela-
tionship between knowledge-how and proofs in section 4.7.
4.2 Rav and Pythiagora the Oracular Computer
One of Rav’s main arguments for the claim that proofs are more important
to mathematics than truths comes from the thought-experiment about an
oracular machine called Pythiagora. Pythiagora is a universal decision ma-
chine, where if you enter any mathematical statement then the machine will
respond immediately with a declaration of the statement’s truth or falsity.
Rav imagines a world in which such a machine sits on every mathemati-
cian’s desktop. The result is that all open problems can be resolved simply
by entering them into Pythiagora, while refereeing papers becomes far more
straightforward since Pythiagora can immediately check any claimed the-
orems. All the hours of trying to establish the truth or falsity of some
proposed claim are done away with, replaced by submitting the statement
to the computer.
The argument is that if the role of mathematical proof is merely to
deliver unto us knowledge of mathematical truths, then such a machine
would be a welcome triumph, replacing the cumbersome and hard process
of proving with an instant resolution to all mathematical problems that take
our interest. However, Rav argues that Pythiagora would not be welcome
at all:
A universal decision method would have dealt a death blow to
mathematics, for we would cease having ideas and candidates
for conjectures. [...] But conceptual and methodological innova-
tions are inextricably bound to the search for and the discovery
of proofs, thereby establishing links between theories, systema-
tising knowledge, and spurring further developments. Proofs, I
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maintain, are the heart of mathematics, the royal road to creat-
ing analytic tools and catalysing growth. (Rav 1999, p. 6)
Expanding on this point, Rav claims that the above benefits are to do with
the epistemological role of proofs compared to that of truths. The claim is
that knowing particular mathematical facts is by itself not very mathemat-
ically interesting, a point Rav makes through a case study of Fermat’s Last
Theorem and the following related quote from Gauss:
[I]f I succeed in taking some of the principal steps in [algebraic
number] theory, then Fermat’s Theorem will appear as only one
of the least interesting corollaries. (Quoted in Bell 1937, p. 261)
On the other hand, the knowledge found in proofs is of a more interesting
type, for proofs contain the problem-solving techniques which mathematics
is most concerned with. Thus Rav can conclude with the primacy of the
knowledge contained in proofs over that of mere truths, facts and theorems:
[P]roofs rather than the statement-form of theorems are the bear-
ers of mathematical knowledge. Theorems are in a sense just
tags, labels for proofs, summaries of information, headlines of
news, editorial devices. The whole arsenal of mathematical method-
ologies, concepts, strategies and techniques for solving problems,
the establishment of interconnections between theories, the sys-
tematisation of results—the entire mathematical know-how is
embedded in proofs. (Rav 1999, p. 20)
Now, Rav makes a compelling case that the kind of knowledge embedded
in proofs is both interesting and importantly different from knowing the
theorems proved, as well as for the general point that mathematics without
proofs would be significantly depleted. Nonetheless, the response to the
Pythiagora example that Rav uses does not seem entirely plausible.
In stark contrast to Rav’s claim that mathematicians’ constant access
to Pythiagora would deal a death blow to mathematics, a better interpre-
tation of the proposed scenario proceeding is the very opposite: not a dark
age but a golden age of mathematics. Of course, on first getting access to
the oracular powers of Pythiagora the reaction of many, most or maybe all
mathematicians might be to check the truth of both famous open problems
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and the problems they personally are working on. It is only natural for peo-
ple to be curious whether the Riemann hypothesis is true or false, whether
P = NP etc. But unlike the description Rav gives, this doesn’t seem to
be the end of the mathematicians’ curiosity. Now certainly Rav is right
to reject the simple picture on which we are only interested in truths, and
this is intuitively clear from the repellence of doing mathematics with these
alone, and no proofs to reveal deeper structural connections, but the focus
on proofs with truths relegated to mere tags and labels suggested by Rav’s
rhetoric strikes me as equally implausible.
The golden age of mathematics that would come about in the thought-
experiment of Pythiagora would be due to the fact that having access to
an oracular machine would not do away with proving in mathematics, but
would on the contrary facilitate it. For one thing, knowing whether a claim
or its opposite is true lets us concentrate on the proof of that. Take, for
example, the question of P=NP. While this is an open question, the general
suspicion amongst computer scientists and mathematicians appears to be
that it is false.2 Nonetheless, if it turns out that it is true after all then
we may be directing the majority of our efforts at proving the wrong thing.
Thus, knowing the truth of P = NP is immediately useful for mathematics.
But knowing the final truth of the ultimate theorem is just the tip of the
iceberg in terms of usefulness to proving. We would be able to use Pythiagora
to not just verify theorems, but also check lemmas and intermediary steps
on the way. Such an application is key to the point I am making: proofs do
not just use skills, techniques and methods to suddenly arrive at the truth
of the theorem, but rather they interweave the application of these skills,
techniques and methods with a whole series of propositional facts. Stated
like this it may sound rather obvious, but the point is that downplaying the
importance of theorems and facts relative to proofs in the epistemology of
mathematics misses the deeper interconnection between different types of
mathematical knowledge.
Let us examine a little further the usefulness of having access to Pythi-
agora for broader mathematical endeavours. For one thing, the time wasted
on blind alleys and poorly chosen lemmas in mathematics must be sub-
2I say suspicion rather than consensus because it isn’t hugely unusual to think the
opposite. A poll, now somewhat out of date, found out of 100 well-respected respondents,
61 expect that P 6= NP , to only 9 believing P=NP. See (Gasarch 2002) for details.
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stantial, and being able to check these in an instant would be informative,
time-saving and helpful. Of course, one might be concerned that there is
some benefit to the honest toil of going in wrong directions, such as that
seeing why they are wrong directions will be helpful in formulating improve-
ments and better choices. However, having access to Pythiagora would also
be very useful in providing insights into where incorrect lemmas and theo-
rems go astray, since it would make it significantly easier to discover actual
counter-examples, from which one may well be able to glean more than a
failed proof alone. The use of an oracle can thus augment and direct our
proving efforts rather than destroy them, because epistemic access to truths
is a vital component of successful proving.
The world in which we have access to Pythiagora is a fantasy land, of
course, for it is well-known that such a universal decision engine is math-
ematically impossible. It might therefore seem indulgent to imagine this
scenario beyond the playful use Rav himself puts it to. However, we don’t
need anything so wild as a universal decision machine to see that Rav’s
conclusion is too extreme by far. All that is needed is something which
is found increasingly extensively in the real world: computational mathe-
matics. As an example, consider the system GAP (standing for ‘Groups,
Algorithms and Programming’), which is a programme used in computa-
tional group theory, which includes a programming language, an interactive
environment, huge data libraries of examples from group theory and related
areas, and implemented algorithms.3 In (Martin 2015), GAP is examined
from the point of view of mathematical practice, revealing the following:
Research users of GAP typically use it to experiment with con-
jectures and theories. Whereas pencil and paper calculation
restricts investigations to small and atypical groups, the ready
availability in GAP of a plethora of examples, and the ease of
computing with groups of large size, makes it possible to develop,
explore and refine hypotheses, examples and possible counter
examples, before proceeding to decide exactly what theorems to
prove, and developing the proofs in a conventional journal paper.
(Martin 2015, p. 42)
In essence, this is exactly what I am describing: ready access to confir-
3Its current homepage can be found at: http://www.gap-system.org/
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mation and computational results, which serve a similar function as the
oracular Pythiagora outputs in Rav’s example, doesn’t hinder mathematics
but instead function as a useful and productive part of mathematical dis-
covery. A similar example is that of SnapPy, which focuses on the geometry
and topology of hyperbolic structures.4 Again, it provides computational
results, such as being able to compute whether an inputted planar projec-
tion diagram5 has a canonical decomposition. On the other hand, a major
focus of their project is also for the program to provide mathematicians with
quick, computer-generated visualisations of the various objects it deals with,
which in turn provide deeper understanding of the objects involved. In both
cases, the computational approach to mathematics certainly provides the
sort of propositional feedback that Rav’s thought experiment portrays as a
danger to mathematics. Yet, a more careful analysis of the effects on mathe-
matics that computational work has demonstrates that this does not lead to
abandoning proofs and proving in the mathematical methodology, rather it
augments it and opens up new ways for mathematicians to do mathematics.
Indeed, this was part of lesson to be learned from the previous chapter.
A potential response that could be offered by Rav is to point to examples
of computer-assisted proving which are less easy to frame in such a positive
light. For example, the proof of the Four Colour Theorem involves reducing
the problem to some large number of cases and then using a computer to
verify the truth of the theorem for those cases. Now there is a case to be
made here for how the computational work fails to deliver the knowledge we
would usually expect from a proof, or maybe more accurately, it doesn’t give
us a proper understanding of the truth of the theorem. Certainly a great
deal of philosophical literature is concerned with the particular case of the
Four Colour Theorem and the shift in proving practices it represents, e.g.
(Tymoczko 1979), (Detlefsen 2008) and (Davis & Hersh 1981, pp. 380-387).
And it may well be true that the essential use of a computer to produce a
proof too long to be checked by a human mathematician represents a radical
shift in mathematical practices and proof in particular. However, this is
precisely the point as I see it: mathematical proof might be augmented and
changed, but this is not to the detriment of mathematical methods, ideas
4Its current homepage can be found at http://www.math.uic.edu/t3m/SnapPy/
Thanks to Adam Epstein for bringing this system to my attention.
5The programme comes with software for anyone to draw their own planar diagrams,
which are a way of representing objects in low-dimensional topology.
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and progress. As an important observation, the Four Colour Theorem itself
was not the end of mathematics on this topic, not the “death blow” that
might be expected, but has been the source of another milestone of progress
when it was formalised by Gonthier, as described in (Gonthier 2008). The
controversy had been about the computational enumeration of the huge
number of cases of reductions for the Four Colour Theorem, with no doubt
cast on the traditional but previously informal parts of the proof leading
up to that point. However, Gonthier’s report describes the significant and
interesting mathematics that came out of formalising the proof fully. Two
points result from this. Number one: formal proofs and formalisation do
not hinder mathematical discovery (including of methods and techniques)
but instead provide new ways of examining, generalising and coming to
understand the mathematics involved. This is in line with what I argued in
the previous chapter. Number two: the Formalist-Reductionist once again
doesn’t benefit from this point. For if one believes that informal proofs are
justified by their formalisations, then the fact that an accepted informal
proof might require substantial mathematical discoveries to be formalised
casts serious doubt on this position. The informal proof was held to be
justified by all of the usual standards, but the formalisation was inaccessible
without the substantial extra mathematical work.
As a further response to the Pythiagora argument by Rav, it should be
noted that the “death blow for mathematics” rather exaggerates the impact
of no longer needing proofs in another direction too, in that it unnecessarily
restricts the realm of mathematics. In fact, mathematics extends far be-
yond the pure mathematics which Rav focuses on throughout his article, to
include the vast swathes of applied mathematics, statistics, computational
mathematics, etc. The point is that the majority of these other areas of
mathematics are bound up with modelling in some form or other rather
than establishing ultimate truths, and as such are better assessed holisti-
cally rather than individually. The point is very similar to Elgin’s point
about scientific knowledge in (Elgin 2006). Indeed, Elgin’s argument that
the factivity of knowledge does not fit well with practices such as scientific
theory-building which are not aiming at truth per se transfers directly to
the broader mathematical situation. In the same way that scientific the-
ories involve purpose-dependent simplifications, abstractions and idealisa-
tions, meaning that the full theory does not purport to be literally true,
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many mathematical theories outside of pure mathematics are focused on
modelling phenomena.
For instance, in an undergraduate applied mathematics course one might
encounter all kinds of models, from mechanics to population dynamics.
Without the theory they are embedded in many of the propositions the the-
ory is built on and generates will not strictly be true, so is hard to describe as
‘knowledge’ given that this is standardly taken to be factive. Elgin’s conclu-
sion is that a more important epistemic goal in these cases is understanding,
meaning the understanding of the phenomena afforded to us by the theoris-
ing or mathematical techniques employed. Understanding, which can come
in degrees and different forms, clearly relates to both propositional facts
and practical knowledge but is not obviously reducible to either of them.
The thought-experiment of Pythiagora is all about delivering truths, but if
large swathes of mathematics are more focused on understanding phenom-
ena mathematically than on finding the ultimate truth of things, then the
thought-experiment cannot expected to see the same devastating effect on
mathematics. For these other areas of mathematics, the same honest toil
will still be required to get their results. Again, this point is in the same di-
rection as Rav’s intended broadening of the class of interesting mathematics,
but actually goes beyond it. As part of the philosophy of mathematical prac-
tice, it is worth remembering that the narrow view of mathematics which is
treated in the standard philosophical accounts is not exactly faithful to the
diversity one finds in mathematics departments.
Thus it would appear that contrary to the simple view Rav attacks,
mathematical knowledge must be more than propositional knowledge of
mathematical truths, but contrary to Rav’s proposed picture, the practi-
cal knowledge embedded in proofs is not by itself an adequate replacement.
The two responses I have given to Rav’s Pythiagora thought experiment
suggest that mathematical epistemology should be concerned with at least
three key concepts: propositional mathematical knowledge, mathematical
know-how and mathematical understanding.
4.3 Knowing-How and Knowing-That
Rav’s discussion goes into detail on why it is that we are more interested in
proofs than in the truths of mathematics. The ultimate point, though, rests
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on the kind of knowledge of mathematics we’re after: that knowledge of
isolated truths (such as those offered by Pythiagora) is not in itself of much
interest, whereas knowledge of proofs contains the structural connections,
the methods, the ideas and the relations of mathematics. Recall from above:
[...] the entire mathematical know-how is embedded in proofs.
(Rav 1999, p. 20)
We find this line in and amongst the many other advantages knowing proofs
has over knowing truths. However, there is a large literature in episte-
mology working on precisely the relationship between knowledge-how and
knowledge-that, one which has hardly been brought to bear on mathemati-
cal knowledge at all. If we take Rav’s point seriously, as I believe we should,
then it will be a worthwhile project to see what the status of knowing-how is
in mathematics and how it relates to the standard propositional knowledge
which has been the common subject of mathematical epistemology in the
past. To enable such an investigation, I will in this section set out the state
of play on this topic as it stands in epistemology. I will proceed from Ryle
to Stanley & Williamson, ultimately settling on the picture by Wiggins that
knowledge-how and knowledge-that are tightly connected and difficult to
pull apart in practice.
To begin, the first important observation is that the intended distinction
is between the standard objects of knowledge, which are propositional, and
some distinctly practical kind of knowledge, but that this distinction is not
necessarily tracked exactly by the linguistic constructions. For instance,
consider the following two sentences:
(1) Caroline knows how to play Doppelkopf.6
(2) Ryo knows how Alper cheated at Doppelkopf.
While the first sentence typically ascribes a practical sort of knowledge to
Caroline, the second might amount to no more than:
(3) Ryo knows that Alper cheated using secret hand-signals.
where this is straightforwardly seen to be essentially propositional. The
point is made by Rumfitt in (Rumfitt 2003) by emphasising the difference
6This is a German card game similar, in certain respects, to Whist.
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between the semantics and metaphysics of knowledge-how. Similar points
are also seen in (Moore 1997, ch. 8) and (Glick 2011, p. 403) and likely
originate in (Hornsby 1980, p. 84). While the linguistic structure can be
used to pick out both forms of knowledge, as in (1) and (2), the metaphys-
ical interest lies in investigating just the practical kind of knowledge. That
is to say, although the usual way of talking about the distinction is between
knowing-how and knowing-that, the interest is not in just any knowledge
identified by “knows how” constructions. In the literature, it is fairly com-
mon to talk about knowledge-how-to instead, but the emphasis on the kind
of knowledge rather than the semantics of sentences is an important issue
we shall return to shortly.
The main source for the philosophical distinction in the literature is Ryle
in (Ryle 1946) and (Ryle 1949, ch. 2) who took himself to be refuting the
‘intellectualist’ position:
Mathematics and the established sciences are the model accom-
plishments of human intellects. [...] They thus bequeathed the
idea that the capacity to attain knowledge of truths was the
defining property of a mind. Other human powers could be
classed as mental only if they could be shown to be somehow
piloted by the intellectual grasp of true propositions. [...] the in-
tellectualist doctrine [...] seeks to define intelligence in terms of
the apprehension of truths, instead of the apprehension of truths
in terms of intelligence. (Ryle 1949, p. 27)
Hereby we come to a debate between the intellectualists on one hand and
Ryle’s anti-intellectualism on the other. Firstly, intellectualism is the view
that holds that all knowledge-how is just propositional knowledge, or that
knowledge-how is just a form of knowledge that. On the other hand, anti-
intellectualism is the position that knowledge-how and knowledge-that are
distinct, or that knowledge-how is practical in a way that knowledge-that
is not or cannot be. As it stands, Ryle’s anti-intellectualist view is gener-
ally acknowledged to have become the philosophical orthodoxy. However,
the modern debate was re-ignited by Stanley & Williamson in their pa-
per (Stanley & Williamson 2001), who took on the intellectualist position
against Ryle. Let us go through both in turn.
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Ryle’s form of anti-intellectualism sees making a distinction between the
two types of knowledge as hugely important for rejecting a narrow approach
to philosophy which is largely based on our knowledge and discovery of facts:
In [philosophers’] theories of knowledge they concentrate on the
discovery of truths or facts, and they either ignore the discovery
of ways and methods of doing things or else they try to reduce it
to the discovery of facts. They assume that intelligence equates
with the contemplation of propositions and is exhausted in this
contemplation. (Ryle 1946, p. 4)
He thus sees the exclusion of the ways and methods as failing to explain
intelligent action. A useful example for our purposes is his discussion of
logical inference, for which he turns to the Lewis Carroll’s story of “What the
Tortoise said to Achilles” (Carroll 1895). The idea is to consider a scenario
in which a student understands two premises A and B and a conclusion Z
in a valid argument, but fails to appreciate that the conclusion follows from
the premises. For the intellectualist, Ryle suggests, what is needed is to add
the proposition C: “if A and B are true, then so is Z” to their consideration.
But Carroll’s Tortoise observes that the problem is not resolved: the student
might still fail to make the inference. Again, we can add a further instructive
premise D: “if A, B and C are true, then so is Z” and again the student
might fail to infer Z from A, B, C and D, and so on ad infinitum. Ryle
argues that what has gone wrong here is the assumption that intelligent
action can be reduced to propositional theorising, for the problem is that
the student can accept all of the new premises in theory without any of them
forcing the student to accept the conclusion. The upshot is:
Knowing a rule of inference is not possessing a bit of extra infor-
mation but being able to perform an intelligent operation. (Ryle
1946, p. 7)
Similarly, Ryle’s main objection against intellectualism takes the form
of a regress:
If a deed, to be intelligent, has to be guided by the consideration
of a regulative proposition, the gap between that consideration
and the practical application of the regulation has to be bridged
by some go-between process which cannot by the pre-supposed
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definition itself be an exercise of intelligence and cannot, by def-
inition, be the resultant deed. (Ryle 1946, p. 2)
If the intellectualists are right, and knowledge-how is just a kind of knowledge-
that, then Ryle’s regress puts the following problem to them. Exercising
knowledge-how in intelligent action will involve two distinct parts: the men-
tal consideration of the relevant proposition and the resultant action. But
then the mental consideration of the proposition needs to be an intelligent
action too (so that the consideration is done in the right way, at the right
time, in the correct circumstances etc.)7 If so, then we need a further act of
mental consideration of a proposition to underlie that action, which in turn
requires another etc. Ultimately then there is the challenge of finding some-
thing which “reconciles these irreconcilables” (Ryle 1946, p. 3), a challenge
which Ryle believes the intellectualist will be hard-pushed to meet.
As for a positive view, Ryle’s position links knowledge-how closely to the
actions and activities that the intellectualist struggles to accommodate. For
instance:
When a person knows how to do things of a certain sort (e.g.,
make good jokes, conduct battles or behave at funerals), his
knowledge is actualised or exercised in what he does. (Ryle 1946,
p. 8)
And while in all of these we can find rules, maxims, canons, principles
etc. (especially in the case of logic), for Ryle these are separate from their
judicious application:
In short the propositional acknowledgement of rules, reasons or
principles is not the parent of the intelligent application of them;
it is a step-child of that application. (Ryle 1946, p. 9)
which is to say that rules are abstracted from practice, rather than knowl-
edge of them being necessary for knowledge-how. Such principles are help-
ful for many things, such as pedagogy, but the metaphysical nature of
knowledge-how for Ryle is more than will be captured by any such rules
or maxims. In particular, knowledge-how will surpass these rules precisely
7In their discussion of the regress, Stanley & Williamson leave out the ‘intelligent’
part of this, focusing simply on considering propositions as necessary for action. For a
further discussion of the form of the regress argument see (Fantl 2012).
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in that knowledge-how also involves regulating the activity as it goes along,
being prepared for eventualities that might arise and adapting as necessary
to them. Furthermore, Ryle’s position also involves the possibility of a kind
of internalisation of the activities in one’s know-how:
But very soon he comes to observe the rules without thinking of
them. He makes the permitted moves and avoids the forbidden
ones; he notices and protests when his opponent breaks the rules.
But he no longer cites to himself or to the room the formulae in
which the bans and permissions are declared. (Ryle 1949, p. 41)
As a result of the ongoing adaptability and the possibility of internalisation,
the picture of knowledge-how that Ryle proposes allows for knowledge-how
to be potentially quite complex. This must be right, given the large range
of knowledge that it picks out. For instance, consider:
(4) Joe knows how to spell ‘rhododendron’.
(5) Carley knows how to fly a helicopter.
While the former picks out a very particular piece of know-how, the latter
is complex and broad, requiring the co-ordination of many other skills and
competences across a range of situations.
There is a caricature of Ryle as holding an ability account of knowledge-
how, that is:
Ability: S knows how to V iff S is able to V .
This picture is actually a fairly popular one, found in (Rosefeldt 2004) and
(Noe¨ 2005) for example, and does well on a large range of cases. It would be
very odd to accept (5), that Carley knows how to fly a helicopter, but then to
also hold that she is unable to fly a helicopter (at least in some salient range
of situations). However, there are a number of common objections. Mainly,
the ability account seems to fail on both necessary and sufficient conditions.8
As a counterexample, take the example of a top chef who loses his sense of
taste in a dire cheese accident. It is plausible that the chef loses the ability to
cook certain complex dishes, without having lost any knowledge. Conversely,
at times we are able to do things by luck alone, without knowledge of how to
8This is brought out particularly clearly in (Bengson & Moffett 2011).
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do them, such as if I were to try to fly a helicopter (I definitely don’t know
how) and just happen to do everything right. Hawley has a particularly
nice example in (Hawley 2011) of a climber getting caught in an avalanche,
but mistaking the snow for water and therefore making swimming motions
to get out. As it happens, this is the correct way to escape avalanches.
While she is able to escape the avalanche by making swimming motions,
she is furthermore reliably successful at doing so. Nonetheless, it would be
highly implausible to say that the climber has knowledge of how to escape
avalanches.
To be fair to Ryle, in (Hornsby 2012), Hornsby makes a convincing case
for the idea that Ryle did not hold the abilities view and was aware of the
kind of counterexamples that such a view would be subject to. She says:
In connection with knowing-how, he spoke of all of “abilities,”
“skills,” “competences,” and “capacities,” and one might assume
that he used these various terms in part because he recognized
that ‘knowing how’ could not be understood in terms simply of
ability. (Hornsby 2012, p. 82)
Hornsby’s contention is that Ryle’s main aim in discussing know-how is
not to give an account of necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather
to establish the existence of another category of knowledge which is not
directly about propositions. The reason for this is that it is required for
Ryle’s broader project of rejecting the Cartesian dualist position, and in
particular the idea that intelligence and practice come apart:
[T]here is no gap between intelligence and practice corresponding
to the familiar gap between theory and practice. (Ryle 1946, p.
2)
So Hornsby’s point seems right in reading Ryle in the following way:
The Cartesian thinks that the mental is separate from the physi-
cal. Ryle wanted it to be clear that the states of mind implicated
in intelligent bodily action are inseparable from bodily action it-
self. (Hornsby 2012, p. 87)
Hornsby is talking about the way in which the Cartesian “myth” which Ryle
stands in opposition to separates thinking from doing, or mental thought
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from bodily action, with knowledge situated firmly in the mental realm.
Ryle’s purpose in exploring knowledge-how, therefore, is not to give a re-
ductive account, but to show that there is another class of knowledge which
is not to be relegated to the mysterious mental domain. For this reason,
rejecting the gap between the ‘inner’ mental life and external behaviours
was a more central aim than an explicit account of knowledge-how.
Let us move on for now to the modern intellectualist revival brought
about in (Stanley & Williamson 2001). Stanley & Williamson take the
Rylean regress argument against intellectualism to be invalid and argue for
the thesis that knowledge-how is just a species of knowing-that. Their ar-
gument against the regress is that there is an equivocation on the kind of
action involved in knowledge-how. On the one hand, the sort of actions we
employ knowledge-how to perform are intentional actions, while the con-
templation of a proposition involved in exercising that knowledge how is
not necessarily intentional, so the move to form a regress of needing deeper
and deeper knowledge-how is rejected. They cite this move as coming from
Ginet, who says the following:
I exercise (or manifest) my knowledge that one can get the door
open by turning the knob and pushing it (as well as my knowl-
edge that there is a door there) by performing that operation
quite automatically as I leave the room; and I may do this,
of course, without formulating (in my mind or out loud) that
proposition or any other relevant proposition. (Ginet 1975, p.
7)
As such, the regress argument doesn’t succeed. Responses to this are ex-
panded in (Hornsby 2012, pp. 95–95) and (Fantl 2012).
Stanley & Williamson’s positive case for intellectualism mainly rests
on one central argument based on the language and semantics of know-
how ascriptions. They present the ‘standard’ semantics for the meanings
of sentences of the form “P knows how to V” and demonstrate at length
that this analyses knowledge-how as a relation to a proposition, through an
embedded-question construction which fits the same structure as knowledge-
what, -where, -who, -when etc. constructions which are normally taken to
be relations to propositional answers. The key question then is what ex-
actly the propositions known are when someone possesses knowledge-how.
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Distilling the argument somewhat, here are two of their examples and the
central thesis expressed about them:
(19) Hannah knows how PRO to ride a bicycle. (Stanley &
Williamson 2001, p. 424)
(20c) Hannah knows how she could ride a bicycle. (Stanley &
Williamson 2001, p. 425)
Relative to a context in which (19) is interpreted as (20c), (19)
is true if and only if, for some contextually relevant way w which
is a way for Hannah to ride a bicycle, Hannah knows that w is a
way for her to ride a bicycle. Thus, to say that someone knows
how to F is always to ascribe to them knowledge-that. (Stanley
& Williamson 2001, p. 426)
The ‘PRO’ that Stanley & Williamson use is part of the syntactic theory,
which functions as “a phonologically null pronoun that occurs [...] in the
subject position of untensed clauses.” (Stanley & Williamson 2001, p. 419)
but this is not so important for our purposes. The point is that the relevant
constructions which ascribe knowledge-how to some agent can be interpreted
in terms of propositional knowledge, in particular of knowing that some way
is the way that the activity can be done.
In this way Stanley & Williamson use the standard semantic theory to
reduced knowledge-how to propositional knowledge of ways. An important
additional feature of this account is that the propositional knowledge as-
cribed in knowledge-how must frequently be held under a practical mode of
presentation. For there is a potential difficulty in the propositional answer
to the embedded ‘how’-question, which is that knowledge that w is a way
to V is possible to have in plenty of cases where we don’t seem to know how
to V in the substantial way we were interested in. For example, if I point
to an expert juggler and observe that the way they do it is a way to juggle
nine balls, I might know that THAT (while pointing) is a way to juggle nine
balls, without myself possessing any knowledge on how to actually go about
doing it. The practical mode of presentation is then the connection to the
complex dispositions involved in knowing-how to do something in a way that
makes it plausible to link it to ability, skills etc. They can then claim:
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It is for this reason that there are intricate connections between
knowing-how and dispositional states. But acknowledging such
connections in no way undermines the thesis that knowing-how
is a species of knowing-that. [...] It is simply a feature of certain
kinds of propositional knowledge that possession of it is related
in complex ways to dispositional states. Recognizing this fact
eliminates the need to postulate a distinctive kind of nonpropo-
sitional knowledge. (Stanley & Williamson 2001, pp. 429–430)
The investigation I am interested in of knowledge-how in the mathemat-
ical context is premised on there being an interesting kind of mathemati-
cal knowledge which has not been adequately appreciated in mathematical
epistemology previously, so in turn presupposes the intellectualist position
of Stanley & Williamson to be flawed. A full discussion of the merits and
failings of the theory could lead us far astray, so let me just set out succinctly
four ways in which I believe it is incorrect, though all are closely related.
Firstly, the heavy use of semantic theory is significantly less convincing once
we see that the account is not uniform across different languages, as aptly
displayed in (Rumfitt 2003) and developed in (Ditter 2016). Rumfitt shows
us that the best semantic theories for other languages range from largely
unhelpful for Stanley & Williamson’s point (in the case of French) to fully
antithetical to it (in the case of Russian). Secondly, there is the underlying
move of making the jump from the linguistic and semantic facts to the meta-
physical realm of what knowledge really is, which is not well-justified. Alva
Noe¨ (Noe¨ 2005) and Jessica Brown (Brown 2013), for instance, both argue
that the language-first methodology fails to consider empirical science, espe-
cially cognitive science, as a potentially divergent source of evidence on the
nature of knowledge-how. Thirdly, linguistics and semantics aim to study
language and meanings, but in building theories there are significant ideal-
ising assumptions made. For example, Noam Chomsky starts his (Chomsky
1965) with the following:
Linguistics is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener,
in a completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its
language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically ir-
relevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of
attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in
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applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance.
(Chomsky 1965, p. 1)
The best understanding of these practices, then, is under the heading of
modelling, broadly construed. However, with this in place, if one wants
to make the kind of argument Stanley & Williamson do, then it must be
demonstrated that the conclusions one is drawing are not artefacts of the
modelling process. No such argument is given, but furthermore there is
a clear story to be told about why modelling knowledge-how ascriptions
in terms of propositions does have the propositions merely as a result of
the modelling: because these are the standard, well-known building blocks
of semantic theories more generally. After all, why expand the theoretical
apparatus when instead we can just simplify the complexity involved in
practical knowledge. Indeed, this strikes me as the reason that Stanley &
Williamson need to posit both ‘ways’ and ‘practical modes of presentation’
as a bridge back to the actual phenomenon we are interested in. This takes
us to the fourth point: both ‘ways’ and ‘practical modes of presentation’
act as a philosophical black box, doing essentially all of the work in getting
to knowledge-how but without any indication of what is going on inside.
Jennifer Hornsby demonstrates that ‘ways’ in particular are not up to the
task required of them on this picture (Hornsby 2012, pp. 90-92).
Having seen Stanley & Williamson’s intellectualism and the Rylean anti-
intellectualism before that, I want to finish this section with a consideration
of positions which are located between the two extremes. One way to find
such a position is to follow (Glick 2011) in separating out weak intellectual-
ism from strong intellectualism, where the former holds that knowledge-how
has propositions as a relatum, while the latter equates knowledge-how with
full theoretical knowledge, i.e. possessing standard features of knowledge-
that like “(some subset of) belief, justification and Gettierizability, linguis-
tic accessibility, availability of content for use in inference, and concept-
possession.” (Glick 2011, p. 411). Importantly, this allows one to find
positions which satisfy the weak but not the strong intellectualist position,
with scope for making the relation between the knowing subject and the
propositions be of some sort which would be acceptable to anti-intellectualist
thinking.
The middle-way I will look further at, though, comes more from the
Rylean direction in Wiggins’s (Wiggins 2012). While Wiggins explicitly
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accepts that Ryle’s general point is correct against the intellectualists, that
there are distinct kinds of knowledge, the interest lies in the way in which
he brings out the close connection between the distinct pieces of practical
and propositional knowledge.9 Wiggins expands further on Ryle’s metaphor
of the ‘step-child’ we saw already above:
In short the propositional acknowledgement of rules, reasons or
principles is not the parent of the intelligent application of them;
it is a step-child of that application. (Ryle 1946, p. 9)
The idea being that a great deal of propositional knowledge, even of rules or
principles, rests on prior practical knowledge. Wiggins gives us the following
example:
A ship’s pilot who is retained by the maritime authorities to
bring large ships safely to anchor in an awkward or difficult har-
bour can tell us, on the basis of his competence and experience,
that when the wind is from the north and the tide is running
out, the best thing to do is to steer straight for such-and-such a
church tower until one is well past a certain bend in the channel.
Almost anyone can come to possess that propositional knowl-
edge but the information they get in this way will probably rest
indispensably upon the experience and practical knowledge of
a handful of people with a different kind of knowledge, namely
practical or [...] agential knowledge. (Wiggins 2012, p. 109)
There is a clear flow in one direction, then: that propositional knowledge of-
ten comes about through practical experience. But I take it that the thought
extends in the other direction too. Once the rule of thumb is in place, the
ship’s pilot can quickly explain how to anchor in the difficult harbour to
other ships’ pilots, that they can thereby combine this propositional item of
knowledge with other know-how of sailing they already possess to be more
knowledgeable generally of how to make it into the harbour safely.
I think it is safe to go even further, in fact, in that a great deal of our
learning comes about through a combination of practical and propositional
knowledge. It would be strange to expect us to be able to trace back our
9Recalling my response to Rav’s Pythiagora thought-experiment above, the idea that
practical and propositional knowledge are interdependent will be crucial in what is to
come.
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knowledge to find it ‘bottoming out’ at either pure knowledge-how or pure
knowledge-that. It is much more likely that we would find the two to be fully
intertwined and mutually supporting. The Wigginsian picture, then, is one
which there is an interdependence between knowledge-how and knowledge-
that. Rather than having one being the step-child of the other, we find that
the different kinds of knowledge are a close-knit family group.
4.4 Mathematical Know-How
In this section I will return to the mathematical realm and explore how
knowledge-how can arise here too. Agreeing with the anti-intellectualist
claim that there is a substantial difference between knowledge-how and
knowledge-that, and the broader picture from Wiggins on which the two
kinds of knowledge are nonetheless strongly interrelated, we now have some
ideas to bring back to apply to mathematics.10
To begin, let us connect Rav’s ideas to the epistemological literature.
Rav claimed that the interesting mathematical knowledge is knowledge of
proofs, since this is where the methods, techniques, concepts and interesting
ideas, which are the essence of mathematics, actually reside. The thought
then is that Rav’s big insight, put in the epistemological framework, is that
the interesting knowledge in mathematics is knowledge-how. On this view,
the knowledge that mathematicians are after is knowledge of how to solve
problems, how to prove theorems, how to analyse data etc.
However, while I thought that Rav’s argument was sufficient to show that
knowledge-how is of serious interest in mathematics in its own right, this is
not to the exclusion of knowledge of mathematical truths and propositions.
Instead the two are closely connected, in that mathematical knowledge-that
of truths and knowledge-how of methods, techniques and strategies, are not
easily pulled apart in practice. What do I mean by this exactly? Well,
the thought is that each would be severely diminished without the other,
10Patrick Greenough has commented on this section that it should be noted that there
is a coherent position for a kind of Ravian intellectualist, where the focus is on practical
modes of presentation for mathematical knowledge-how as a kind of propositional knowl-
edge. This doesn’t seem to be compatible with Rav’s own views due to the other material
he has against Formalist-Reductionist claims, standing against there being underlying
propositions for proofs or knowledge of them. However, there is room for this position
in the debate and it does appear to be open for proponents of intellectualism to explore,
though I shall not be doing so here.
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both in the history and practice of mathematics. I want to now spend some
time on various examples of how the distinction between knowledge-how and
knowledge-that will be reflected in mathematics, as well as where we can
see the interaction between the two taking place.
For one thing, a focus on knowledge-how in mathematics will contribute
to a better picture of mathematics education. Work in maths education has
shown a significant awareness of the need to teach students practical knowl-
edge and skills. A prime example is found in the work of Gila Hanna who
has over 30 years examined the importance of proof and proving in mathe-
matics education, such as in (Hanna 1989), (Hanna & Jahnke 1996), (Hanna
& Barbeau 2008) and (Hanna 2014).11 In fact, in (Hanna & Barbeau 2008),
they engage with the Ravian view of proof and weigh up its importance for
mathematics education:
We argue that what is true of mathematics itself may well be true
of mathematics education: in other words, that proofs could be
accorded a major role in the secondary-school classroom pre-
cisely because of their potential to convey to students important
elements of mathematical elements such as strategies and meth-
ods. (Hanna & Barbeau 2008, p. 352)
They make the argument for this around two case studies of the benefits
of teaching particular mathematical proofs, one of the quadratic formula
(which I will discuss separately shortly) and one concerning angles inscribed
in circles. The point is that learning proofs is an important way of also
learning strategies that take us beyond merely learning the truth of the
theorem, as well as allowing us to come to a more rounded understanding
of mathematics.
There is a major Rylean point here about the process of learning: that
learning a subject is often about being inducted into the practice of that
subject rather than merely learning the truths associated with it. Ryle even
includes mathematics as an example of this phenomenon:
The fact that mathematics, philosophy, tactics, scientific method
and literary style cannot be imparted but only inculcated re-
veals that these too are not bodies of information but branches
of knowledge-how. They are not sciences but (in the old sense)
11This is only a representative sample; Hanna has over forty relevant papers.
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disciplines. The experts in them cannot tell us what they know,
they can only show what they know by operating with clever-
ness, skill, elegance or taste. The advance of knowledge does not
consist only in the accumulation of discovered truths, but also
and chiefly in the cumulative mastery of methods. (Ryle 1946,
p. 15)
Actually, Ryle goes on further to suggest that knowledge-that rests on
prior knowledge-how, as both discovery and deployment of our proposi-
tional knowledge requires practical knowledge of how to discover and where
the knowledge fits into the wider framework.
Effective possession of a piece of knowledge-that involves know-
ing how to use that knowledge, when required, for the solution
of other theoretical or practical problems. (Ryle 1946, p. 16)
The case for this in mathematics is particularly strong, as even understand-
ing the language of mathematics is about knowing what can be done with
the various concepts deployed. For instance, as one of the first things chil-
dren learn, the ‘+’ symbol is directly associated with learning the process
of adding numbers together and it is hard to imagine understanding what
it means independently. Of course, the inculcation into mathematical prac-
tice is not a one-off event, but a continuing development of knowledge of
mathematics, both practical and propositional.12 There are some skills,
abilities and pieces of know-how which are more general and others which
are topic-specific, but this does not affect the point that mathematics in-
volves the cumulative mastery of methods as well as knowledge of theorems
and propositional statements.
That learning mathematics involves being inducted into practices, prac-
tices which involve both knowledge-how and shared items of propositional
knowledge, has clear impact on the claims from the previous chapter con-
cerning mathematical concepts. Something which I quietly avoided flagging
up earlier was that Rav’s idea of what proofs give us knowledge of (besides
methods, skills, interactions and systematisations) included knowledge of
12As well as much more besides: being inducted into the practices of mathematics
involves all kinds of additional learning, such as how to behave at conferences; how to
present proofs on a blackboard; which journals to send which papers to; which math-
ematicians are helpful, rigorous, friendly, quick at responding to emails; which funding
bodies to apply for grants from etc.
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mathematical concepts. There is room here for a strong stance on the na-
ture of concepts, where concept possession is about the ability to make use
of them in various ways, such as in distinguishing whether some object be-
longs in the extension or anti-extension, deploying them in inferential moves,
describing them correctly in appropriate linguistic settings, recognising the
relations between them and other concepts etc. Such a move would bring
concepts and knowledge-how close together, via the tight link between abil-
ities and knowledge-how. I refrain from leaping into this discussion fully,
but it certainly does not strike me as implausible in the mathematics case.
In particular, the prominent place of informal concepts, open-texture and
domain-specific reasoning in mathematics is suggestive of the idea that com-
ing to know how to do mathematics involves coming to a tacit understanding
of the sort of activities which are acceptable to carry out. I shall return to
this point later in section 4.6.
Thus far, we have seen that on the picture I am presenting, mathematical
knowledge-how is frequently prior to propositional mathematical knowledge.
However, I also want to demonstrate that the Wigginsian observation is in
full effect and the relationship goes the other way too, such that knowledge-
that and knowledge-how are interdependent. Following Hanna & Barbeau,
consider the example of the quadratic formula, i.e. that the solutions to an
equation of the form ax2 +bx+c = 0 are given by x = (−b±√b2 − 4ac)/2a.
The point Hanna & Barbeau make is that learning the proof that the
quadratic formula will always deliver the roots of a quadratic equation can
teach a student the skills involved for several related techniques, such as
the “completing the square” method and applications to examples beyond
quadratics, such as quartic equations of particular forms. But, as a parallel
point, the propositional knowledge of the truth of the theorem does deliver
the knowledge of an easy way to solve a whole class of problems, one which
a struggling student can perform almost mechanically even if they don’t un-
derstand the reason that it works. That student can now know how to solve
more quadratic problems than they did before. Indeed, if their difficulty is
localised to just quadratics, that student might even be able to solve much
more complex problems that require solving quadratics as a part. Obtaining
the propositional knowledge of the quadratic formula acts as a key to unlock
further knowledge-how.
To take a more advanced example, consider equivalence and duality of
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categories. These are relations between categories that show them to be “es-
sentially the same” in the case of equivalence, or equivalent to the “opposite”
in the case of duality. The power of such results is immense in their ability
to bring out connections between seemingly disparate areas of mathematics
and to transfer theorems easily from one to the other without a fresh proof.
This holds in a very strong sense, as Mac Lane puts it:
For more complicated theorems, the duality principle is a handy
way to have (at once) the dual theorem. No proof of the dual
theorem need be given. We usually even leave the formulation
of the dual theorem to the reader. (Mac Lane 1998, p. 32)
In general, category theory thrives on these kind of links, and there are a
large number of theorems about duality between categories. For example,
Stone’s representation theorem gives an isomorphism between Boolean al-
gebras and certain topologies on sets (in particular: a topology on the set
of ultrafilters of the Boolean algebra) and Birkhoff’s representation theo-
rem does the same for distributive lattices and partial orders. Generalis-
ing, Stone duality refers to the broader class of categorical dualities hold-
ing between topologies and partially-ordered sets, which allows us to move
between different disciplines while straightforwardly transferring theorems.
The philosophical significance here is that there is once again the lock-and-
key phenomenon going on of knowledge-that providing the means to open a
whole new range of methods and puzzle-solving techniques. While certainly
it requires some background to establish dualities, the interesting mathe-
matics lies not necessarily in the proofs or the methods used in the proof,
but rather in the fact that the establishing of the representation theorems al-
lows us to think about certain structures in two distinct but equivalent ways.
The usefulness of this is emphasised by Abramsky as a ‘creative ambiguity’:
Mathematically, this distinction can be related to the duality
between points and properties, in the sense of Stone-type du-
alities: the duality between the points of a topological space,
and its basic “observable properties”—the open sets. The par-
ticular feature of domains which allows this creative ambiguity
between points and properties to be used so freely without in-
curring any significant conceptual confusions or overheads is that
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basic points and basic properties (or observations) are essentially
the same things. (Abramsky 2008, p. 494)
The Ravian picture, on which the theorem is the ‘headline’ to go with the
interesting parts of mathematics which are embedded in the proofs, falls
short on the example of representation theorems and Stone duality, in that
the interesting mathematics does not reside in the relatively mundane proofs
of the theorems, but instead in the new connections one can draw once the
theorem is in place and the Gestalt-shifting in viewing well-known structures
in entirely different ways. Knowledge of how to prove the theorems is an
important discovery that establishes the truth of the duality and gives us
knowledge thereof, but it is the latter knowledge of the truth of the theorems
which is primary in opening up the new connections which can subsequently
be drawn. The knowledge that is discovered about the vast network of con-
nections between different mathematical structures is interesting and might
well be entirely propositional. The propositional knowledge of these con-
nections then opens up the scope for a whole range of additional methods,
techniques and results, once again supporting the idea that the mathemat-
ical knowledge is best understood in terms of interconnected propositional
and practical knowledge.
4.5 Lo¨we & Mu¨ller on Mathematical Skills
I am not the first to pick out the fact that Rav’s claims about the interesting
knowledge of mathematics fits directly into the framework of knowing-how as
found in epistemology. Lo¨we & Mu¨ller in two papers (Lo¨we & Mu¨ller 2008,
2010) propose a picture of mathematical knowledge as context-dependent
which draws on mathematical knowledge-how as defined in terms of math-
ematical skills. In this section I will set out the arguments they give and
critically assess them.
The papers begin with Lo¨we & Mu¨ller setting out their main claim as
follows:
We argue that mathematical knowledge is context dependent.
Our main argument is that on pain of distorting mathemati-
cal practice, one must analyse the notion of having available a
proof, which supplies justification in mathematics, in a context
dependent way. (Lo¨we & Mu¨ller 2008, p. 91)
138
The argument to establish this claim is especially relevant to us in that it
draws heavily on mathematical practice, and in particular the distinction
between formal and informal proofs, placing these in the context of their re-
lationship to mathematical knowledge. The idea is to look at the “standard”
account of mathematical knowledge from proofs, given by:
K1 S knows that P iff S has available a proof of P .
To then arrive at a mathematical contextualism, the thought they have is to
show that both the notions of ‘availability’ and ‘proof’ in this account must
vary with context. In order to demonstrate this, Lo¨we & Mu¨ller run through
a series of explications of K1, to show that any invariantist sharpening of the
two notions is doomed to fail to properly match ascriptions of mathematical
knowledge as found in practice.
The first observation is that K1 cannot be read as merely requiring physi-
cal access to a proof, else standing in the Mathematics Departmental Library
would turn even the slowest dimwit into a mathematical genius. Instead,
the idea behind K1 must be spelled out with “a modalised reading in which
the epistemic subject S plays an active role” (Lo¨we & Mu¨ller 2008, p. 92)
such as the following:
K2 S knows that P iff S could in principle generate a proof of P .
Again, this leaves the invariantist about mathematical knowledge needing
to fix readings for ‘in principle’, ‘generate’ and, of course, ‘proof’. Following
the Formalist-Reductionist, one could fix ‘proof’ as ‘formal proof’. In that
case we can look to Formal Mathematics to see how long formalisations have
taken and use that as an benchmark for how long one should be given to
generate a formal proof for K2. Lo¨we & Mu¨ller cite certain Coq formalisa-
tions as having taken ten years, suggesting that therefore ‘could in principle
generate’ might be best be set within such a timeframe:
K3 S knows that P iff , given ten years, she could write a formal derivation
of P in the language Coq.
But they point out that this is far too generous: given ten years, the mathe-
matician could learn Coq from scratch as well as a large number of theorems
previously unknown to her (Lo¨we & Mu¨ller 2008, p. 99). Clearly K3 will be
inadequate. It should also be clear that fixing the length of time some other
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way will always be too restrictive (ruling out the hard cases, like early Coq
formalisations) or too permissive (ascribing knowledge to those who clearly
don’t possess it).13
In a different direction, Lo¨we & Mu¨ller suppose that ‘proof’ could be
taken along the lines of ‘informal proof on a blackboard’:
K4 S knows that P iff , given a blackboard and a piece of chalk, she is able
to produce an acceptable blackboard proof within an hour.
But once again, setting an exact timeframe—such as the one hour above—
will be problematic. The time cannot be too short, because there are normal
cases of mathematical knowledge where the mathematician needs to refresh
the details if they are to write up a proof on the board:
They need to try one or two standard approaches to tackle the
problem, remember the important details, and only after that
are they able to provide an acceptable proof. (Lo¨we & Mu¨ller
2008, p. 99)
Too long, however, and someone can in theory have time to figure out some-
thing new; they might even believe ¬P and by working for the one hour
arrive at the opposite belief. It would certainly be undesirable for us to
claim they knew P despite believing ¬P .
The upshot is that we should take mathematical knowledge to be linked
to the salient context. Any attempt by the invariantist to fix the key con-
cepts in a rigid way is open to refutation by pointing either to a context
in which possessing mathematical knowledge is very demanding which the
definition is too strict for, or one in which mathematical knowledge is made
too easy by it. The argument is that there is no way in which we can fill out
the details of the link between proof-possession and mathematical knowledge
that isn’t inextricably linked to the context.
Lo¨we & Mu¨ller next suggest that mathematical knowledge in their con-
textualist picture should be explicated in terms of mathematical skill :
K5 S knows that P iff S’s current mathematical skills are sufficient to
produce the form of proof or justification for P required by the actual
context. (Lo¨we & Mu¨ller 2008, p. 104)
13They also consider another version based on Steiner’s ‘midwife logician’ idea (Steiner
1975). In this case ‘could in principle generate’ is set as ‘could with aid of a midwife
logician produce’. Problematically, as indicated by Lo¨we & Mu¨ller, this blurs the line
between some agent’s knowledge and the knowledge of the midwife logician.
140
In their follow-up paper (Lo¨we & Mu¨ller 2010), Lo¨we & Mu¨ller expand
on what they mean by mathematical skills, with reference to the Rylean
picture and the idea that Rav’s claim is about the primacy of knowledge-
how in mathematics. However, they quickly set this aside to focus purely
on skills as professional skills, suggesting that Ryle took knowledge-how to
be synonymous with skill and following him in this usage.14 They have
a lot of useful things to say concerning the nature of professional skills
in mathematics, drawing explicit parallels with the case of nursing as a
profession:
The notion of a skilled nurse is related, ultimately, to a nurse’s
job description, which has developed historically. We are not
concerned here with a natural kind of human beings, nurses, of
which there are more and less skilled ones. Rather, we are as-
sessing human beings who have chosen a specific profession, as
more or less skilled as required by the (historically and sociolog-
ically contingent and changing) requirements of that profession.
Nursing skills are professional skills. (Lo¨we & Mu¨ller 2010, p.
270)
They point out that in mathematics there are a number of complex and
context-dependent issues surrounding the nature of mathematical skills.
Firstly, there are a whole range of mathematical skills needed in being a
professional mathematician, ranging from almost essential ones used in do-
ing mathematics and mathematical reasoning, to fairly relevant ones such
as giving talks and engaging in informal chats, to mostly peripheral skills
such as filling in expense forms or adjusting to jet-lag. Secondly, there is a
question of the granularity of mathematical skills and how one individuates
them, to which they answer:
Mathematics is one subject, and for most purposes, it makes
sense to view general mathematical skills as the pertinent level
of granularity. For purposes of assessing knowledge claims, local
dimensions of skill may however also play a role, depending on
context. (Lo¨we & Mu¨ller 2010, p. 274)
Due to the contextualist picture, context (as well as the particulars of the
theorem P ) plays an important role in picking out the relevant skills in the
14I don’t think this is a correct reading of Ryle, something I shall return to momentarily.
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picture of mathematical knowledge, as well as the extent to which the gen-
erality of the skills holds up. It might well be that there are theorems which
require very particular topic-specific skills, for example. Finally, there is
an interesting set of questions concerning the measurement and assessment
of skill. In particular, the thought is that skills must go beyond particu-
lar performances, as even the most highly skilled individual can go awry
occasionally.15
So let us assess the picture presented by Lo¨we & Mu¨ller. In general,
I find the direction appealing and believe that it is in the same vein on
many issues as the picture of mathematical knowledge in terms of virtue
epistemology to be given in the next chapter, especially with respect to
making the mathematician play an active role in their epistemic state. I also
share the general naturalistic methodology of beginning with mathematical
practice, and think that context and skill must play a role in mathematical
knowledge.
However, there are points of contention too. First of all, I do not think
it is correct to equate knowledge-how with skill, and have argued that this is
not the Rylean picture either. As we saw above, Hornsby makes a convincing
case that Ryle was not interested in any sort of reductive analysis such as
this, be it to abilities, capacities, skills etc. Such exegesis doesn’t hinder the
philosophical claims, of course, but does cast doubt on how well the work
follows through on the Rylean project as it applies to mathematics.
Secondly, one obvious place to look for criticism of the Lo¨we & Mu¨ller
position is in the usual invariantist responses to contextualism, which would
seek to explain away the cases of shifting knowledge ascriptions varying
with context. One way to do this is to argue that mathematicians might
well commonly engage in “loose talk”, where they use the term ‘knowledge’
but actually mean something weaker. They might go so far as to reserve the
term ‘knowledge’ for the idealised, Formalist-Reductionist view, and argue
that anything less than this does not meet the high standards we have for
mathematical knowledge. Mathematical knowledge from proof, after all, is
singled-out as special precisely because of its rigid, deductive form of jus-
15This point will be extremely important in the next chapter, where skills will be
connected to intellectual virtues. For some virtue epistemologists, possessing the right
virtues is necessary for knowledge, but we see from the current point that this can’t be
the whole picture, as neither skills nor virtues generally suffice to make someone immune
to performance errors.
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tification and, one might argue, if this is lacking then what results does
not deserve the title of ‘knowledge’. However, I think Lo¨we & Mu¨ller are
right not to accept this, as they are clear in their naturalistic methodol-
ogy which gives mathematical practice a primary role. The strict account
which the invariantist might offer would simply rule out so much of our
claimed knowledge of mathematics that it would be a Pyrrhic victory: the
concept of knowledge arrived at would be neither the one actually in use
nor particularly useful for any mathematical purposes.
A more pressing worry, in my opinion, is about the details of modalis-
ing mathematical knowledge through the notion of skill. With skills, and
knowledge-how more generally, it makes a great deal of sense to modalise in
a way that means we know how to do things that we have not previously
done or even considered doing, because the very notions of knowledge-how,
skill and ability are bound up with success or reliability across a range of
counterfactual scenarios. Furthermore, considerations of granularity mean
that an application of knowledge-how can almost always be to a new sit-
uation if we describe it finely enough. However, the worry is that Lo¨we
& Mu¨ller transfer this modalisation to mathematical knowledge generally,
and in particular to propositional pieces of knowledge, which is their main
target for the contextualist approach they are advocating. To emphasise,
their final account is based around the following thesis:
K5 S knows that P iff S’s current mathematical skills are sufficient to
produce the form of proof or justification for P required by the actual
context. (Lo¨we & Mu¨ller 2008, p. 104)
My concern is that this principle assigns mathematicians too much knowl-
edge, even with the contextual restrictions that they build in. For the con-
text here only supplies the form of the proof or justification needed to know
that P , ranging from a rough proof-sketch to a full formal derivation (Lo¨we
& Mu¨ller 2010, pp. 274–275). The difficulty, however, is that mathemati-
cians may possess many skills which don’t then get applied to some given
proof for a theorem P . The fact that S possesses all the relevant skills is
sufficient to satisfy K5, even if S never goes through the motions of actually
proving P .
Indeed, we saw above that performance errors are a reason for talking
of skills more generally rather than the instantiations of them, but similarly
143
they are a reason that having skills won’t suffice for possessing the deliver-
ances of successful performances of those skills. On K5, it would still easily
be possible to possess all of the relevant skills to produce the level of proof of
P required by the context, and thereby to know P on K5, despite believing
¬P . For example, adopting one of Lo¨we & Mu¨ller’s own cases, imagine a
student S going into a maths exam who has studied all of the techniques
and methods of the course, but just before entering is told by a usually
trustworthy fellow student “psst don’t forget that ¬P”. While S does have
all of the relevant skills to produce a proof of P up to the standards of the
exam, she might well believe ¬P on the basis of the testimony. Simply put,
K5 allows for someone to know something they simultaneously believe to be
false— a most undesirable result.
The answer to this problem, as I see it, is to go beyond skills to re-
quire successful performances or manifestations of knowledge-how to obtain
propositional mathematical knowledge. We shall explore the epistemology
of this in the next chapter. However, what I would now like to emphasise in
the coming section is that this requires observing the importance of proving
as an activity, and it is going through the actions built into a proof which
is what secures knowledge of the truth of the theorem proved.
4.6 Proving in Action
In this section I will consider the difference between proofs themselves and
the activity of proving, specifically with respect to their contribution to
mathematical knowledge. The focus on actions in proofs builds on previous
work by Larvor in (Larvor 2012), so let us extract some key points he makes
first.
4.6.1 Larvor’s Inferential Actions
In (Larvor 2012), Larvor sets out the case for the existence of essentially
informal arguments (from which we have essentially informal proofs too, as
those proofs which involve essentially informal arguments). Hereby we can
identify a substantial area which is not covered by the traditional approaches
to the philosophy of mathematics, which also requires investigating math-
ematical practice. The philosophy of mathematical practice can then gain
traction and make the perspectival shift being advocated clear. Larvor’s
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main proposals are that essentially informal arguments are distinguished
from formal arguments by their content-dependence and, furthermore, that
a proper account of content-dependence will include a broadening of the
picture of inference beyond merely linguistic argument to a full class of
inferential actions. This is because the content of mathematics, and that
which we act on inferentially, is not limited to language alone.
In what way are essentially informal proofs content-dependent? Larvor
argues that the content of a proof connects to some domain the proof is
located in, and that this domain has some class of acceptable inferences
that can be employed in proofs in this domain. A proof is then valid if all
of the inferences used in the proof are acceptable in the domain, and have
been applied properly etc. Importantly, formal rules are acceptable across
all domains (such as modus ponens)16, but Larvor’s picture allows us to also
have domains with more contentful moves which are not generally applicable
across all domains. While this might mean some inferences are specific to a
very restricted domain, many are in fact acceptable across a broad range of
domains without this being so broad as to include all domains. A content-
dependent proof will then make use of these content-dependent inferences.
Further clarification is needed, though. For instance, the above has not
yet told us about what content is or what counts as a domain. We would
be in big trouble if the domains were so fine-grained to have it that each
purported proof is located in its own domain, with the acceptable inferences
being precisely those employed, as this could trivialise mathematics and
the whole notion of proof. The right answer seems to be that domains are
particular areas of mathematics, with particular frameworks for acceptable
inferences established through mathematical practice, though it would be
wise to follow Lo¨we & Mu¨ller in including some context-dependence in this.
The content is merely the subject-matter of the proof, which connects to the
domain in the straightforward sense that, for example, a geometrical proof
reveals that we are working in the domain of geometry and thus authorises
the use of geometrical moves in the proof.17
16There is, here, the obvious question of which logic determines the rules that are
acceptable across all domains, or whether there even is such a thing. I don’t think it
would be a bad thing for the position being advocated here if there is indeed no universal
background logic. The logical pluralist in me certainly thinks so. Nonetheless, I will set
aside these issues as outside the scope of the current discussion.
17We should be careful, of course, to avoid the subject-matter merely being comprised
of some set of acceptable inferences, as this threatens circularity.
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The account of informal proofs as depending on content as well as their
form does lose us some nice features that a Formalist-Reductionist account
would have. For example, if all of our proofs could be reduced to formal
proofs alone, then the required logic could remain topic-neutral, which now
will be explicitly given up. Likewise, Larvor points out that “we have to
abandon the hope of establishing a general test for validity” (Larvor 2012,
p. 723). We shouldn’t be unhappy to see these go, however, given that they
are so closely linked to formality which we have good reason to reject as the
right account of informal proofs (see the first half of this thesis). Rather,
it will become clear that these features can have no general place in the
new, more dynamic approach to mathematical proof conceived of in terms
of content and action.
The second main proposal by Larvor is a switch to emphasising the ac-
tivities involved in inferring, arguing and proving. Above, we saw a number
of mentions of the acceptable moves, steps and inferences in some given
domain. Regarding these, Larvor says:
If we think of an argument as a sequence of propositions con-
nected by logical relations, it is hard to see how the content
of the argument can play a role in the step from one propo-
sition to the next. This is in part because a classically trained
philosophical imagination is dominated by general logic, but also
because orthodox philosophical education urges us to forget that
the movement from one line of a proof to the next is an action.
(Larvor 2012, p. 721)
Larvor argues that we should recognise the purely propositional framework
as being too limited to properly account for actual arguments found in math-
ematical practice and mathematical proofs. The point is not merely that
we should recognise the actions involved in moving between propositions,
but rather that adopting such a focus reveals that the objects of our actions
actually form a much broader class than just propositions.
The liberating insight is to notice that in making arguments,
we act on all sorts of items in addition to propositions and
well-formed formulae. Sometimes, we act inferentially on non-
propositional representations of the subject-matter such as dia-
grams, notational expressions, physical models, mental models
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and computer models. (Larvor 2012, p. 721)
More specifically to informal proofs, the kinds of steps found in mathematics
are not limited to actions on propositional contents, something Larvor illus-
trates with a series of examples from diverse areas of mathematics. Indeed,
it may even be that these actions do not have objects at all, such as if the
subject-matter is the manifestation of the action. Larvor’s example of the
last point is the demonstration by a gymnast that some complex gymnastics
move is possible by performing the move.
The framework being proposed by Larvor, then, is to see proofs as sys-
tems of inferential actions. This is far removed from the alternative, tra-
ditional view of proofs as abstract objects made up of sequences of propo-
sitions.18 Inferential actions are just those actions which can be used in
arguments and, in the mathematical case, proofs. Of course, as described
above, the inferential actions acceptable for some particular proof depends
on the domain the proof is in.
There is a strong dose of Lakatos and Kneebone in this conception of
inferences as found in actual proofs. We can view the key point as being
that we should switch from a static conception of proofs to a dynamic one.
While the static conception is primarily concerned with the stops along the
way and the stepping-stones through the proof, in contrast, the dynamic
view is concerned with the movement through the proof and the actual
steps being made, as it is these which ultimately take us through the proof
to establish a theorem. That isn’t to say that the places we stop aren’t
important. The full picture that should emerge of informal proof will be
one which takes account of how the non-propositional actions found in the
proof relate to the propositional content of that proof as in the Wigginsian
anti-intellectualist view of Ryle. This aligns with the approach to practical
and propositional knowledge being argued for in this chapter.
Again, the move to the action-oriented perspective gives up on cer-
tain desirable features, especially when combined with validity as content-
dependent. Primarily, unlike in formal logic, there is now no general test
18Proofs and arguments as abstract objects is not restricted to the formal proofs and
arguments. For example, Leitgeb takes informal proofs to be abstract objects:
[...] we regard mathematical proofs per se as abstract entities which are
independent of any material instantiation. (Leitgeb 2009, p. 266)
Similarly, (Simard Smith & Moldovan 2011) treats arguments as abstract objects (al-
though abstract objects which can come into existence and disappear again).
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for validity because there is no full and final list of inferential actions. Even
when limited to some domain, if that domain is anything beyond the simplest
cases then it will simply not be possible to fully settle all of the actions that
might be permissible within that domain. Although this is certainly a cost of
the view, as Larvor points out, it is a rather mild one. This is so because it is
something that we have been lead to believe by the Formalist-Reductionist
tradition that we will get, yet isn’t really something we should be expecting
once we pay attention to proof in practice. Indeed the open-ended nature of
mathematics and mathematical methods is vitally important to its growth
and development, as we saw in the previous chapter.
Let us briefly mention the place of rigour as it is sketched in Larvor’s
view. Larvor says that
[F]or every kind of inferential action, there must be a correspond-
ing means of control, to ensure rigour. Sometimes these controls
are simple rules like ‘do not divide by zero’. In other cases, these
controls may be the fruit of mathematical research [...] Demon-
strating rigour involves making the controls on inferential acts
explicit, which is why some diagrams disappear from the final
published version of a mathematical argument. The problem is
not with diagrams as such, but rather that the actions performed
on these diagrams in this piece of work do not have established,
agreed controls. (Larvor 2012, p. 728)
Such controls are important— mathematicians should be careful not to di-
vide by zero or abuse diagrams and infinite series. Larvor is right that it
is often a fruitful project to make these explicit and that this is connected
to mathematical rigour. However, we might be sceptical that rigour is fully
accounted for by such corresponding controls, for I take correct and rigor-
ous proving to be connected to practical knowledge and it has been argued
that this is not fully enumerable in terms of explicit rules or principles in
any reasonable sense. Just as in Ryle’s point that there may be regulative
propositions, rules and maxims which apply to practical knowledge, but
these cannot be the whole of what knowledge-how amounts to, nor should
we expect there to be a particular list of controls which ensure rigour. As
such, we should not expect to be able to demonstrate rigour in the way
described either, unless it reduces to the Formalist-Reductionist position,
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which is not what is intended. If not, though, we need to answer the further
question of how we will ever manage to be confident that there is not some
further ‘hidden’ rule that we violate in a given proof?
We can also wonder if such controls will form a unified class at all, or
whether there is a range of different principles, between those necessary for
rigorous proving and those which are merely good proof etiquette. For ex-
ample, if I were to switch languages (from English to Japanese, to Afrikaans
etc.) between each line of a proof, is this a lack of rigour or just poor style?
Just like the open texture of mathematical concepts, for any given math-
ematical domain it might well be that there is a never-ending horizon of
ways to mathematically misbehave. The way these are avoided is not about
implicit rules, but about learning how to behave well. This is not to say
that there are no such rules; in line with the arguments from Ryle we can
extract them from practice and describe them in exactly the same way that
we can identify logics which our practices cohere with. We certainly have a
great deal of rules and heuristics taught in classrooms and lecture halls, for
example. The point is just that there is something more than this to rigour.
In the next chapter I will argue that the correct account of mathematical
rigour should connect it to intellectual, mathematical virtues.
4.6.2 Proving as an Activity
Proofs play numerous roles in our mathematical practices and serve many
different functions, but one I am here primarily interested in is their role
in mathematical epistemology. Previous considerations of mathematical
knowledge seem to have paid little attention to the idea that the knowl-
edge we get from proofs is arrived at by the activities of proving. Even the
Lo¨we & Mu¨ller papers discussed above, which seem to be going in the right
direction, start from an idea of merely having access to a proof and finish on
a modalised notion which grants us knowledge of everything we are skilled
enough to do with respect to a context, without requiring us to actually do
the work of obtaining the knowledge we have. Larvor is correct to empha-
sise that the movement through a proof involves inferential actions, but his
focus lies elsewhere and the paper does not make explicit the impacts this
has on mathematical epistemology.
The important idea is that it is the activity of proving which is of pri-
mary epistemological significance in mathematics, with proofs themselves of
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secondary importance. Outside of philosophy this has been picked up on
in more popular reflections on mathematics, such as by Marcus du Sautoy
in (du Sautoy 2015), as quoted at the start of this chapter. He sees proofs
as narratives, describing the journey across the mathematical terrain from
familiar and well-trodden starting points to far-off realms. He continues as
follows:
Within the boundaries of the familiar land of the Shire are the
axioms of mathematics, the self-evident truths about numbers,
together with those propositions that have already been proved.
This is the setting for the beginning of the quest. The journey
from this home territory is bound by the rules of mathematical
deduction, like the legitimate moves of a chess piece, prescribing
the steps you are permitted to take through this world. At times
you arrive at what looks like an impasse and need to take that
characteristic lateral step, moving sideways or even backwards
to find a way around. Sometimes you need to wait for new
mathematical characters like imaginary numbers or the calculus
to be created so you can continue your journey. (du Sautoy
2015)19
Reading this, there is a touch of formalistic thinking in the further analogy
to moves in chess20 which we wouldn’t want to take too seriously, but the
notion of a journey fits very well with the thought that we should emphasise
the activity of proving. The quote is, of course, very reminiscent of the
well-known picture from G. H. Hardy:
I have myself always thought of a mathematician as in the first
instance an observer, a man who gazes at a distant range of
mountains and notes down his observations. His object is simply
to distinguish clearly and notify to others as many different peaks
as he can. There are some peaks which he can distinguish easily,
while others are less clear. He sees A sharply, while of B he
can obtain only transitory glimpses. At last he makes out a
ridge which leads from A, and following it to its end he discovers
that it culminates in B. B is now fixed in his vision, and from
19I am grateful to Ursula Martin for pointing me to this article.
20That old chess-nut.
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this point he can proceed to further discoveries. In other cases
perhaps he can distinguish a ridge which vanishes in the distance,
and conjectures that it leads to a peak in the clouds or below
the horizon. But when he sees a peak he believes that it is there
simply because he sees it. If he wishes someone else to see it,
he points to it, either directly or through the chain of summits
which led him to recognise it himself. When his pupil also sees it,
the research, the argument, the proof is finished. (Hardy 1929,
p. 18)
The point of these rather long quotes is that the metaphor of mathematics
as a huge landscape has been drawn on before. However, du Sautoy’s way
of speaking is preferable to Hardy’s for now, as it brings out the active
nature of proving rather than the more passive language of the ‘observer’.
The claim I am making is that if we want to attain knowledge, this requires
finding and following the path to get there. We can think of proofs, via a
similar metaphor, as maps or directions providing us with a guide as to how
to get from one place to another, from A to B. While the activity of proving
is about traversing the mathematical landscape, a proof provides a record
of the series of actions required to reach a new mathematical location and
is used to communicate what the discoverer of the proof went through to
others who wish to follow the same road and gain the same mathematical
knowledge.21
Indeed, there is clear linguistic evidence for such an idea in the fact
that much of the standard terminology in informal proofs is imperatival.
21I have recently discovered, thanks to Josh Habgood-Coote, that Ryle actually uses
the same metaphor for mathematical discovery:
[...] the pioneering path-finder, Pythagoras say, has no tracks to follow; and
any particular sequence of paces that he tentatively takes through the jungle
may soon have to be marked by him as leading only into swamps or thickets.
All the same, it may be, though it need not be, that in a day’s time or a
year’s time he will have made a track along which he can now guide docile
companions safely and easily right through the jungle. How does he achieve
this? Not by following tracks, since there are none to follow. Not by sitting
down and wringing his hands. But by walking over ground where tracks
certainly do not exist, but where, with luck, assiduity and judgement, tracks
might and so perhaps will exist. All his walkings are experimental walkings
on hypothetical tracks or candidate-tracks or could-be tracks, or tracks on
appro; and it is by so walking that, in the end, while of course he finds lots
and lots of impasses, he also finds (if he does find), a viable track. (Ryle
1971, p. 224)
151
Common terms are ‘let’, ‘assume’, ‘suppose’, ‘define’, ‘construct’, ‘observe’,
‘consider’, ‘reduce’, ‘rearrange’, ‘note’ and many more.22 Once again, we
find ourselves with a point familiar from Ryle:
We certainly can, in respect of many practices, like fishing, cook-
ing and reasoning, extract principles from their applications by
people who know how to fish, cook and reason. Hence Izaak
Walton, Mrs. Beeton and Aristotle. But when we try to express
these principles we find that they cannot easily be put in the
indicative mood. They fall automatically into the imperative
mood. (Ryle 1946, pp. 11–12)
A proof thus tells the reader what to do in order to prove some theorem, and
thereby makes one important role of proofs to guide us through the inferen-
tial actions needed to get to a certain place. An equally good analogy, then,
would have been recipes in cookbooks: the recipe itself is only important
in so far as it directs you how to make the cake in question. While we can
talk about better or worse recipes, this is derivative on how well it guides
us through our baking activities.23 In (Robinson 1991), Robinson describes
proofs in a way similar to du Sautoy’s narrative idea:
[A] kind of meaningful narrative [...] more like a story, or even
a drama, conveyed to us in language calling on our semantic
and intuitive understanding. [...] To follow an informal proof
as it unfolds in time is to understand the story as it develops.
(Robinson 1991, p. 269)
Now certainly this seems right in certain respects, but it appears to suggest
that we are passive observers to the unfolding drama with our understanding
just being used to follow the action from afar. On the contrary, I take
understanding a proof to involve being part of the action. The proof tells
us which actions to take; the mathematician acts them out. Proofs thus
don’t operate in a vacuum, securing their targets in the abstract, but rather
they are secondary to the mathematical activities they guide us through,
22This should be familiar to anyone who has looked at mathematical proofs, but I invite
anyone sceptical of this to open up a few recent pure mathematics articles on the ArXiv
and check for themselves. An interesting study to carry out in the future would be to do
a proper analysis of some body of real proofs.
23Though the baking analogy works slightly less well because we also judge recipes for
the tastiness of the baked goods they produce.
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activities which are themselves embedded in a practical context and carried
out by agents.
To conclude, by seeing proofs from this action-centred perspective we can
thus say something new about the relationship between proofs and math-
ematical knowledge. Gaining knowledge of mathematics from proofs is ac-
tually done through the activities of proving: blazing a new trail through
the mathematical landscape or following the paths that others have set, by
following the instructions they have given us in their proofs. The epistemic
importance thus lies primarily with the activities and actions, not the proof
itself or its mere existence. The Formalist-Reductionist project misses out
on this crucial idea, according the primary importance to proofs themselves,
or worse still to unaccessed or inaccessible formal proofs underlying them,
thereby failing to correctly explain the epistemic role of proofs. We, on the
contrary, are in a place to explain how mathematical knowledge actually
connects to proofs and proving activities. This will be the topic of the next
chapter.
4.7 Conclusion: Knowing How to Prove It
To finish this chapter, let us briefly return to the relationship between
knowledge-how, knowledge-that and proofs. Following Rav, I have argued
that besides knowledge-that of mathematical facts, theorems and proposi-
tions, there is also knowledge-how of methods, tricks, techniques, interrela-
tions and more besides, something which has not received proper attention in
mathematical epistemology. Rav’s idea, put in the epistemological terminol-
ogy, was that knowledge-that of theorems in their statement-forms is of less
interest in mathematics than knowledge-how as embedded in proofs. I have
been arguing, though, that in mathematics knowledge-how and knowledge-
that are actually very closely linked, with each delivering the other in a
range of cases, in a way that does not entirely track the theorem/proof di-
vide. Additionally, I have been arguing that while knowledge-how might
be modal, in that in relates to how one acts and behaves across a range
of possible scenarios, the propositional knowledge of a theorem we get from
having proved it is not, since proving is an activity which delivers knowledge
only when it has been successfully carried out.
An interesting upshot of the positions I have taken is that there are, for
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any given mathematician, theorems which they know how to prove without
having knowledge of the theorem or its truth. This falls out of the fact that
the knowledge of how to prove some theorem T is modalised in such a way
that one might possess all of the relevant knowledge-how to produce a proof
of it without ever carrying out that proof. Meanwhile, the propositional
knowledge of the truth of T demands the stronger condition of actually
having proved it, which I have argued involved going through the inferential
actions the proof is made up of.
I don’t take this to be problematic, though, as this certainly matches
up with what we should want from an account of mathematical knowledge.
For there are plenty of cases where we might possess the know-how, skill
and ability to carry out a proof straight-off, without that meaning that we
have any knowledge of the particulars before actually proving the relevant
theorem. For example, one might be fully competent with quadratics and
know how to solve any given example, without already knowing the roots of
1124723477234x2 − 3419824x + 1 = 0. This is exactly as it should be, and
even a desirable feature of the position, since it demonstrates that there is
a clear reason to want our epistemological theory to include both kinds of
knowledge of mathematics.
So what is it to know how to prove some theorem? Just as in knowledge-
how more generally, an ability account might seem initially appealing:
Ability 2 S knows how to prove theorem T iff P is able to prove theorem
T .
One can even argue that the problematic cases don’t apply here. Firstly,
unlike knowledge-how more generally where counterexamples arise in the
general pattern of pianists who break their fingers etc. which impinges their
ability without affecting their knowledge, in mathematical cases there seem
to be far fewer physical requisites on being able to prove some theorem.
Secondly, the cases of lucky success are somewhat harder to generate for
mathematics, as there can be a distinction made between actually proving
something and producing a proof of it. The thought is that by emphasising
the activity involved in traversing the mathematical landscape, we can ex-
clude cases where a proof is put on paper without the mathematical activity
being carried out, such as if Jackson Pollock accidentally flicked paint into a
proof of the Riemann hypothesis. Hereby, we can also rule out lucky success
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cases.
However, once again this will not fly. With a bit more imagination we
can think of fresh counterexamples, such as going blind initially hindering
someone’s ability to do diagrammatic proofs. As to lucky successes, there are
more cases than those of the monkey-and-typewriter variety. For instance,
we have probably all witnessed students guess at steps they think the teacher
wants to hear but subsequently not be confident that what they have done is
correct. This may be a case of knowing how to prove the theorem, but it is
a worryingly low bar. Furthermore, the Lo¨we & Mu¨ller discussion provides
us with other problems for an ability view, such as filling out how long it
should be allowed to take for them to be said to be able to. Or another
case: what if a student knows thirty techniques, only one of which will work
for the proof, but where the student has no idea which to use or even how
to go about deciding between them. In the weak sense they do know how
to prove the theorem— they might be able to just by trying out all thirty
approaches— but their ability might require far longer to enact than if they
knew how to select the right tool for the job, which is itself an important
piece of mathematical know-how.
There is also reason to be hesitant regarding a mathematical know-how
as mathematical skills position. Lo¨we & Mu¨ller do well by linking the ap-
propriate skills to the context relative to which a knowledge ascription is
being made. Nonetheless, there are difficulties concerning what kinds of
skills and exactly which they are: even a moderately straightforward proof
might require a whole range of skills, but more than this, they need to be
combined in the right way to form a complete path of inferential actions.
Indeed, it might well be that for plenty of open problems in mathematics,
we do already possess all of the relevant mathematical skills, techniques
and methods, but simply haven’t combined them in the right way yet. Pre-
sumably, we don’t know how to prove these theorems, despite possessing the
relevant skills. Of course, we could avoid this problem by positing that there
needs to be some kind of “putting it all together” skill which is also in play.
But this move is less than ideal for two reasons. Firstly, such a skill seems to
be of a different kind to the general-level skills which Lo¨we & Mu¨ller want,
being tied to the specific proof. Secondly, this means that the reduction of
knowledge-how to skills has not been particularly informative, as once again
it seems like the “putting it all together” skill basically amounts to knowing
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how to prove the theorem.
Regarding mathematical know-how, I am broadly inclined towards the
Rylean position as exposited by Hornsby, namely to avoid such reductive
analyses. Nonetheless, there is a great deal more to be said about the
interaction between proving and mathematical knowledge, which I will do
in the next chapter where I explore the application of virtue epistemology
to mathematics.
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Chapter 5
A Virtue Approach to
Mathematical Epistemology
I was unable to find flaws in my “proof” for quite a while, even
though the error is very obvious. It was a psychological prob-
lem, a blindness, an excitement, an inhibition of reasoning by
an underlying fear of being wrong. Techniques leading to the
abandonment of such inhibitions should be cultivated by every
honest mathematician.
— John Stallings (1965) “How Not To Prove The Poincare´
Conjecture”
5.1 Introduction
In the paper quoted above, Stallings describes the mathematics behind a
failed attempt he made at proving the Poincare´ Conjecture. Prior to Perel-
man’s 2003 proof, this was one of the best known open problems in math-
ematics, so we can certainly sympathise with the excitement and fear ex-
pressed by Stallings at the prospect of having solved it. The fatal error in
the proof stems from proving a key auxiliary theorem, named ‘Theorem 0’,
for all cases of n > 2 but then subsequently making essential use of it for
a case where n = 2, a case for which it is demonstrably false, shown by a
counterexample Stallings provides.
My topic in this chapter will be mathematical virtues and vices and
how these play a crucial role in mathematical knowledge. To introduce this
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theme, I want to draw out two key aspects of Stallings’s words. Firstly,
Stallings blames the mistake in the proof on psychological failings, where
these are what lead to him not spotting the misapplication of Theorem 0.
He blames himself for the error, seeing it as caused by inhibitions of his
reasoning, or we might say performance error in his mathematical skills
and competences. Putting this explicitly in virtue-theoretic terminology,
there are two ways that we might blame epistemic vices here: either in his
making the error in the first place or in failing to spot and correct it later on.
Secondly, the emphasis Stallings puts on the honest mathematician wanting
to develop techniques to prevent such errors and failures of rigour in future
mathematical proofs or, to put it another way, to develop the mathematical
virtues.
A central idea in this chapter will be that the investigation of math-
ematical virtues and vices will be able to develop and draw on some of
the major lessons learned in virtue epistemology and virtue ethics in recent
decades. One key difference which emerges in virtue-theoretic approaches
in epistemology, in contrast to other epistemological theories, is that the
agents and communities play a central and irreducible role in their own
epistemic positions and states. For the current project I will thus be looking
at the place of the mathematicians in mathematics.1 If we take virtue epis-
temology seriously, mathematical knowledge may be deeply connected to
virtuous mathematical behaviours such as those of Stallings’s honest math-
ematician, and conversely we may find that failings in mathematics may at
times stem from mathematical vices. Placing such emphasis on the role of
the mathematician will have wide-ranging consequences for the philosophy
of mathematics, a number of which I will set out and explore in this chapter.
What we will see is that virtue theory will be crucial to resolving difficult
questions concerning proof and rigour in mathematics, and in particular how
they relate to mathematical knowledge.
One might immediately take a dismissive attitude towards the virtue
turn for mathematics by arguing that while we do have terms for virtues and
vices in mathematics, the explanatory value of these is limited to just a few
1We can, for simplicity, call everyone engaging in explicitly mathematical activities
a mathematician. Nothing hangs on this in the broad overview of the project here, but
it may well turn out that contrasting mathematical virtues and vices as possessed by
mathematicians and non-mathematicians reveals interesting aspects of how we learn and
behave in different mathematical contexts.
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aspects of mathematical practice which are already involved with crediting
and evaluating mathematicians. Conversely, one might see in the virtue
approach the germ of a radical shift in philosophy of mathematics generally.
To draw out the large range of views that we may adopt under the general
heading of virtue-theoretic philosophy of mathematics, I will separate three
levels of claims that one can propose, develop and defend:
Moderate Proposal Virtues and vices of mathematicians will be relevant
to mathematical knowledge.
Strong Proposal Virtues and vices of mathematicians will be explana-
tory of mathematical knowledge. In other words, virtue epistemology
should be adopted to give the correct epistemology for mathematics.
Radical Proposal Virtues and vices of mathematicians explain mathe-
matical knowledge and extend to provide alternative answers to other
kinds of questions in the philosophy of mathematics, e.g. those con-
cerning ontology, access, metaphysics etc.
As stated, these three proposals are only meant to serve as a general guide
to different levels of views one might take rather than exact statements or
theories. Work needs to be done to establish the meaning behind the three
proposals and their plausibility. In this chapter I will focus on the Strong
Proposal, beginning with a brief discussion of the Moderate Proposal and
returning only briefly to the Radical Proposal in the conclusion.
Incorporating a theory of mathematical virtues into our theoretical land-
scape of mathematics and our knowledge of it will in many ways be a grand
departure from a lot of traditional thinking in the philosophy of mathemat-
ics. In section 5.2, I will begin with the Moderate Proposal, showing that
the evaluation of skills, competences and character traits of mathematicians
is already commonly taken to be be relevant to mathematical knowledge. In
section 5.3 I will set out the key elements of the virtue epistemology liter-
ature, followed in section 5.4 by its application to the case of mathematics
as the Strong Proposal. In sections 5.5 and 5.6, I will apply to framework
to show that the Strong Proposal also provides a well-motivated account
of proof and rigour respectively. Furthermore, in section 5.7, I will show
that the virtue approach on the Strong Proposal is very amenable to being
extended to more notions in epistemology, in particular the under-explored
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area of mathematical understanding. I will in section 5.8 examine a very
current and ongoing case study concerning Shinichi Mochizuki’s proposed
proof of the abc conjecture, showing that there is indeed a close link to virtue
theory: that the approach I advocate is in the best position to account for
the surrounding controversy.
5.2 The Moderate Proposal for a Virtue Approach
to Mathematics
Let us begin with a look at the Moderate Proposal for incorporating talk of
virtues, vices and values more generally into our philosophy of mathematics.
The central idea of this proposal is given above as:
Moderate Proposal Virtues and vices of mathematicians will be relevant
to mathematical knowledge.
Of course, a great deal already rests on which aspects of mathematical prac-
tices we are seeking to explain, so this is something we must consider. Before
I introduce the more weighty proposals drawing on virtue epistemology, the
talk of virtue and vice can also be understood in different ways. One may
talk about theoretical virtues and vices on the one hand and personal or
agential virtues and vices on the other.2
The importance of the theoretical virtues to mathematics is already
present in the philosophy of mathematical practice literature. To list but a
few: elegance, simplicity, generality, unification, applicability, explanatori-
ness and beauty all affect how mathematics is developed, which areas we
find interesting and worth pursuing, and how much we favour some given
mathematical proof. Another way of putting this is that such theoretical
virtues already play a role in mathematical practice, and already there is a
blossoming literature surrounding a number of different theoretical virtues
of this kind. Questions concerning mathematical beauty and mathematical
explanation (and thereby explanatoriness) are already to be found in the
philosophy of mathematical practice in particular. Meanwhile, questions
concerning the applicability, simplicity, generality or unificatory power are
2A good reason to prefer the term ‘agential’ is that the virtues possessed by groups
will be explanatorily important in the case of mathematics, and this term stays neutral
on groups as agents, whereas ‘personal’ does not.
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commonplace in mathematics and the philosophy of mathematics more gen-
erally. If we are interested in the nature and purpose of proofs, theoretical
virtues immediately come to the fore. For example, proofs are evaluated
for things like elegance, simplicity, intricacy, rigour, explanatoriness and
beauty.3 The attribution of theoretical virtues and vices is certainly not
limited to proofs either. Mathematical ideas come in many varieties, all of
which may be evaluated according to what we value and the like. Besides
proofs, these may include concepts, notations, theories, definitions, symbol-
isms, techniques, ideas etc. For instance, a well-constructed definition can
be bountiful for mathematical theorising and streamlining for the proofs
and lemmas it is deployed in. Consider, for example, the  − δ definitions
of convergence and continuity, discussed in chapter 3. Meanwhile cumber-
some notations can reduce our understanding or even inhibit mathematical
breakthroughs. Nonetheless, let us set aside theoretical virtues to focus
on agential virtues. This is not to diminish the importance of theoretical
virtues, just that these are not central to the case to be made which focuses
on how the mathematician is primary in obtaining mathematical knowledge.
We also can observe that agential virtues are regularly discussed in rela-
tion to their importance for mathematics; for instance, in praise of particular
mathematicians who have made major contributions to their fields. A prime
example of this would be the kind of language used to describe John Conway;
no discussion of him seems to be complete without attributing his mathe-
matical breakthroughs to his playfulness, curiosity and light-heartedness.
For example:
But the truly amazing thing about the surreal numbers is how
Conway found them: by playing and analysing games. Like
an Escher tessellation of birds morphing into fish—focus on the
white and you see the birds, focus on the red and you see fish—
Conway beheld a game, such as Go, and saw that it embedded
or contained something else entirely, the numbers. And when he
found these numbers, he walked around in a white-hot daydream
for weeks. (Roberts 2015)
The article quoted here is an edited selection from Siobhan Roberts’s bi-
ography of Conway. Not only is his famous playfulness linked explicitly to
3And many more besides. See (Inglis & Aberdein 2015) for experimental results on
how the different descriptors may be linked.
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the discovery of the surreal numbers, it is furthermore connected to his dis-
covery of the Conway groups, where the Conway groups are three of the
twenty-six sporadic cases of finite simple groups, discovered by looking at
automorphisms of the Leech lattice. Playfulness as exhibited by Conway is
seen as an epistemic virtue, in which he takes joy in the complex mathemat-
ical structuring to be found in games. By translating difficult mathematical
problems and ideas into games, Conway managed to invoke his playfulness
to be deeply fruitful for mathematical discovery. The virtue of playfulness is
clearly relevant both to Conway’s own knowledge and the collective knowl-
edge of the mathematical community, since it was certainly instrumental in
the discovery. The identification of the Conway groups also feeds in to the
triumphal proof of the classification of finite simple groups, thereby demon-
strating its connection to the rich tapestry of mathematical achievements.
That virtues are relevant, in an interesting sense, to mathematical knowl-
edge is thus shown by the connection between Conway’s playfulness and the
mathematical discoveries it resulted in. The point could equally well have
been made of numerous other mathematicians and their respective virtues
which have contributed to mathematical breakthroughs and discoveries. As
such, I take the Moderate Proposal to be vindicated by the example. The
Moderate Proposal, nonetheless, is maybe best seen as a “foot in the door”,
in that it is readily acceptable but nonetheless brings to the foreground the
importance of virtues in mathematics. By making it plain that our interests
as philosophers of mathematics are bound up with the virtues displayed by
mathematical theories, proofs, ideas, concepts, methods and practitioners,
the Moderate Proposal is suggestive of the fact that it will be a fruitful
project to further investigate the relationship between the two. This is my
intention for the remainder of the chapter, beginning in the following section
with a description of the main strands of thought in virtue epistemology.
5.3 Virtue Epistemology
The central idea that unites the diverse approaches under the banner of
‘virtue epistemology’ is that individual agents and groups of agents must
be considered in approaching the core issues of epistemology. The way in
which the knowers themselves figure in theories of knowledge (and other
epistemological concepts) is through the exercise or failure of their epistemic
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virtues and vices. Where these theories come apart is on the nature of
these epistemic virtues. The two main camps are the virtue reliabilists and
the virtue responsibilists, which I shall outline in turn, followed by a brief
discussions of further ways in which one might be a virtue epistemologist,
namely by taking on some kind of hybrid view or by focusing on epistemic
agents while rejecting the reductive and definitional projects in epistemology.
5.3.1 Virtue Reliabilism
Virtue reliabilism is the approach proposed by Ernest Sosa (Sosa 1980, 1991,
2007), John Greco (Greco 2010), Christoph Kelp (Kelp 2011) and Alvin
Goldman (Goldman 2000) which takes virtues to be stable, reliable facul-
ties, abilities, skills or competences. The epistemic variety of virtues, the
intellectual virtues, are then the faculties, skills or competences which are
aimed at epistemic ends, such as acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false
ones. Reliability is understood in terms of how well those ends are achieved.
The faculties that reliably produce true beliefs in this way are quite broad,
including “faculties of sense perception, memory, induction, and deduction”
(Battaly 2008, p. 645).4
Given the picture of intellectual virtues as skills, abilities, faculties or
competences which reliably maximise truth over falsity, we may now see the
account of knowledge that this provides. In (Greco 2010), Greco argues that
knowledge is a kind of success through ability, meaning that it amounts to
an achievement rather than a merely lucky success (and thereby avoiding
Gettier cases):
S knows that p if and only if S believes the truth (with respect
to p) because S ’s belief that p is produced by intellectual ability.
(Greco 2010, p. 71)
Similarly, Sosa defends the following claim:
[K]nowledge is true belief out of intellectual virtue, belief that
turns out right by reason of the virtue and not just by coinci-
dence. (Sosa 1991, p. 277)
4Given the current focus on the mathematical case, the last item on the list, deduction,
will be of particular interest to us. However, I believe that such a broad notion does not suit
our needs in appealing to the virtue approach, so the account of mathematical deduction
I am proposing will be more fine-grained.
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This develops the intuitive idea that knowledge comes about through a pro-
cess which isn’t lucky, but also emphasises the cognitive role that is played
by the knowers themselves.
The most famous way that Sosa explains his view is through the example
of the archer and three evaluative measures of how well she does: accuracy,
adroitness and aptness. Accuracy is an evaluation of the success of the shot
at actually hitting the target. Adroitness is whether or not shooting the bow
manifested the relevant skill at archery on the archer’s part. However, the
big observation is that a shot can be both accurate and adroit, but fail to be
accurate-because-adroit, due to double luck situations analogous to Gettier
cases where good luck cancels out bad luck. For example, the archer may
line up the perfect shot, but a gust of wind blows the arrow astray, only
for it to deflect off a tree and finally hit the target. Aptness, then, is Sosa’s
term for those performances which are successful because they manifest the
correct skills or competences, and it is these which are creditable to a skilful
and virtuous agent. The idea, then, is that obtaining knowledge requires the
same manifestation of skills or competences, but furthermore, the success
at obtaining true beliefs needs to be because of the skilful or competence
performance. Sosa calls this the AAA-structure: knowledge requires being
accurate, adroitness in manifesting the relevant skill or competence, and
being apt.
The reliabilist virtues listed above are not the end of the picture, since
many skills which reliably attain truths are acquired and developed through
practice. Thus complex intellectual skills and abilities can play a key part in
acquiring true beliefs, as we shall see in the mathematics case. This is closely
connected to the difference between low-grade knowledge, the more imme-
diate knowledge gained through channels such as sensory experience, and
high-grade knowledge, the more reflective, systematic and inquiry-focused
knowledge.
5.3.2 Virtue Responsibilism
Virtue responsibilism, as championed by Linda Zagzebski (Zagzebski 1996),
Lorraine Code (Code 1987) and James Montmarquet (Montmarquet 1993),
sees intellectual virtues as needing to be understood in a way that is broadly
continuous with moral virtues in the virtue ethics tradition dating back to
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Aristotle.5 On this view, virtues are acquired excellences or traits of char-
acter, examples of which include open-mindedness, intellectual courage, in-
tellectual autonomy, intellectual humility, reliance on trustworthy authority,
perseverance and thoroughness.
The intellectual virtues as character traits have two major components
on Zagzebski’s account.6 Firstly, they have a motivational component, which
are dispositions to be motivated towards particular ends, something which
wasn’t present for the reliabilists. In the case of intellectual virtues, the
motivation is generally epistemic and is described by Zagzebski as all being
“forms of the motivation to have cognitive contact with reality” (Zagzeb-
ski 1996, p. 167), where this broad heading covers the desires for true
beliefs, certainty, understanding etc. Secondly, virtues also have a success
component, for Zagzebski argues that to be virtuous means to be reliably
successful in securing the ends you are motivated towards. Putting these
together, character traits which are made up of these two components are
then enacted:
An act of intellectual virtue A is an act that arises from the mo-
tivational component of A, is something a person with virtue A
would (probably) do in the circumstances, is successful in achiev-
ing the end of the A motivation, and is such that the agent ac-
quires a true belief (cognitive contact with reality) through these
features of the act. (Zagzebski 1996, p. 270)
Such acts of intellectual virtue are key in the definition of knowledge Za-
gzebski gives:
Knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out
of acts of intellectual virtue. (Zagzebski 1996, p. 270)
The fact that cognitive contact with reality here is broader than just having
true beliefs is very relevant to the mathematical case we will get to later,
for consider:
5It is pointed out in (Greco & Turri 2011) that this is better called Neo-Aristotelian
rather than Aristotelian because Aristotle does not claim such a unified account of moral
and intellectual virtues.
6While Code and Montmarquet have similar attitudes to what the virtues amount to,
they are less committed to recovering a definition of knowledge in terms of the virtues.
I’ll return to this in the next section.
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[U]nderstanding is also a form of contact with reality, one that
has been considered a component of the knowing state in some
periods of philosophical history... [I]t is a state that includes the
comprehension of abstract structures of reality apart from the
propositional. (Zagzebski 1996, p.167)
This will be useful in approaching the wider aspects of mathematics which
are usually left aside in philosophical and epistemological accounts, such as
mathematical understanding, visualisation and diagrams.7 We will return
to understanding later in section 5.7.
5.3.3 Hybrid Virtue Approaches
Under the general heading of virtue epistemology we are not limited to the
two approaches sketched above. In this section I will briefly set down a fur-
ther distinct way of taking the virtue turn towards epistemology, by adopting
a hybrid approach which combines aspects of the other two theories. The
hybrid approach in virtue epistemology is endorsed by both Heather Battaly
in (Battaly 2008) and Nenad Miscevic in (Miscevic 2007). The guiding idea
is that both the virtue responsibilist and virtue reliabilist proposals have
correct ideas which will take us forward in our epistemic theorising. Rather
than seeing the two as rivals, the hybrid approach can partially endorse
both, or take on aspects of both theories.
The first way to do this is by broadening the category of epistemic virtues
to include both virtues as faculties and virtues as character traits, as is sug-
gested by Battaly. Her reason is that both ways of filling out the concept
of ‘virtue’ are equally legitimate, in that they both track normal uses of the
term. The idea then is that the two kinds of virtue correspond to different
kinds of knowledge. Contrasting the two categories of high-grade knowledge
and low-grade knowledge, Battaly argues that these are achieved in different
ways. Low-grade knowledge is the sort of quick and immediate knowledge
we get from sensory experience, while high-grade knowledge is knowledge
which requires greater cognitive effort or reflection, such as scientific knowl-
edge. The hybrid view being proposed, then, can make use of the fact that
for low-grade knowledge all that seems to be required is the correct and reli-
able functioning of the relevant faculties while high-grade knowledge seems
7Though excellent work in this area is done by (Giaquinto 2015).
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to need character traits such as inquisitiveness, open-mindedness etc. Con-
versely, requiring responsibilist levels of motivation seems to fit poorly with
the fact that we can come to know things by seeing them without any mo-
tivation towards knowing, while the reliabilists seem to leave an incomplete
story if their account of higher-order knowledge fails to involve the relevant
traits required by the process of inquiry. As such, the hybrid view can en-
dorse different kinds of virtues as necessary for different kinds of knowledge.
The other way of endorsing a hybrid view, as presented by Miscevic, is
to divide up the aims of the approach to allow the different types of virtue to
satisfy those different aims. Miscevic’s idea, entitled the integrated virtue-
based view, is to endorse a virtue reliabilist account of knowledge (motivated
by the idea that this does better at truth-tracking), while taking the value
of knowledge to be tied to the character trait of inquisitiveness.
Indeed, Zagzebski’s own virtue responsibilist view readily acknowledges
that skills are importantly related to intellectual efforts, including mathe-
matical ones:
Spatial reasoning skills, mathematical skills, and mechanical skills
are important for effectiveness in many of life’s roles, and the per-
son who is virtuous in such roles would be ineffective without the
associated skills. (Zagzebski 1996, p. 115)
Nowhere will this be clearer than in mathematics itself! There is certainly
a close connection between intellectual virtues and intellectual skills, some-
thing which the hybrid views want to employ to develop a full account of
both.
5.3.4 Epistemic Vices
Very little has been said so far about epistemic vices, echoing the literature
where these have mostly played a secondary role, something which is only
recently being rectified. Let us quickly survey how intellectual vices might
be understood.
There is an Aristotelian line on the nature of moral vices, as is well-
known, taking virtues to be intermediate between vices of excess and vices
of deficiency:
Now [virtue] is a mean between two vices, that which depends on
excess and that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean
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because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is both
right in passions or actions, while virtue both finds and chooses
that which is intermediate. (Aristotle 2009, II.6.1107a.2–5)
Aristotle illustrates with various examples such as the virtue of proper pride
being an intermediate between empty vanity and undue humility, or the
virtue of courage being the mean between cowardice and rashness. However,
there is no obvious reason to take this to be generally true, so while it
might fit in particular cases this will not do as a characterisation of vice
generally, nor of epistemic vice, nor of mathematical vice, without some
further argument to that effect.8
Starting with the reliabilist approach, we do find some mentions of vices.
For example, Goldman lists the following as intellectual vices:
The vices include intellectual processes like forming beliefs by
guesswork, wishful thinking, and ignoring contrary evidence. (Gold-
man 2000, p. 6)
These appear to be intellectual processes which are actively misleading, tak-
ing us generally towards false beliefs rather than true ones. Similarly, for
the virtue responsibilist approach, Zagzebski says:
Some examples of intellectual vices are as follows: intellectual
pride, negligence, idleness, cowardice, conformity, carelessness,
rigidity, prejudice, wishful thinking, closed-mindedness, insensi-
tivity to detail, obtuseness, and lack of thoroughness. (Zagzebski
1996, p. 152)
The difference between the two quotes corresponds to the difference in their
account of virtues, the reliabilist seeing vices as processes which are un-
reliable in delivering true beliefs and the responsibilist taking vices to be
negative traits of character.
In (Battaly 2014), Heather Battaly points out that actually we can be
more precise about the concepts of vice on offer. Firstly, reliabilist vices can
be distinguished between those which deliver negative epistemic ends and
8Not to take the Aristotelian picture of virtue and vices too seriously as a modern
framework was a point impressed on me by Brendan Larvor. Rightly so it seems, for
even Zagzebski who is explicitly trying to apply Aristotle’s picture of moral virtues to
intellectual virtues does not take this to be correct.
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those which fail to produce positive ones. Similarly, responsibilist vices can
either be filled out in terms of having negative motivations or in terms of
the failure to have positive motivations. The last of these four options may
seem initially implausible, but Battaly argues that there are ways in which
this can be more convincing. For example, we might be blameworthy of vice
simply by failing to consider epistemic value, such as through dedicating
ourselves to collecting trivia about soap operas; there is nothing wrong with
soap trivia per se, so this cannot be a case of bad epistemic motivation, but
the problem is the failure to pursue valuable epistemic ends.9
Epistemic vices, then, can be cashed out in different ways, according to
one’s other theoretical motivations. For the sake of this chapter, we can
leave it open whether any one of these is the correct account of epistemic
vice and continue now with an exploration of how virtue epistemology will
apply to mathematical knowledge.
5.4 The Strong Virtue Proposal for Mathematical
Knowledge
Above I argued for the correctness of the Moderate Proposal, where the
investigation of theoretical or agential virtues is relevant to the philosophy
of mathematics. Now I shall take on the Strong Proposal, which was the
following:
Strong Proposal Virtues and vices of mathematicians will be explana-
tory of mathematical knowledge. In other words, virtue epistemology
should be adopted to give the correct epistemology for mathematics.
Such a claim is far from obvious. Nonetheless, I shall propose that we
should adopt a virtue-epistemological approach to mathematical knowledge
and that this will be successful in settling difficult problems in the philoso-
phy of mathematics. The virtue account of mathematical knowledge will be
a genuine rival theory of mathematical knowledge which can draw on an es-
tablished tradition in the realm of epistemology to solve problems pertaining
9An interesting conclusion of the analysis of vice is that Miranda Fricker’s discussion
of epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007) is best understood in terms of the bad outcomes it
leads to, so aligns more naturally with the reliabilist conception of vice despite Fricker’s
responsibilist framework.
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to mathematics, such as those concerning the nature of proof and mathe-
matical rigour. In this section I will set out the virtue-epistemic approach
to mathematical knowledge.
One place we might look for a prior articulation of the Strong Proposal
would be in the literature on virtue epistemology. Indeed, we should expect
any proponents of virtue epistemology to be immediately inclined to agree
that their preferred epistemology extends to mathematical knowledge too.
Yet there seems to be little previous consideration of how such a theory
might go or how it might benefit mathematics. Reliabilists often list de-
duction as a virtue, in that it is a reliable faculty or competence that leads
to knowledge, but it strikes me that this is far too coarse to deal with the
subtle and complex issues going on in mathematics. Meanwhile, responsi-
bilists have not had anything explicit to say about the mathematical case,
although Zagzebski does quote Moravcsik relating mathematical proof to
understanding at (Zagzebski 1996, p. 47).
Applying virtue epistemology to a hard case like mathematics should be
an appealing undertaking for people already convinced of the correctness
of virtue epistemology, not just as a straightforward application but also as
an important test case. It might be that the mathematical applications of
virtue epistemology will favour reliabilism over responsibilism or vice versa,
or indeed a hybrid view such as Battaly’s over both. Even more important
is that mathematics has a number of peculiar epistemological difficulties,
whereby we treat mathematical knowledge as special. Mathematical knowl-
edge might be considered special in any number of ways such as it being a
priori, necessary, deductive, objective, infallible, certain, analytic etc. Many
of these are central to the Traditionalist take on mathematical knowledge
and explaining them is seen as one of the main projects that we should be
engaged in. The questions that might thus arise in applying virtue episte-
mology concern which of these properties of mathematical knowledge are
maintained and defended, or whether we join Lakatos in storming the dog-
matist fortress and reject some or all of these properties. For now I am
just blazing a path for this work to be carried out so will not be answering
all of these questions here, but it is important to note that there are such
major questions which need to be developed in giving a theory of mathe-
matical knowledge and that filling out these details for the virtue approach
is a project which needs carrying out.
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The first major question for the virtue project is: what exactly are the
virtues at play in mathematics? Setting aside the theoretical virtues dis-
cussed above, in virtue epistemology the virtues are primarily those pos-
sessed by agents (or possibly groups of agents). The answer to what they
are exactly will depend on the flavour of virtue epistemology one favours so
let me take these in turn.
On the virtue reliabilist account, virtues are taken to be faculties, com-
petences, skills or abilities, varying amongst the different proponents of the
view. For the current case, then, mathematical virtues will be mathematical
faculties, competences, skills or abilities. It strikes me that these may be
separable into two levels. Firstly, mathematical skills or abilities may be
about being able to implement particular mathematical techniques, at what
we can call the particular level. These might range from the most basic
mathematical skills such as counting, mental arithmetic or finding the roots
of a quadratic equation, all the way to advanced mathematical techniques
such as forcing in set theory, stochastic modelling or finding saddle points
in dynamical systems. With the techniques at the particular level, there is
a notable granularity issue in how precisely we define some given technique
and when we attribute such a skill to a mathematician. For example, mental
arithmetic above could have been broken down into skill at adding, subtract-
ing, multiplying, etc. where we could count these as distinct skills. I don’t
believe anything major hangs on how exactly we specify such skills, but it
does seem to indicate that certain contextual parameters will be in play
when employing mathematical virtues for epistemological purposes. This
would certainly fit with the discussion of Lo¨we & Mu¨ller from the previous
chapter. This is also in line with how things go in virtue reliabilism more
generally.
However, it seems that just deploying particular skills is not sufficient for
many mathematical activities, such as developing and checking proofs. As a
second level of mathematical virtues for the reliabilist, what we may call the
general level, we might identify reflective, higher-order mathematical skills.
For example, giving a proof isn’t just about deploying particular mathemat-
ical techniques but also about picking the right method for the situation and
combining it with other techniques in the correct manner. The higher-level
virtues seem to be those we intend when we talk of ‘mathematical thinking’
generally, which includes being able to construct and follow mathematical
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arguments, accurately check for errors and solve technical problems on the
fly.
Let us proceed to the virtue responsibilist take on mathematical virtues.
Mathematical virtues, here, would form a subcategory of intellectual virtues,
which are defined as acquired character traits. There are many such intel-
lectual virtues that are already present in the general case but seem to apply
directly to the realm of mathematical activities. For example, Zagzebski lists
thoroughness, perseverance, “the teaching virtues: the social virtues of be-
ing communicative, including intellectual candor and knowing your audience
and how they respond” (Zagzebski 1996, p. 114) and reliance on trustwor-
thy authority as intellectual virtues. Thoroughness and perseverance are
clearly important for discovering and developing proofs; communication is
not limited to mathematical teaching but also relevant to tailoring proofs to
their intended audience; and relying on testimony from trustworthy sources
will be vital to engaging with the mathematical community and developing
collaborative mathematics. On the other hand, there may be intellectual
virtues which are particular to mathematical endeavours. Indeed, I will
later defend the idea that, for the virtue responsibilist take on mathematics,
mathematical rigour is a specifically mathematical virtue.
Now the big idea behind the strong virtue proposal is that mathematical
knowledge should be explained in terms of the possession and enacting of cer-
tain mathematical virtues, whichever account of them one prefers. Notably,
though, an important aspect of the move towards the evaluation of mathe-
maticians’ virtues as key to the notion of mathematical knowledge, is that
this is intended to move away from a misguided, overly-idealised standard
account towards a more accurate picture of mathematics and mathematical
knowledge in the real world. As such, I am careful to point out that actual
mathematical knowledge can be obtained in a whole range of different ways.
The major traditional way is, of course, through deductive proofs, which
will be the focus of the next section.
But there are many others too. Testimonial knowledge has a huge liter-
ature in epistemology (see Adler 2012), and can and does provide a lot of
mathematical knowledge out there too. In mathematics education, there is
a great deal of reliance on the teacher’s word, at least initially. One might
think that once we get into the domain of mathematics proper, maybe uni-
versity and beyond, that we should be familiar with the proofs behind all
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of our mathematical knowledge, but here we might be relying on our mem-
ory to provide them; that having once seen/produced/understood a proof
the knowledge remains. The virtue reliabilists actually categorise memory
as an intellectual virtue, so admitting its use is already requiring greater
philosophical resources. Even still, the idea that we have even encountered
all of the proofs for theorems we can claim to know, rather than relying on
testimony, might not even be so plausible. Indeed, it seems to be common
knowledge that Fermat’s last theorem and Poincare`’s Conjecture are both
true, yet undoubtedly most mathematicians have only a rough knowledge
at best of how proofs of these proceed. Furthermore, mathematicians are
social builders, disseminating and using results produced by others to make
progress in their own work. While we might idealise that everyone will trace
back all the results they use through the tree of dependencies of results
those in turn rely on, it seems wildly unlikely. Consider further the classifi-
cation of finite simple groups, a proof of such grand scale that likely nobody
knows all of it. Such massive collaborative projects are grand successes of
mathematics and undoubtedly involve testimonial knowledge.
We have only scratched the surface of the epistemic complexities involved
in mathematical knowledge in practice. To list some more possible ways
to gain mathematical knowledge, consider mathematical knowledge through
sensory experience (Giaquinto 2015); through probabilistic justification, like
cases of primality testing (which may be problematic in their resemblance to
lottery cases); through computational verification, from mere calculators to
complex models run on super-computers; or mathematical know-how which
might be acquired through training and being inducted into particular prac-
tices (as discussed in the previous chapter). A natural response to the
diversity of sources of mathematical knowledge is to concentrate on some
particular special properties of mathematical knowledge which are accorded
only to knowledge gained deductively from proofs and thereby isolate the
interesting case. In the next section I take on the strong proposal’s account
of mathematical proofs, but I want to note that the virtue turn thrives on
the diversity of sources of knowledge because there are a great number of
intellectual virtues which are important for mathematics. The benefit, then,
is that applying virtue epistemology to mathematical knowledge does not
find itself limited to pure mathematics and deductively proven theorems,
but conversely provides a framework for giving a fuller, richer account of
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the whole spectrum of mathematical knowledge. A move away from taking
all mathematical knowledge to be a priori is advocated in (Kitcher 1984)
and the virtue approach allows us to do this while still adopting a unified
account of mathematical knowledge. This is already a huge advantage of
the virtue approach to mathematical knowledge being endorse on the Strong
Proposal. Furthermore, in opening up this diversity of types of mathemat-
ical knowledge, we see the materialisation of the fact that deploying the
virtue epistemological approach to mathematical knowledge is more than
just the flat-footed project of answering Traditionalist questions with a new
set of answers, but rather opens us up to the wider project of investigating
diverse mathematical practices and the interrelated virtues and vices at play
in them.
I will now proceed to a discussion of mathematical knowledge from proofs
on the virtue account.
5.5 Virtues and Proving
The Strong Proposal to see mathematical knowledge as best explained through
a virtue epistemological lens can provide a better alternative to the Formalist-
Reductionist account of proofs. Rather than being hindered and undermined
by the issues we have seen raised against the Formalist-Reductionist account
throughout the thesis, the virtue epistemological view on proofs I will offer
positively thrives on them, as we shall soon see.
The first move that we make on the virtue approach needs us to ob-
serve that in the virtue epistemology literature the key to knowledge is
virtuous intellectual activity. It is through virtuous acts, acts in which we
exhibit or manifest relevant virtues, that we gain knowledge. The Formalist-
Reductionist approach, meanwhile, emphasises proofs as construed as ob-
jects, where we can then study these objects to discover what makes them
good/correct/rigorous/etc. But then the account fares poorly with respect
to our proving practices, having tried to abstract away from their material
instantiation. In contrast to the proofs-as-objects view, then, the virtue ac-
count should focus instead on proving as an activity, as argued for in the
previous chapter.
Let us now proceed to locate the role of virtues in this account of proofs
and the knowledge it secures. The virtue epistemological view is that in
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order for the proving activities to secure our mathematical knowledge, they
need to be virtuous in the appropriate way. Once again, how the details
of this are filled out will depend on the particular virtue epistemology one
favours.
Starting with the reliabilist, for someone producing a proof to have se-
cured mathematical knowledge therewith, the proving must be completed
with the relevant skills and competences. The mathematician needs to cor-
rectly deploy the particular mathematical skills involved in whatever the
proof is, rightly observing any limitations or restrictions on the domains
of application. Furthermore, these skills need to be tied together to form a
coherent whole, which delivers the final theorem as the result of the manoeu-
vres combined correctly, that is, avoiding errors and mistakes, which will be
the result of general level competences. Similarly, in the case of checking or
learning from a previous proof, the proof on the page (or wherever it may
be) acts as a guide or recipe as to how one should carry out the actions of
the proof, as described in chapter 4. Still, the person doing the checking
must accurately follow the techniques being presented and see how one step
follows the last in order to come to know the ultimate solution. Importantly,
following steps in this sense does not need to be filled out as following the un-
derlying formal moves, but instead is about the fitting together of the steps
in the overall reasoning pattern and recognising what follows from what in
the moves that are being made, moves which can certainly be informal in
the operative sense.
Virtue responsibilists, on the other hand, require that the mathemati-
cian comes to know the proved theorem through acts of mathematical virtue,
which is to say that their proving activities must be virtuous and free from
vices. In particular, they gain knowledge through proving if the activity of
this instantiates the necessary virtue of mathematical rigour. The nature
of rigour is a major question of philosophy of mathematics, one which has
not been done justice by the Formalist-Reductionist answer, so I will dis-
cuss this in greater depth in the following section as something additional
that the Strong Virtue Proposal can offer besides the expected account of
mathematical knowledge. Importantly, following the Zagzebski framework,
the virtue of rigour will have an epistemic motivational component, usually
aimed at establishing the truth of the theorem, or making cognitive contact
with mathematical reality (whatever form that takes), and also a success
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component of actually doing so. Once again, this builds in the fact that our
right reasoning must track the contours and landscape of mathematics.
Let us illustrate these both using the Stallings example we began the
chapter with, where these virtues go astray to lead to a failed proof. Re-
call that Stallings’s proof of the Poincare´ Conjecture failed because it relies
on deploying a theorem in a case for which it doesn’t hold. The mathe-
matical reliabilist account of what has gone on here is that what Stallings
describes as his “psychological problem, a blindness, an excitement, an in-
hibition of reasoning by an underlying fear of being wrong” (Stallings 1966,
p. 88) represents a failure of his usual skills and competence at putting
together a proof to form a complete argument, check for errors and, in par-
ticular, observe the domain of application of theorems being used. The
talk of developing “[t]echniques leading to the abandonment of such inhi-
bitions” (Stallings 1966, p. 88) can be taken seriously; the development
of such skills is paramount in securing correct proofs and further mathe-
matical knowledge. For the mathematical responsibilist, the focus will be
on the misapplication of theorem 0 as a failure on his part to be rigorous
in his proving, rigour being a mathematical character trait to be discussed
shortly. Additionally, the responsibilist would also be more interested in the
idea that developing the techniques for avoiding this is something desirable
to “every honest mathematician” (Stallings 1966, p. 88) as the intellectual
honesty will work alongside rigour to ensure that our motivations in our
mathematical proving are of the correct sort, rather than simply being di-
rected at fame and fortune.10 For both approaches, the failure to enact the
relevant virtues in the creation of the proof are how the proof came to be
mistaken and its reasoning flawed, with the upshot that the activities did
not deliver mathematical knowledge to Stallings of the truth of the Poincare´
Conjecture.
What has been given here is a description of how proving as an activity
can deliver or fail to deliver mathematical knowledge. However, the chal-
lenge on which I began was to account for proofs, rather than the activities
surrounding creating and verifying them. In the previous chapter, I put
forward a re-orientation of priority, where we focus on proving activities
first and see proofs as objects or arguments as of secondary concern. Proofs
10Of course, this does not mean that this cannot be a part of your motivation, just
that it cannot come to the detriment of correctly tracking mathematical truth.
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don’t operate in a vacuum was a slogan form of the idea that a proof con-
sidered in some idealised sense will miss out on the crucial connection to
the provers who create, know, understand and employ them, a connection
I have claimed is fundamental to the mathematical knowledge that proofs
are aimed at. Nevertheless, there is an emerging worry here which must be
addressed: that prioritising the individual activities appears to take us too
far in an individualistic direction. The fact is that we do have a seemingly
robust notion of what is sufficient for a proof, a set of standards taught
in classrooms and lecture halls which is enforced by teachers and even the
referees for journals. One might think that it cannot be simply down to
the individual whether a proof is enough to secure knowledge, as this seems
hopelessly subjective with respect to mathematics, which should be held up
as objective.
In response, though, we can observe that this does not really cut to
the core of the issue and that this instead merely reintroduces certain Tra-
ditionalist attitudes to mathematical proof. For one thing, it seems that
this response seeks to re-idealise proofs as something which are ‘out there’
to discover, thereby conflating the contours, structures and relationships of
mathematics, on one hand, with the proofs themselves on the other. Cru-
cially, proponents of the Strong Virtue Proposal can and should accept that
there are many operative canons in mathematical practice and that proof
is standardised in numerous ways. None of this poses a difficulty, however.
The point is that the standards are set for how to best structure and commu-
nicate proofs, thereby also helping to inculcate mathematical reasoning and
problem-solving into students by demonstrating how to set out reasoning
in clear and cogent ways. That each individual needs to go about actually
carrying out the reasoning in order to gain the specific type of knowledge
associated with proving (as opposed, say, to testimonial knowledge of its
correctness) does not necessarily impede the objectivity of the mathemat-
ics at stake. To return to the map metaphor: we can agree that there are
important map-making conventions, while asserting that properly knowing
the route it describes involves traversing it.
Under the current attitude, we can also do better than the Traditionalist
in discussing the conventions and standards surrounding proving. For exam-
ple, the claim that there are well-guarded standards of mathematical proofs
must come with some major qualifications. The fact is that the demands
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such conventions place on us vary from context to context, with more details
demanded for proofs for students and less for discussions between colleagues
etc. These differences seem to concern the granularity of the proof, or how
much can be assumed on the part of the reader. For instance, in Pettigrew’s
review (Pettigrew 2016) of (Burgess 2015) he points out that informal proofs
must communicate the key ideas which deliver the truth of the theorem, and
that it is this rather than the mere convincing which is important for a proof
to be successful. For the Traditionalist, such a statement would fit poorly
with the constant standards of rigour which are assumed, but for the Virtue
approach this is only natural since virtues can be assessed across contexts
and situations. Besides the virtue of rigour which can be displayed in prov-
ing, many other virtues are relevant to mathematical work, including virtues
(in whatever sense they are taken) which pertain to communicating and col-
laborating. It may well be that very coarse proofs which only include the
main ideas might not fully display whether the thinking underlying them is
rigorous or not, in that they leave substantial gaps in between these main
ideas, but could still be sufficient to communicate how to go about rigorously
proving something if we address them to the right people. The point is that
a virtue approach embraces also the diversity of purposes for which we em-
ploy proofs, as set out at the start of the introduction to this thesis. While
one such purpose is to fully set out how to deduce some conclusion, another
may be merely to communicate how this is done to a fellow researcher who
does not need the full explanation to arrive at mathematical knowledge, by
virtue of their existing knowledge and abilities. The virtue picture does give
us a way to account for how these different facets come together and what
to say when they come apart, in particular that divergent purposes might
need to be assessed with respect to different virtues.
Ultimately, I take the point here to be that communal standards re-
flect something about the way in which we systematise our communication
of mathematical ideas, approaches and proofs. This does diverge from the
question of how proofs and proving relate to mathematical knowledge, but
has been constantly conflated in Traditionalist and Formalist-Reductionist
approaches. Let us now proceed to see what can be said concerning mathe-
matical rigour from the virtue perspective.
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5.6 Rigour
Mathematical rigour has already played a role in the discussion above, where
it has been proposed that we should see it as a specifically mathematical
virtue. Let us investigate this in greater detail.
Again, there is a strong claim put forth on the nature of rigour given by
the Formalist-Reductionist, taking rigour to amount to little more than for-
mality or straightforward formalisability. The ‘straightforward’ component
here is often cashed out as algorithmic formalisability, a process of filling in
the gaps until we hit a bedrock of formal inferences. That the formalisation
process is nowhere near so straightforward has been frequently pointed out,
such as in (Antonutti Marfori 2010, p. 266) and back in chapter 1, and
this cannot be seriously maintained by anyone with experience of actually
formalising proofs. In Marfori’s view:
[A]s a matter of fact it cannot be denied that in ordinary math-
ematical practice, standards of rigour are constantly appealed
to. However, these very much differ from standards of formal
rigour. Formalisation is seldom called for, and the mathemat-
ical community seems to widely converge on what to count as
an adequate proof for the truth of a theorem and adjudicates
controversies often without the need to formalise informal argu-
ments. (Antonutti Marfori 2010, pp. 270–271)
She argues that we should thus separate our investigations of formal rigour
from a separate endeavour of investigating informal rigour, amounting to the
community standards converged on as securing the right degree of mathe-
matical certainty. However, even these communal standards seem insuf-
ficient to me for the reasons outlined at the end of the previous section,
namely their variability and shifting with respect to the purposes, creator
and audience of the proof. I claim, though, that investigating these will
not solve the issue concerning the relationship between informal proofs and
mathematical knowledge, due to still not appreciating the role of the knower
in the proving which has been emphasised throughout this chapter as a way
of casting off the problems facing the Traditionalist.
The proposal is that, in addition to the notions of formal correctness and
the ‘informal rigour’ of communal standards, we also investigate the notion
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of rigour as a virtue, analogous to intellectual thoroughness or meticulous-
ness but concerned specifically with mathematics. In this way, mathemati-
cal rigour will have a clear connection to mathematical knowledge through
proofs, as outlined above, as well as explaining how we can do rigorous
mathematics outside of proofs, namely by manifesting the virtue in other
mathematical activities. Let us examine the details of how this works for
the virtue approaches to mathematical knowledge.
Let us begin this time with the responsibilist, as the story here is more
straightforward. We can take rigour to be a mathematical virtue, that is,
rigour is an acquired character trait and excellence specific to mathematical
practices.11 As with other intellectual virtues, rigour will have a motiva-
tional component and a success component. The motivation is, in the ter-
minology of Zagzebski, to make cognitive contact with mathematical reality,
where this involves one’s proving and other mathematical work tracking the
relationships, contours and dependencies of mathematics, while avoiding er-
rors, substantial gaps and wrong turns. Success, of course, is success at
doing so, that your proving is in actual fact error-free, fallacy-free and gap-
free. Rigour is acquired in the sense that we need to train and habituate
ourselves to be rigorous mathematicians, through schooling, university and
ongoing practice, as discussed in the previous chapter in relation to Rylean
know-how. This is done both through learning the actual mathematical
facts and techniques themselves, as well as through constant feedback cycles
of what needs to be reasoned out versus what counts as a gap in reasoning,
with respect to a practical context we find ourselves in. We try to weed out
related vices of sloppiness, guesswork and unrigorous thinking in order to
avoid gaps, errors and leaps of reasoning.
Now there are two major worries that can be raised against the division
of rigour into the three components: formal rigour of derivations in formal
systems; informal rigour of communal conventions, standards and norms;
and rigour as a virtue (as I have introduced it). The two related problems
for the inclusion of rigour as a virtue are the following. Firstly, usual talk
of rigour does not seem to match up with it being a character virtue of the
sort described here, but rather is applied to proofs themselves. Secondly,
11We might want to take the virtue here to be ‘rigorousness’ instead of simply ‘rigour’,
to distinguish the character trait from the communal standards of rigour, but the point
is that these are not sufficiently robust to ground proofs, while I argue that the character
trait is and so should be taken as primary.
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the virtue as described above for the responsibilist directly relies on notions
of correctness, gaps and errors, for which one can argue we need to appeal
to the existing notions of rigour, making this third aspect redundant.
In response, it would certainly be wrong to deny that we do talk of
proofs themselves being rigorous or unrigorous. However, this does not rule
out that the character virtue is at play in such assessments. For example,
we also speak of proofs as being ‘creative’, ‘inventive’ or ‘ingenious’, all of
which are best understood as assessing the mathematician who authored the
proof in so doing. After all, to take a proof in the abstract to be creative
would be a category mistake, with the real meaning being that it displays
mathematical creativity. Even closer to the virtue of rigour, we can also call
proofs ‘meticulous’ without raising a fuss and, again, this seems to be better
read as saying that the proof shows the meticulousness of its author. We
should take the virtue of rigour to be of the same type as this, except with
a vitally important role to play in the connection between proofs, proving
and mathematical knowledge.
On the second objection, the point isn’t that the proponent of the virtue
of rigour needs to deny that there are a number of conventions and social
norms as to how we do mathematics and assess its correctness, or decide
whether something is an error or a substantial gap; certainly these do exist.
The point is just that these require an extra step to secure mathematical
knowledge, and that rigour as a virtue of mathematicians (or groups of
mathematicians) can make this step, thus is far from redundant. The way I
have laid out the proof as a record and guide to activity versus proving as
the activity itself, makes clear that the conventions of informal rigour apply
foremost to the proofs themselves while virtues will be more concerned with
the dynamics of the activity of proving. As such there are clear and definite
theoretical roles to be played for both notions.
Let us turn now to the virtue reliabilist account of rigour. To achieve
mathematical knowledge through a proof, one must deploy particular math-
ematical skills. Yet, for the reliabilist most skills require being reliable, but
in the case of reasoning we want the skills of mathematics to not lead us
astray and not permit fallacies, gaps and errors. Sosa discusses fallacious
reasoning in (Sosa 2007), with the example of affirming the consequent:
[...] what denies justification to the fallacious reasoner might
just be his carelessness or inattention or blundering haste. With
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rare exceptions, normal, rational humans do not affirm the con-
sequent when they are careful, attentive and deliberate enough.
[...] Fallacies can thus be viewed as performance errors charge-
able against the subject, by contrast with deliverances of a com-
petence. (Sosa 2007, p. 59)
The idea seems to be that rigour, as in being careful, attentive and deliberate
enough, is not some special competence which needs to be added at the
general level, but rather is already built into the reliability of the specific
skills being deployed in our reasoning. Rigour is present when the reasoning
is carried out correctly and not present when it goes awry. As such, by
Sosa’s way of speaking, rigour would not be a virtue itself, but rather a
necessary feature of certain mathematical virtues. The communal standards
of mathematics will set out criteria for correctness of moves in a proof, and
then a mathematician will have been rigorous just in case the deployment
of the particular moves are free from errors and gaps.
In summary, the responsibilist and reliabilist accounts might very well
come apart on the issue of whether rigour is a mathematical virtue, or
instead a condition on mathematical virtues. Either way, though, rigour
has an analysis in the virtue approach which does not rely on unattractive
appeals to formality and formal proofs, contra the Formalist-Reductionist
view.
5.7 Mathematical Understanding
Let us turn now to a third issue for which adopting a virtue-theoretic phi-
losophy of mathematics, in particular the Strong Proposal, can provide new
answers and interesting insights: the nature of mathematical understand-
ing.12 While still being a major concept of epistemology, understanding
seems to come apart from knowledge in numerous ways:
1. Understanding can come in degrees whereas knowledge does not.
2. Understanding is compatible with epistemic luck while knowledge is
not.
12One thing to be careful about is the fact that we can be said to understand many
different things, which might not be uniform in the properties that understanding amounts
to. For example, understanding German might be conceptually different from understand-
ing group theory, or indeed understanding a particular proof.
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3. Understanding may be non-factive, while knowledge entails truth.
The first and second claims are defended in (Kvanvig 2003, Ch. 8). The
third is the point made in (Elgin 2006) by focusing on the case of scientific
theories:13
[S]cience is riddled with symbols that neither do nor purport to
directly mirror the phenomena they concern. Purified, contrived
lab specimens, extreme experimental situations, simplified mod-
els, and highly counterfactual thought experiments contribute to
a scientific understanding of the way the world is. (Elgin 2006,
p. 213)
Considering the case of mathematics and mathematical understanding, one
can go either way on this. On one hand, one might think that there cannot
be the same disconnect between mathematical theorising and mathematical
reality, such that only true mathematical theories are the sort of things
one can understand.14 Indeed, this might fit well with a narrower view of
mathematics which focuses on pure mathematics and understanding proofs.
On the other hand, there are plenty of mathematical areas which permit
similar arguments to Elgin’s. I already touched on this while discussing
Rav’s Pythiagora thought-experiment, but mechanics, applied mathematics
generally and statistics all seem to make frequent use of modelling which
do not even purport to be literally true of the target phenomenon, but
nonetheless contribute to understanding. Given the broader conception of
mathematics used in the latter view, I see no reason to be unnecessarily
restrictive in taking understanding to be factive in mathematics generally.
So what is understanding? This is the big question in giving an account
of understanding and therefore fairly important if we want to give an account
of the more specific phenomenon of mathematical understanding. Speaking
loosely to get started, understanding seems to involve recognising patterns,
structures, relations etc. As Riggs puts it:
[U]nderstanding [...] is the appreciation or grasp of order, pat-
tern, and how things ‘hang together’. Understanding has a
13Worthy of note is that Kvanvig disagrees on this last item, seeing understanding to
be factive. I take Elgin’s point to establish that this is not correct.
14There are, of course, questions concerning what it is for a mathematical theory to be
true. I shall not engage with these deep and complex issues here.
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multitude of appropriate objects, among them complicated ma-
chines, people, subject disciplines, mathematical proofs, and so
on. Understanding something like this requires a deep apprecia-
tion, grasp, or awareness of how its parts fit together, what role
each one plays in the context of the whole, and of the role it
plays in the larger scheme of things. (Riggs 2003, p. 217)
While not being very exact, this certainly points to the kind of phenomenon
we are interested in. However, seeing understanding in this light adds two
further differences from basic accounts knowledge, traditionally conceived.
First, unlike knowledge, understanding does not obviously consist merely in
holding certain beliefs, whereas knowledge is normally taken to be justified
true beliefs plus whatever extra criterion one’s theory prefers to avoid Get-
tier cases. Second, when dealing with the standard cases of knowledge it
is assumed to be propositional, whereas understanding might well not be.
For instance, understanding might well involve diagrammatic representa-
tions which are not reducible to propositional content, something which is
particularly relevant for the case of mathematics where diagrammatic and
visual thinking are not uncommon (see Giaquinto 2015).
Mathematical understanding itself has not received a great deal of atten-
tion in the philosophical literature in comparison to mathematical knowl-
edge. Nonetheless, it does seem to be central in mathematics in practice.
For example, in (Martin 2015), Martin draws her title from the following
description by Andrew Wiles (famed for his proof of “Fermat’s Last Theo-
rem”, better called ‘Fermat’s Conjecture’ and now ‘Wiles’s Theorem’) of the
mathematical process of coming to understand new areas of mathematics:
Perhaps I can best describe my experience of doing mathematics
in terms of a journey through a dark unexplored mansion. You
enter the first room of the mansion and it’s completely dark. You
stumble around bumping into the furniture, but gradually you
learn where each piece of furniture is. Finally, after six months
or so, you find the light switch, you turn it on, and suddenly it’s
all illuminated. You can see exactly where you were. Then you
move into the next room and spend another six months in the
dark. (Martin 2015, p. 30)15
15Note the close similarity between this metaphor and the description of proving as
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Let us thus investigate how the two main strands of virtue epistemology
will be able to incorporate a theory of mathematical understanding in their
accounts of mathematics. To do so I will take as a starting point the main
account of specifically mathematical understanding in the literature, that of
Jeremy Avigad, as found in (Avigad 2008). Interestingly, the two strands
of virtue epistemology will come apart in whether or not they can take on
the position Avigad endorses, as I will show after a description of Avigad’s
account.
Avigad draws heavily on the later Wittgenstein to present an account
of mathematical understanding which is functionalist, in that he rejects any
spooky theorising about understanding as pertaining to our inner mental
lives, in favour of identifying understanding with the possession of particular
mathematical abilities. Mathematical understanding is also, according to
Avigad, closely connected to the ascriptions people make of mathematical
understanding, which coheres with the main thesis because he argues that
people ascribe understanding to each other just in virtue of their abilities to
perform a selection of relevant mathematical activities. As such:
[W]hen we talk informally about understanding, we are invari-
ably talking about the ability, or a capacity, to do something.
It may be the ability to solve a problem, or to choose an ap-
propriate strategy; the ability to discover a proof; the ability to
discern a fruitful definition from alternatives; the ability to apply
a concept efficaciously; and so on. When we say that someone
understands we simply mean that they possess the relevant abil-
ities. (Avigad 2008, p. 321)
As can be seen in the quote, Avigad readily moves between talking about
understanding and talking about ascriptions of understanding. The picture
is complicated somewhat by the fact that understanding is ascribed on the
basis of a whole selection of interrelated abilities: for understanding a proof,
Avigad lists eleven different abilities, any combination of which someone
might have in mind when ascribing understanding— and the list isn’t even
meant to be exhaustive. The point, of course, is that understanding comes
in degrees and so won’t have some exact formula. Rather, the Avigadian
account will be that understanding amounts to a cluster of abilities:
journeying through the mathematical landscape given in the previous chapter.
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The claim I am making here is simply that the terrain we are
describing is best viewed as a network of abilities, or mechanisms
and capacities for thought. (Avigad 2008, p. 326)
Beginning with the virtue reliabilist version of the Strong Proposal, there
is a great deal that fits well with Avigad’s account of understanding. In
particular, the virtue reliabilists take the virtues to be stable, reliable skills,
faculties, competences or abilities. Putting the theory in terms of abilities,
as noted above, is exemplified by Greco in (Greco 2010), taking knowledge
to be true belief caused by intellectual abilities. As such there is a clear
parallel between Greco’s account of knowledge and Avigad’s account of un-
derstanding.16 Thus, it is an available and attractive option for the virtue
reliabilists to adopt an Avigadian line on understanding, since this would
draw on the same source in abilities to explain both mathematical knowledge
and understanding while simultaneously explaining their distinct features.
Mathematical knowledge consists in the true beliefs which result from intel-
lectual abilities; mathematical understanding consists in the possession of
a broader but related network of abilities. Focusing on proofs once again,
knowledge is obtained by using one’s mathematical abilities to present rea-
soning from premises to a conclusion, while understanding comes in degrees
relative to how many additional surrounding abilities the mathematician
possess: abilities to explain, generalise, re-formulate, formalise etc.
Turning to virtue responsibilism, Zagzebski has a great deal to say about
understanding that will be relevant to mathematical understanding. Indeed,
she quotes Moravcsik on what it is to understand a proof:
What is it to understand a proof? It cannot be merely being
able to reproduce it, or to know what it is, or to know lots of
truths about it. [...] What elevates the above to understanding
is the possessing of the right concepts, and the intuitive insight
of the connection that makes the parts of the proof to be the
proper parts of a sequence. (Moravcsik 1979, p. 55). Taken
from (Zagzebski 1996, p. 47).
Zagzebski uses this to point towards an agreement with Kvanvig (and the
line we saw in Riggs) that understanding amounts to grasping structures
16Greco does mention understanding, following the Kvanvig line that understanding
amounts to a knowledge of causes, broadly construed.
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and patterns of “a whole chunk of reality” (Zagzebski 1996, p. 46). A
main point she develops also in (Zagzebski 2001) is that understanding in-
volves the grasp of structures that are not necessarily propositional. As
mentioned previously in section 5.3.2, understanding for Zagzebski sits be-
side knowledge as making cognitive contact with reality, thereby expanding
the domain of epistemology on the virtue account to include such contact
with non-propositional structures too. This certainly seems desirable in the
case of mathematics, to account not only for diagrams but also the fact that
understanding does seem to involve the more holistic features of seeing how
mathematical theories, concepts, proofs, definitions and methods fit inside
large structures.
As to the Avigadian picture, the Zagzebskian view will not fit anywhere
near so well as the reliabilist could. While certainly the responsibilist view
Zagzebski defends will hold that understanding entails certain abilities, it
will not endorse the functionalist leanings which have Avigad rejecting talk
of the inner mental life. Instead, the account is one on which we see under-
standing as coming through intellectual character virtues making cognitive
contact with mathematical reality. For example, the mathematician might
understand a proof by possessing insight into the whole structure and how
it fits together as described by Moravcsik above. Hereby the responsibilist
can also reject the conflation between understanding and ascriptions of un-
derstanding, such that the ascriptions do not take on the same importance
they did in the Avigadian picture.
5.8 Case Study: Mochizuki and the abc Conjec-
ture
In this section I will give a case study one of the most fascinating current
episodes in mathematics, that of Shinichi Mochizuki and his controversial
proof of the abc conjecture. In it we will see the explicit presence of virtue-
theoretic terminology in mathematical practice, thus enriching and exem-
plifying the account given above. I shall begin by setting out some of the
background and details of the case, after which I will draw on Mochizuki’s re-
flections on the status of his proof in order to show that the virtue-theoretical
approach is also the most effective explanation of the controversy surround-
ing it. Indeed, this case has not finished playing out: there is at the time
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of writing no settled consensus of whether the proof will be accepted by the
community or not. However, I don’t think this matters to the point I am
making with it: whether or not the proof is accepted as correct or some
irreparable error or gap is found, the clearest and best explanation of what
is going on in the controversy is the virtue-theoretic one.
Some background: the abc conjecture, otherwise known as the Oesterle´-
Masser conjecture, can be stated as follows:
abc conjecture For every  > 0, there are only finitely many triples (a, b, c)
of coprime positive integers where a+b = c, such that c > d1+, where
d denotes the product of the distinct prime factors of a ∗ b ∗ c.
So, to give an example, try the triple (5, 8, 13) which are coprime positive
integers and form the sum 5+8 = 13. The distinct prime factors are then 2,
5 and 13, so then d = 2× 5× 13 = 130. So for this choice of c and d, c < d
and thus for all  > 0 we have that c < d1+, meaning this is not going to be
one of the finitely many exceptions.17 The general mathematical interest of
the conjecture lies in the huge number of consequences it has in establishing
other theorems.
At the end of August 2012, Shinichi Mochizuki uploaded four papers
containing a decade’s worth of his solitary work developing ideas on ellip-
tic curves in what he calls Inter-Universal Teichmu¨ller Theory, known as
IUTeich for short. In particular, one result this leads to is a proof of the
abc conjecture. The problem is, however, that a huge amount of material is
covered in the run-up to the proof—fifteen hundred to two thousand pages
of dense technical work, or down to five hundred if one is already an ex-
pert in anabelian geometry— and in it Mochizuki has developed a whole
new area of mathematics with its own terminology, structuring, deep ideas,
novel tools and original ways of thinking. As such, the proof has still not
been widely accepted because nobody has been able to independently pen-
etrate and understand the proof.
After an initial wave of excitement, both within mathematics and from
the media such as in (Ball 2012), the daunting task of reviewing and verify-
ing the proof became clear. While Mochizuki is described as forthcoming in
responding to emails from other mathematicians, he has as of yet not lec-
tured on his work outside of Japan, which has created quite a large barrier
17If we were trying to find an example of one of these exceptions, choosing our c as
prime would’ve been a pretty poor starting point.
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to acceptance by the wider mathematical community. As a result, there has
been some frustration towards the proof and aimed at Mochizuki himself,
such as in (O’Neil 2012) and with further examples given in (Castelvecchi
2015). At the end of 2015, a workshop was held in Oxford to try to get a
larger group familiar with the central themes of Mochizuki’s work and the
general structuring of the proof of the abc conjecture, with some success and
other fresh expressions of frustration, such as are given in (Knudson 2015)
and described in detail in (Conrad 2015). The nature of the surrounding
controversy, then, concerns the correctness of the proof and the respective
duties in the verification process of both the originator of the proof and the
community at large who have to carry out this verification.
One could say a great deal about this situation following the template
set out for the Moderate Virtue Proposal above, focusing on the virtues and
vices both of individuals and the mathematical community at large that have
lead to the difficulties in communicating and verifying the proof. For exam-
ple, we could look at the balance required between intellectual autonomy in
developing new mathematics and the collaborativity in bringing others along
with you. However, the virtue proposal can be of even greater benefit in
examining Mochizuki’s own reflections on the status of the proof and its ver-
ification. In response to the widespread discussion about the difficulties in
verifying the abc proof, Mochizuki has produced two reports on his personal
endeavours in trying to disseminate and communicate the proof (Mochizuki
2013, 2014). What is of particular interest to us is that Mochizuki’s opin-
ions on what it will take for others to verify his proof appeal directly to the
characters and motivations of those doing the verifying. It is not so common
or straightforward to find mathematicians’ opinions and reflections on their
practices without a pre-established philosophical agenda.18 As such, the fact
that on this occasion—where a significant mathematical break-through is at
stake— the language and ideas are unmistakeably virtue-theoretical seems
to be worthy of note, and furthermore offers the opportunity to demonstrate
the effectiveness of a virtue-theoretic philosophy of mathematics.
Let us examine what Mochizuki has to say in some detail. The central
contrast Mochizuki is trying to draw is between his collaborators, who he
has worked through the proof with and now seem to have agreed on the
18We might be less concerned here about Mochizuki’s obvious mathematical and per-
sonal agenda, since this does not seem to automatically introduce a philosophical bias.
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correctness of his work (namely the three mathematicians Go Yamashita,
Mohamed Sa¨ıdi and Yuichiro Hoshi), and the detractors in the mathematical
community. Ultimately, the point that he seems to want to make is that the
level of verification performed by the former group should be sufficient to
satisfy the community at large:
[T]he verification activities on the part of the three researchers
discussed above already exceed, by a quite substantial margin —
i.e., in their content, thoroughness, and meticulousness — the
usual level of refereeing for a mathematical journal. (Mochizuki
2014, p. 7)
[I]t seems to me that the degree of meticulousness and attention
to detail exhibited in the verification activities [...]— which, as
noted above, exceed, by a substantial margin, the scope of a
typical referee’s report for a mathematical journal — together
with the wealth of refereeing experience of Yamashita and Sa¨ıdi
[...] should be regarded as lending quite substantial weight to the
extremely positive evaluation that I received from both of them
in the course of these activities. (Mochizuki 2013, p. 4)
In both cases, observe how the concern is with the thoroughness and metic-
ulousness involved in the checking of the proof. I take these to be a main
component of the virtue of rigour, as the responsibilist would put it, as
described above. Mochizuki thus directly links whether or not we know a
proof is correct to these aspects of virtuous behaviour and character. Fur-
thermore, he insists the following plausible point about offering up opinions
on mathematical work:
[T]he essential significance of such an opinion concerning IUTe-
ich lies [...] in the issue of whether or not the opinion reflects
a rigorous and appropriate mathematical understanding of the
topic under consideration. (Mochizuki 2014, p. 13)
Note again the discussions of the rigorousness of the understanding involved
in the evaluation of the proof. Importantly, the not-so-veiled criticism of
the detractors of his work is that they lack the motivation and dedication
required to properly engage with the mathematics, because of the following
claimed feature it has:
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Yamashita warned that if you attempt to study IUTeich by skim-
ming corners and “occasionally nibbling” on various portions of
the theory, then you will not be able to understand the theory
even in 10 years; on the other hand, if you study the theory
systematically from the beginning, then you should be able to
understand it in roughly half a year. (Mochizuki 2014, p. 2)
The upshot is that the normal approach of searching for overlap with prior
knowledge they possess and thereby assimilating the new results won’t work,
according to Mochizuki. In order to be able to pass a substantial judgement
on the proof, one must have a proper and full mathematical understanding
of the way it works. The way he puts this point is:
[E]very researcher in arithmetic geometry [...] throughout the
world is a complete novice with respect to the mathematics sur-
rounding IUTeich, and hence, in particular, is simply not quali-
fied to issue a definitive (i.e., mathematically meaningful) judg-
ment concerning the validity of IUTeich on the basis of a “deep
understanding” arising from his/her previous research achieve-
ments. (Mochizuki 2014, p. 9)
This quote fits very well with the virtue reliabilist approach: the suggestion
being that the researchers who are failing to penetrate the proof are lacking
the necessary skills and expertise for grasping the proof or judging its valid-
ity. Indeed, Mochizuki’s opinion is that established skills may actually be a
hindrance:
[T]he most essential stumbling block lies not so much in the need
for the acquisition of new knowledge, but rather in the need for
researchers (i.e., who encounter substantial difficulties in their
study of IUTeich and related topics) to deactivate the thought
patterns that they have installed in their brains and taken for
granted for so many years [...] (Mochizuki 2014, p. 11)
We might translate this to the moral that skills in one mathematical domain
do not automatically transfer to another, nor are they guaranteed to gener-
ate knowledge there. Equally, the talk of “deactivating thought patterns”
is also clearly linked to the virtue of open-mindedness, in that one should
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be flexible in one’s thinking and not reject new mathematics because it is
hard, unfamiliar or requires learning new ways of thinking.
Mochizuki also adds more general allusions to the virtues of his colleagues
and the link between these and correct mathematics. For example, he refers
to the “serenity” of Sa¨ıdi’s demeanour (p. 3) , as well as the “exception zeal
and teamwork” of all three (p. 15).19 The best quote has been saved for
last though:
[...] I have always been a strong advocate of the need, in the
case of both domestic and international interaction activities, to
maintain a humble stance dedicated to uncovering the ultimate
truth of things (Mochizuki 2014, p. 14)
Not only does this echo the Stallings quote, in that arriving at mathemat-
ical truths requires one to set aside ego, personal excitement and fear, but
furthermore it explicitly acknowledges the role of humility as a virtue which
directly benefits mathematical inquiry.
So here is the main point that is illustrated in looking at this case.
Adopting a virtue-theoretic perspective towards mathematics, as I have been
advocating in this chapter, allows us to give the best account of what is
going on in the controversy in general and Mochizuki’s perspective on it in
particular. The issue is one of the division of labour between the creator of
a proof and those who have to check it. Critics, believe that a major part
of mathematics and mathematical proving is the communication of your
results to others. For example, O’Neil says:
It only constitutes a proof if I can readily convince my audience,
i.e. other mathematicians, that something is true. Moreover,
if I claim to have proved something, it is my responsibility to
convince others I’ve done so; it’s not their responsibility to try
to understand it (although it would be very nice of them to try).
(O’Neil 2012)
19I should state again that I don’t have a horse in this race. However, if one is concerned
about the correctness or success of IUTeich, it seems like zealotry on the part of its
proponents might well be counter-productive in comparison to open-mindedness or the
humility I will come to momentarily. Similarly, the fact that they are working as a team
with Mochizuki might well be seen to detract from the earlier suggestions that they are
suitable evaluators of the correctness of the theorems.
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For Mochizuki, the view is that the unusually large body of work required
for the abc proof, and its novelty, difficulty etc., requires a corresponding
increase in effort to understand and corroborate the results. The virtue
interpretation offers the following analysis of the problems on both sides.
For Mochizuki, as we have seen, the verification of the proof will require
immersion in the theory of IUTeich rather than the application of previous
knowledge to get to an understanding. To be properly immersed, according
to Mochizuki, requires a mathematician to be strongly motivated and vir-
tuous in a number of other ways, say through serenity, humility and rigour,
which will be necessary for the verification of IUTeich and the abc conjec-
ture. Conversely, in demanding so much from his referees, opponents can
make the case that Mochizuki has breached a social convention of doing
all one can to make the understanding of a new theorem smooth and pain-
less. They could argue that this shows a deficit of virtues of communication
and collaboration, or worse that there are vices in play in making the the-
ory impenetrable. Either way, there are huge barriers to understanding for
even the practitioners who are actively engaging with the theory, placing
epistemic limits on what they can get out of the proof.
In summary, while the controversy is one concerning the verification of
a potentially ground-breaking contribution to mathematics, the best way to
explain the details of the case is to appeal to the epistemic and mathematical
virtues needed in coming to understand a proof.
5.9 Conclusion
In this chapter I have defended a virtue-theory for the philosophy of math-
ematics, in terms of the Moderate and Strong Proposals:
Moderate Proposal Virtues and vices of mathematicians will be relevant
to mathematical knowledge.
Strong Proposal Virtues and vices of mathematicians will be explana-
tory of mathematical knowledge. In other words, virtue epistemology
should be adopted to give the correct epistemology for mathematics.
Not only do these provide a robust and plausible account of mathematical
knowledge, but I have shown that these offer rich and fruitful answers to
other major related issues in the philosophy of mathematics. In particular,
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I have shown that both virtue reliabilists and virtue responsibilists can do
better than the Formalist-Reductionist approach in dealing with the nature
of proofs and rigour. Indeed, the virtue approach is a natural companion
for the switch of emphasis from proofs-as-objects to proving-as-an-activity
which I have also been advocating. Furthermore, deploying virtue episte-
mology has the potential to be bountiful as a major school of thinking in
mathematical epistemology. Not only are there well-motivated extensions of
the central ideas presented here to the many other ways of gaining mathe-
matical knowledge, those the Traditionalist trend of thinking widely ignores,
but additionally the virtue approach expands the relevant epistemological
concepts which can be accommodated in our theorising, as I have shown in
the previously under-explored area of mathematical understanding.
One thing I have not covered is the Radical Proposal:
Radical Proposal Virtues and vices of mathematicians explain mathe-
matical knowledge and extend to provide alternative answers to other
kinds of questions in the philosophy of mathematics, e.g. those con-
cerning ontology, access, metaphysics etc.
The difference was that the Strong Proposal aims to remain neutral on a
great deal of traditional philosophy of mathematics and would fit comfort-
ably alongside it. For example, different stances in previous debate might
still help to settle how it is that contact with mathematical reality is possi-
ble, something which has been left open above. In the Radical Proposal the
role of virtues is meant to extend beyond the realm of epistemic concepts
such knowledge, understanding and proof, to also provide a new set of an-
swers to traditional questions, potentially in direct conflict with a greater
range of the literature. Expanding on how such a project could go, however,
would require a great deal of further work, while embroiling us in many more
controversies.20
20One view which could be fairly amenable to being adopted to a Radical Proposal-
style virtue mathematics would be a mathematical version of Peregrin’s inferentialism
(Peregrin 2014) (which builds on work by (Sellars 1954) and (Brandom 1994)). Peregrin
offers us a broad picture of inferentialism, intending to give an account of meaning in
terms of inferential role. He covers both inferentialism in logical systems, defining logical
constants through their inference rules, and inferentialism in natural language, seeing
meaning as deeply related to rules of usage which over time come to have normative force
through corrective behaviour. Peregrin does not engage with the difficulties of informal
mathematics, but one could propose the application of his inferentialist theory of natural
language (rather than that of formal logic) to the mathematical case. This would allow
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To conclude, then, let me emphasise that in many respects the virtue-
theoretic approach to mathematical knowledge is a grand departure from
orthodox thinking in mathematical epistemology. Nonetheless, what I have
shown is that there are interesting and novel answers which it can give to
both traditional questions and the difficulties coming out of the philosophy
of mathematical practice, difficulties which threaten to undermine a great
deal of the orthodox conception anyway. While virtue epistemology is now
receiving major attention as a theory of epistemology, it has hitherto not
been adopted in the realm of mathematics, leaving an unexplored gap. What
I have done here is to begin mapping out some of the terrain of this bountiful
new land.
us to incorporate a virtue-theoretic perspective in that we could tie the correctness of
practices to the behaviours and virtues of the agents participating in making the rules
normative. This would also be radical, in our sense, in that the meanings of mathematical
terms would come down to the rules for their manipulation. One might term a view like
this game informalism, where the acceptable moves are tied to the virtues of agents and
their communities. Again, a great deal of additional work would need to be done to make
it tenable, but it does not seem that we should rule out the possibility of having answers
to questions of ontology in mathematics be secondary to a theory of virtue.
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Conclusion
In the last three chapters, I have put essentially the same strategy to use
three times to make progress on three different topics. The strategy has
been one of showing that there is some significant open area of philosophical
questions pertaining to proofs, then connecting it up to an existing literature
to demonstrate that there are resources to draw on to answer them. Firstly,
I argued that the difficulties encountered in relation to mathematical con-
cepts can draw on recent work in conceptual engineering. Secondly, I argued
that the important shift in what we consider to be the important knowledge
in mathematics should build on the literature on knowledge-how, particu-
larly anti-intellectualism. Finally, I presented an account of mathematical
knowledge, proofs and rigour which was based on virtue epistemology. The
moral to draw here is that the philosophy of mathematical practice is not
alone. While the ‘maverick’ approach of studying mathematical practice is
doing something new in the arena of the philosophy of mathematics, I have
shown that there is no shortage of allies in philosophy more broadly.
In the first chapter, I presented a new argument for the failure of the
Formalist-Reductionist view of informal proofs, based on a dilemma between
agent-independence and agent-dependence, as well as an overgeneration ar-
gument to the effect that the Formalist-Reductionist’s picture of how the
correspondence between informal and formal proofs justifies rigour and cor-
rectness is incompatible with there being many substantially different and
equally good formal correspondents for a given informal proof. What the
argument brings out is the fact that if the account of informal proofs that
the Formalist-Reductionist offers is so dependent on the correspondence be-
tween informal proofs and their formal counterparts then the details of how
they are matched up matter, and as it turns out these details do not support
the claims being made.
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In the second chapter, I showed that Beall and Priest’s arguments that
paradoxes about the notion of informal provability lead to the conclusion
that mathematics is inherently inconsistent were unsuccessful. The central
criticism I had of these arguments rejected the premise that all of math-
ematics could be straightforwardly formalised. I suggested that this was
too simplistic to be true, and that ways of filling it out that are accurate
pictures of the formalisation process no longer support the dialetheist argu-
ments. In particular, I suggested that formalisation is a complex procedure
which might lead to many different results, rather than the single super-
system that the argument depends on. Priest uses Go¨del’s results to claim
that the trade-off between the axes of completeness and consistency will
favour completeness, but I instead argued that we need to see a third axis
of formality to properly evaluate the arguments.
In chapter 3, I investigated the relationship between proofs and math-
ematical concepts. I first compared the ideas underlying Waismann and
Shapiro’s notions of open texture, showing the difference in the phenomena
they are intended to pick out. Next, I worked through Lakatos’s Proofs
and Refutations in detail, looking at how proofs develop the concepts that
feature in them according to Lakatos’s dialectical philosophy of mathemat-
ics. I took a strong stance on the correctness of different interpretations
of Lakatos’s view of the role of formal proofs, favouring the interpretations
of Davis & Hersh and Larvor over those of Worrall & Zahar and Corfield.
However, from this discussion it emerged that there was a significant open
question for dialectical approaches to philosophy of mathematics concerning
the role of formal results, proofs, theories and methods as they are used in
modern mathematics. After a brief sojourn showing that several Lakatosian
ideas were also found earlier in the overlooked works of Kneebone, I ar-
gued that one of the big morals we should draw is that mathematical con-
cepts do display open texture. In the latter half of the chapter I turned to
the literature on conceptual engineering as it applies to the development of
mathematical concepts. I mainly concentrated on two different proposals,
those of Haslanger and Scharp. I deployed Haslanger’s distinction between
manifest and operative concepts for the mathematical cases of set-theoretic
foundations and the difference between formal and informal proofs. I then
discussed Scharp’s replacement strategy as it works for solving the tension
between formal methods and informal mathematics.
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The purpose of chapter 4 was to link the literature in epistemology on
knowing-how to the arguments by Rav that the important mathematical
knowledge is embedded in proofs. I argued that the thought-experiment
of Pythiagora was fine for Rav’s motives of emphasising the importance of
proofs, but that his idea of what would happen in such a scenario was incor-
rectly pessimistic. I argued that a better alternative picture would emphasise
the interrelation between the methods, techniques and know-how in proofs
and the propositional truths of mathematics. I reviewed the literature on
knowledge-how and knowledge-that, covering Ryle, Stanley & Williamson,
Hornsby and Wiggins, arguing against the Intellectualist position, and ar-
gued that Wiggins’s picture of the interdependence of knowledge-how and
knowledge-that fits best with case of knowledge of proofs. I backed this
up with discussion and examples of mathematical knowledge-how and its
importance in mathematical practice. I examined Lo¨we & Mu¨ller’s con-
textualist account of mathematical knowledge, which employs the idea of
mathematical know-how as skills, but showed that ultimately it does not
succeed because it allows one to know some mathematical fact while believ-
ing the opposite. Finally, I examined Larvor’s view of informal proofs as
depending on inferential actions and expanded on the importance for a view
of mathematical knowledge to prioritise proving as an activity over proofs
as objects.
In the final chapter, I proposed a virtue-epistemic account of mathemat-
ical knowledge. I suggested three different levels of engagement with the lit-
erature on intellectual virtues, and argued in favour of the Strong Proposal,
that virtue epistemology is the best account of mathematical knowledge. I
demonstrated that this view does better than the Formalist-Reductionist
family of approaches in accounting for mathematical knowledge through
proving, the nature of rigour and mathematical understanding, while also
naturally generalising to other types of mathematical knowledge. I also gave
a case study of Mochizuki’s proof of the abc conjecture, showing the fruitful-
ness of deploying virtue theory in the philosophical study of mathematical
practice.
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